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Due to the level of response to the special issue topic,
the Journalof Sociology & Social Welfare does not contain
any book reviews this issue. This section will return in
our September 2011 issue.

Thinking about Peace, Conflict, and War:
An Introduction to the Special Issue
Special Editors

SONDRA

J. FOGEL

University of South Florida
DANIEL LIECHTY

Illinois State University

This special issue had humble beginnings. As a matter of
fact, odds were stacked against it, especially given that the
original plan for this topic was for a panel discussion based
on submitted work to the 2009 Society for the Study of Social
Problems (SSSP) Conference. However, not one abstract was
received for this topic. I found this quite curious and alarming since at that time this country was engaged in two wars,
there was continuous media coverage around "terrorist" activities, and we were experiencing frequent changes to our
daily routines based on new security measures. Anti-war protestors were growing silent. It has been said that "sometimes
no action is an action." The lack of peace talk, or discussion of
ending conflict and war was shocking-at least to me.
I am old enough to remember Vietnam. I remember the protests and hearing plans from older "boys" to cross to Canada. I
remember the activism on college campuses across the county
from students organizing and shouting their views. I remember the news reports showing the destruction and disruption
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2011, Volume XXXVIII, Number 2
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of everyday lives. I remember the picture of the young girl
running naked down the barren street of her town after being
burned by the explosion of a bomb. I remember all of this
vividly ... and this was at a time when there was no internet or

instant access to images from cell phones or web-cameras.
Given these experiences and adding many more that have
occurred over the last 30 or so years, I still think about peace.
What would it look like? Can we ever achieve it? Why is there
so much conflict and war? What stops us from peace? When
I shared the news with my colleagues at the SSSP that I did
not receive any abstracts for the proposed session on Peace,
Conflict and War, I was heartened to hear encouragement
from my colleagues and Robert Leighninger, the Editor of
this journal. He offered to print a note to readers requesting
that they write about this topic. From this note, Dan Liechty
emerged as a fellow thinker on this topic. Together we proposed a special issue on the topic of peace, conflict and war
that was accepted by JSSW.
Our call for papers went out last year. The responses were
slow to trickle in, making us wonder even more about the
silence surrounding this topic. Another email blast went out to
various academic disciplines, including peace studies departments. Manuscripts came pouring in towards the end of the
submission period. Through a peer-review process, Dan and I
selected diverse, and perhaps unconventional, scholarship for
this special issue.
The contributions included in this collection cover a broad
range of material, which we present in thematic pairs. The first
essay introduces the topic and invites readers into a reflective
and philosophical consideration of the subject. Michael Allen
Fox notes that too often our reflexive understanding of peace
actually presupposes the priority of war and conflict as constants, with peace as an absence of war, or at least in contrast
to war. Fox challenges us to be more creative in our concept of
peace, approaching peace as an imaginative concept in its own
right, quite apart from our customary pairing of peace with
war. As we do this, many of the commonplaces about human
nature and social institutions are called into question, which in
turn yields a clearer picture of the hidden trade-offs we make
by supporting war and war preparations.

Thinking about Peace, Conflict, and War
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The pair of essays following Fox's article draws attention
to concrete experiences in global peace work. These essays serendipitously prove to be very timely in the context of world
affairs. First, Joseph G. Bock highlights some of the unanticipated partnerships, alliances and programs that have emerged
as human service focused NGOs have gradually contoured
their guiding philosophies toward peace and justice concerns
in the wake of the passing Cold War era. Then Shaazka Beyerle
examines the connections between political and economic corruption that occur in areas of armed conflict and military government. This corruption is felt at the popular level as a basic
denial of human rights and freedom. This type of oppression
has been successfully ameliorated through movements of civil
resistance and grassroots efforts to combat corruption.
The next pair of essays focuses on peace education and
activism within academic institutions. One of the byproducts
of recent U.S. political history has been a pervasive identification with patriotism and militarism among the populace. One
result of this is that military recruiters have been given a degree
of access to adolescents not seen for an entire generation. Scott
Harding and Seth Kershner report on efforts to challenge such
access through organized counter-recruitment programs in
secondary schools. Following this, Eric Swank and Breanne
Fahs describe their studies to better understand and articulate
the complexity of factors involved in decisions of undergraduate-level social work students to become politically engaged in
antiwar activism.
The next two contributions focus generally on the issue
of religion and conflict. As these essays are written from the
perspective of advocate-believers, it might surprise some that
they were chosen for inclusion in a journal of social sciences.
Therefore, a bit of explanation is in order. Each is worthy in its
own right. However, pairing the two yields, we believe, even
more than the sum of the parts. Whereas many in our society,
and even in the academy, may associate the Islamic faith with
coerced religious conformity and Buddhism with high levels
of social tolerance, these essays drive home the point that
in concrete historical situations, both of these religions have
served to justify coercion and violence, as well as peace and
social tolerance. In both of the articles, the authors, Liyakat
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Takim, who looks at Islam, and Masumi Hayashi-Smith, who
addresses Buddhism, suggest that the deepest and original
"core values" of the religion grow out of and support attitudes
of peace, pluralism and social tolerance. However, through
sudden or gradual co-optation of the religion by the governing powers, both religions lent themselves to interpretations
supporting warfare, coercion and social intolerance. In each
of these essays, the author makes the case for concerted disentanglement of the religion from the legal and political assumptions of state and government, and to once again allow
believers' attitudes and ethics to be contoured by the original
core values of the religion. Social observers will notice in these
essays the emergence of concepts and ideas that directly echo
the experiences of other great religions, especially of western
Christianity which became the religion of state and subsequently transitioned into institutions within democratic societies in which religion and state are formally, legally and constitutionally separated. Most specifically, we see the employment
of an historicist hermeneutic for reading sacred texts which
retains the communal authority of the text itself while simultaneously criticizing the ossification of particular interpretive
traditions around the text.
The contribution of S. Elizabeth Snyder was chosen to end
this collection because this essay brings together many of the
themes present throughout the collection. The summary vision
of this collection is that we must transition from being cultures
of war into becoming cultures of peace. Elizabeth Snyder contends that German society, in conscious reaction to its significant role as a perpetrator of war during the 191 and 20 centuries, developed a deep vein of antimilitarism among its people
and a sincerely held desire to create a culture of peace. At the
same time, Germany also endeavored to maintain itself as a full
and active member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
This entailed significant commitment to maintaining a military
force and relatively high levels of military spending. While
these competing social trends of becoming a culture of peace
and maintaining NATO involvement coexisted successfully,
if at times uneasily, during the time when NATO focus was
primarily within the European Theater, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain as NATO, at the prodding primarily
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of the U.S., is expected to supply troops and treasure for wars
in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. There is clear evidence of
open dispute between those in German society who seek to
continue movement in the direction of a culture of peace and
those who want to see more dutiful support for NATO and
its U.S.-led policies. Snyder's essay ends, in effect, posing to
German society the ancient perennial question. "Quo vadis?"
Where are we heading? Will we move forward in creating
world cultures of social peace and tolerance, or will we lose
ground and continue to be defined by forces of fear, militarism
and war?
Although social scientists are rightfully hesitant in much of
their work to step out of their roles as objective observers and
into the roles of advocates, in terms of the question Snyder's
essay poses-of whether or not we move forward toward
building a culture of peace-we are all actively engaged and
the role of (disinterested) objective observer seems mightily
out of place.
Thus, we end this collection with a commentary by Michael
D. Knox. Knox's credibility and reputation as a social science
researcher has been firmly established over a long career, yet
Knox has now clearly and unapologetically moved into the
role of peace advocate. Employing his wealth of knowledge
about human social processes, Knox outlines the very concrete
steps being taken by a peace advocacy organization he leads
to raise the profile of peace education in the U.S. Whether or
not readers feel animated by Knox's particular project, his
work reminds us that as social scientists we do not live in a
vacuum. Our accumulated professional knowledge places an
even greater burden of responsibility on our shoulders than
would otherwise be the case.
This special issue of The Journalof Sociology and Social Welfare
is conceived and offered in the expectation that we can move
forward toward greater social peace and tolerance, as citizens
of our respective nations, as world citizens, and as a collective
species.

Thinking about Peace Today

MICHAEL ALLEN

Fox

University of New England
School of Humanities

Discussing peace-and how to get to and maintain situations,
practices, and socio-political structures that build peace-is of
the greatest urgency. But the first step, both psychologically and
epistemologically,is overcoming preoccupationwith war and resistance to thinking about peace. This article takes on these problems
and lays essential groundworkfor substantive discussion of peace.
Attractions of war and myths of war are deconstructed,and negative views of humans' capacityfor peaceful behavior are examined
and rejected. Wide-ranging costs of war and war-preparednessare
also exposed. The value of peace is then discussed. A concluding
section offers a list of "home truths" (beliefs that invite universal
assent), from which constructive reflection on peace might begin.
Keywords: peace, peace-building,war,resistance,peaceful behavior

The Obstacle of War
Some of the best thinking about humans as social and political beings has been devoted to peace. But a far greater amount
has undoubtedly been devoted to war. Indeed, war hovers,
like some abstract entity, just beneath the surface of daily life
and, tragically often enough, occupies the surface itself. Even
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2011, Volume XXXVIII, Number 2
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when war is not "hot" in some geographical area near you, it
consumes many resources while biding its time and exercising
its metaphorical presence-as in the sentence just phrased. War
appears in everyday discourse not just as a metaphor but even
as a model for conscientious action. Campaigns to improve
the human lot, for example, are often characterized as: "war
on poverty," "war against climate change," "war on hunger,"
"1war against HIV/AIDS," "war on child abuse," and so on.
Over the past few years, the "war on terror" has been on the
front page and the evening news more or less daily, and this
ill-considered concept has licensed a spectrum of illegal and
immoral behaviors, from systematic lying by elected leaders
to the dark excesses of Abu Ghraib and Guantinamo, which
are comparable to wartime crimes of the past (Cortright, 2008).
Think you've heard it all? You haven't. Surfing the crest of the
war on terror wave, the Civil Aviation Authority of Australia
now declares "war on error" (Marchbank, 2009), an educational "roadshow" aimed at reducing pilot mistakes.
War is free for the taking in lots of ways. Some say that in
contrast, peace has to be "sold," that there is a problem of "marketing peace" to those who know little and maybe think less
about it, or else are just downright skeptical of the idea. Why
should there be a problem of this kind? It seems absurd. But
let's accept the premise and see where we can go from there.
Peace scholar David Cortright remarked that: "Throughout
history the cause of peace has been on trial, standing like a
forlorn defendant before the court of established opinion,
misunderstood and maligned on all sides" (Cortright, 2008,
p. 1). Cortright's reflection suggests that the answer to the
"why" question posed earlier can be framed as follows: Peace
is an unfamiliar and poorly understood concept and reality.
Perhaps it has been too seldom experienced-or in the case of
some people, hardly tasted at all. Learned observers note that
there have been fewer inter-state wars in recent times; that democracies do not go to war with one another; and that war as a
useful extension of national policy and means of pursuing political objectives is a thing of the past. Perhaps so, but this does
not prevent wars from occurring in abundance, and increasingly they are intra-state civil wars, guerrilla-led insurgencies,
explosions of ethnic violence, criminal power-struggles, and
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proxy wars. However, as war historian Jeremy Black cautioned,
It is possible that low-intensity warfare will be that
which is most common in the future, but, equally,
across much of the world there is no effective restraint
on the ambitions and activities of states, and the
continued combination of issues over which to dispute,
and bellicose leaderships, may lead to serious levels of
warfare between regular forces. (Black, 1998, p. 235)
Since war is such a familiar part of human life, past and
present, and peace, by contrast, occupies the shadows, it
follows that in order to think about peace, we first have to get
past thinking about war. This requires us to move beyond some
pretty formidable and influential ideas. These are, for example:
that war brings out the best qualities in men; that it is a "manly
art"; that it makes men out of boys; that a nation comes of
age through armed conflict, its defining moment being some
famous battle or a particular war; that the most honorable way
in which one can serve one's country (or group) is by shedding blood for it. Such ideas have not served humanity wellrather, just the opposite. They have led us blindly into more
and more wars, genocides, arms races, and ultimately, to the
constant state of war-readiness we find ourselves in today-a
kind of unending war, as some observers have called the situation. Wars have cost our species and the planet hugely both
in terms of their casualties and other consequences and the resources consumed by war-preparedness. What is it all for? Are
we stuck forever within cultures of violence? Do we lack the
intelligence, will, moral fiber, and sense of world community
to find better ways of conducting our affairs? Is it in our genes
to be warriors? Is there something specifically wrong with
how males are constituted or socialized that leads to war? Are
there forces in history with their own irresistible momentum
that bring about periodic clashes? Or, on the other hand, are
there perhaps many valuable templates already in existence for
building relationships, negotiation strategies, trust, and modes
of behaving that can provide alternatives to war and even terrorism? As Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd pondered in
2008, on the ninetieth anniversary of Armistice Day, "...is war
our permanent condition? Must every generation go through
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war to be reminded why there should be no war? Or can we
dare to do something different, can we dare to think something
different?" (Rudd, 2008). The questions pile up like the dead
and maimed that humans continue to produce in warfare.
Many have raised these questions and more, wondering
whether humans are fatefully warlike and locked into perennial cycles of mortal combat. To be sure, no one can claim to have
complete answers to the deep questions about war because
abundant areas of uncertainty still persist in our knowledge
about our own species. Even if we could gather together all of
the world's psychologists and psychiatrists, it is unlikely they
could explain everything we need to know in order to create
a world free from war and violent conflict. But we can try to
move forward with the insights we've achieved and the tools
we have for understanding and promoting the factors that
make peace possible, with the aim of stimulating new and different thought and feeling processes that may promise better
choices than those made in the past.

War Myths
In keeping with the commitment to examine and move
beyond barriers that block thinking about peace, it will be
useful to expose some myths. Of course myths alone do not
explain war. A monocausal account could never do justice to
the complexities of war, and no attempt will be made here to
provide a comprehensive explanation of why wars occur. This
would be an entirely different and far more ambitious project.
But, whatever else might be said about war, it lives in the
domain of myth, and this applies both to the factors that help
bring it about and to those that create and sustain ideas such
as that of the "demonic enemy." As psychologist Lawrence
LeShan pointed out, war brings about a shift from the normal
or "sensory mode" of perceiving reality to a "mythic mode"
(LeShan, 1992) with a logic of its own. Journalist Chris Hedges,
who has reported on-the-scene from numerous wars, explained
this "logic":
The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its
destruction and carnage, it can give us what we long
for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for
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living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does
the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives
become apparent. ... And war is an enticing elixir. It

gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble. And
those who have the least meaning in their lives ... are

all susceptible to war's appeal. (Hedges, 2003, pp. 3-4)
Looking back at his own experience of war's addictive
allure, Hedges added: "The chance to exist for an intense
and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion,
seemed worth it in the midst of war-and very stupid once the
war ended" (Hedges, 2003, p. 5).
War also thrives on symbolism and imaginative associations, and it has been remarked, in this vein, that: "Wars commence in our culture first of all, and we kill each other in euphemisms and abstractions long before the first ... missiles

have been launched. ... The deformed human mind is the ultimate doomsday weapon ... " (Thompson, as cited in Zwicker,

1983, p. 7).
It is partly these myths and subconscious connections to
which Black referred when he observed that in studying wars,
past or present, "Rather than focusing on individual conflicts,
it is more important to understand the values that made compromise unacceptable, force appear necessary and even desirable, and war seem crucial to identity and self-respect" (Black,
1998, p. 242).
According to the first and most prominent myth about war
the history of humankind is equivalent to the story of great
deeds done by famous rulers and leaders (mostly men) and the
wars they have prepared for and fought. Peace, viewed from
this standpoint, consists of the dull, uneventful periods in
between wars that are unworthy of investigation. Aside from
begging questions about the nature of peace, peace as a desirable goal, and avenues by which to reach a peaceful world, this
outlook neglects the positive phenomenon of peaceful everyday interactions that predominate among humans (Fry, 2007;
Tomasello, 2009), as well as the perspective that history cannot
be written without reference to the actions and ways of life of
average people throughout the ages.
Second, there is the myth that wars solve human problems
and advance interests more effectively than other kinds of
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engagements. The fact that wars are recurrent should by itself
show that (with a very few, debatable exceptions) they do not
solve problems, or at best, do so only temporarily and partially, while sowing the seeds for nationalism, inter-group hatred,
revenge-seeking, defective political arrangements and boundaries, and therefore, for future conflict. At the end of the day
communication, respectful coexistence, and sometimes even
forgiveness and reconciliation, are the only ways to bury hostilities with finality. As one social scientist observed, "What all
wars have in common is the unmistakable moral lesson that
homicide is an acceptable, even praiseworthy, means to certain
ends" (MacNair, 2003, p. 51). But following this go-nowhere
teaching can only yield negative feedback: aggression begets
more aggression, violence, more violence, and war, more war,
if they remain unchecked by negotiation and nonviolent resolution. Surely bitter experience has taught us that there is no
"war to end war"-or has it?
A third, associated myth is that wars-or "military actions"
that perpetrators seek not to have thought of as wars, invasions, or acts of aggression-are undertaken (always) in defense
of shared ideals and a cherished way of life. On the contrary,
historical examples show that in warfare, economic, class, and
other factors are often front-and-center, and that private political aspirations, the jingoism of particular interest groups, and
various ideological factors are rife. While it is simplistic and
one-dimensional to argue that in all wars the poor and disadvantaged serve the interests of the rich and powerful, a stark
slogan from the First World War-"A bayonet is a weapon
with a worker on both ends"-makes us wonder whether this
perspective embodies a significant grain of truth. Widespread
opposition to, and public demonstrations against, the Vietnam
War and the Iraq War, both in America and abroad, also bring
into focus the question of whose values, interests, and political
judgments were driving these conflicts.
The preceding paragraph may put one in mind of a fourth
myth, expressed in the belief that traditional notions of a
just war can still be defended today. While just war theory
has a long and distinguished career, to be sure, in the age of
aerial bombardment, and nuclear and other contemporary
weapons, killing has become actually and potentially more

Thinking About Peace Today

21

indiscriminate, making the concept of "just war" highly
tenuous. And because, as mentioned previously, warfare
not only promotes actions that would be considered clearly
immoral in any other context, and frequently serves vested
interests of one kind or another, it may turn out that just war
theory will itself become either a casualty of philosophical critiques (Francis, 2004) or at least an extremely restricted category for rationalizing armed conflict (Lucas, 2007).
Fifth, there is the myth that human nature is inherently
aggressive and warlike. A widely-held theory claims that war
"has played an integral role in our evolution." Specifically,
"[t]he theory ... suggests the cooperative skills we've had to

develop to be effective warriors have turned into the modern
ability to work towards a common goal" (Holmes, 2008, p. 8).
Some might infer that such a view is perhaps merely another
vaguely disguised glorification of war, a coopting of our peaceful instincts by a view about our inborn (biologically determined) aggressiveness. However, it would be facile to draw
these conclusions, given that the theory stems from research
findings in a number of fields that tend toward a consensus.
More importantly, the outlook under consideration tells us
that although cooperative tendencies evolved from warlike
ones, they have taken on a life of their own and thus play a
real, independent role in human affairs. Looking at the theory
in this way helps us avoid endorsing the fallacious belief that
how things once were tells us how they will be, ought to be,
or even must be. What has occurred or might have occurred
during the ancient (and not so ancient) past life of our species
is a very unreliable and not necessarily desirable guide to how
things might or should be, either now or in the future. The
premise for the statement just made is that humans are capable
of choice, rational reflection and analysis, and hence also of
change. Unless one accepts some form of rigid determinism,
no biological or anthropological account can provide everything we require in order to understand the past or plan for
the future. Not only this, but humans are showing every sign
of being able to control their own future evolution. ("Being
able" does not, of course, entail that we are yet willing to take
on the task in a responsible manner, and to use this potential
wisely.) While some aspects of human nature may be relatively
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constant, our species is noteworthy for having reinvented
itself many times over. As recent brain research on "neuroplasticity" keeps demonstrating, humans are not so "hard-wired"
into stereotypical patterns of thinking and response as many
suppose (Doidge, 2007; Eliot, 2009).
A century ago, William James, psychologist, philosopher,
confirmed pacifist, and proponent of the idea that humanity
exists in a state of unending war, confidently proclaimed-as
if it were a truism needing no argumentative or empirical
support: "Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone
and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it
out of us" (James, 1987/1910, p. 1283). But as we've seen, this
view is now being challenged on both historical and scientific grounds. And if recently proposed revisions to Darwinian
theory prevail, the previously scorned idea that "environment
can alter heredity" may eventually take hold (Burkeman, 2010),
opening up new possibilities for changing human behavior for
the better-if we so choose.
We can now begin to see more clearly that evolutionary
traits revealed in the human past do not license inferences
about the inevitability of war and other forms of violent conflict in the future. The claim that "war is in our genes," therefore, should be rejected. Leaving aside possible supplements
to the theory of natural selection, a growing body of empirical research tends toward the conclusion that, even if humans'
evolution into peaceful beings is not guaranteed, it's equally
evident that war cannot simply be rationalized as a kind of
"biological compulsion" (Horgan, 2009). Furthermore, inasmuch as belief in the inevitability of something tends to make
that thing inevitable (a self-fulfilling prophecy), we need to be
on guard against any such belief, for it negates humans' decision-making capacity and consequently the ability to change
the course of events in which they are involved. Immanuel
Kant, the brilliant Enlightenment philosopher, entertained the
theory that:
war itself requires no particular motivation, but appears
to be ingrained in human nature and is even valued as
something noble; indeed, the desire for glory inspires
men to it, even independently of selfish motives.
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Consequently, courage in war (among American Indians
as well as during Europe's chivalric period) is judged
to be of immediate and great worth not only during
war (as is reasonable), but also in order that war might
be, and often war is begun only as a means to display
courage. As a result, an intrinsic worth is bestowed on
war, even to the extent that philosophers, unmindful of
that Greek saying, 'War is a bad bet because it produces
more evil people than it eliminates,' have praised it
as having a certain ennobling influence on mankind.
(Kant, 1983/1795, p. 123; emphasis original)
This is a very perceptive and interesting blend of two views:
the belief that humans are innately warlike and the idea that
war has the magic transformative power to actualize the finest
aspects of human nature. Kant concedes a certain amount of
truth to both views, but it is of much greater importance to
notice that the context in which he discusses them-his famous
essay on "perpetual peace"-builds a strong argument on
behalf of a rational arrangement of mutual interest by which
nations can abolish war.
We needn't be frightened, then, of the theory that war has
developed cooperative skills in our own (and closely related)
species. Let us assume that war has done so, rather than
struggle resignedly against admitting the possibility. Many
other activities have also undoubtedly co-developed these
same skills. And the conclusion we ought, therefore, to reach is
that maybe the route we have followed to this end is in some
ways unfortunate, but the cooperative skills now exist and can
be used and developed further in new settings. In this respect,
as in many others, the future doesn't have to resemble the past,
with ourselves as mere passive and despairing onlookers. It
can, on the contrary, be consciously, conscientiously fashioned
by us, and this gives grounds for hope that we will do so.
Looking again at Kant's comments, we can see that they
confirm the claim (also found in the observations by Hedges
cited in the previous section) that war produces a strong sense
of common purpose and solidarity. This assertion should
not be dismissed lightly. It was acknowledgment of this fact
that motivated James to introduce the important idea of a
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"moral equivalent of war" (James, 1987/1910), that is, some
participatory activity or activities that are capable of yielding
the same beneficial outcomes for humanity as war does. While
James' and Kant's accounts expressed the masculinist bias of
their times, they nevertheless made an important point, and
ongoing research is providing evidence about alternative
activities that produce the rewards and emotional outlets often
attributed to war (MacNair, 2003). But in the end, the question
remains whether, for the vast majority of humans of both sexes
(the dead, injured, maimed, and all noncombatants), this is the
most relevant issue. Furthermore, given the fragile state of the
world today and the costs of war, one group of psychologists
remarked that "peace cannot wait until all the data are in"
(Winter, Christie, Wagner, & Boston, 2001).
Another perspective that tends to foster pessimism about
our species' warlike nature is Freud's theory of the "death
instinct." With an intellectual lineage deriving from Empedocles
in ancient Greece, this formulation first appeared in Freud's
(1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle and was developed in
several subsequent works. Most of Freud's early students and
followers rejected the theory, with the notable exception of
Melanie Klein, but renewed interest in it has been stimulated
by French psychoanalysts Jacques Lacan and Jean Laplanche.
Philosopher Richard Boothby, an expert on Lacan, argued that
the death instinct is "the darkest and most stubborn riddle
posed by the legacy of psychoanalysis" (Boothby, 1991, p. 1).
In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" Freud
(1964/1937) argued that there are "unmistakable indications
of the presence of a power in mental life which we call the
instinct of aggression or of destruction according to its aims,
and which we trace back to the original death instinct of living
matter" (p. 243). The death instinct entered the scene primarily
to explain neurosis, masochism, certain kinds of dreams, and
other phenomena as surrogate forms of self-punishment or
self-eradication, and human psychic life came to be understood
as the site of a struggle between "Eros" (the life instinct) and
"Thanatos" (the death instinct). Eros includes impulses that
"seek to preserve and unite," and the death instinct those that
are motivated by hatred and "seek to destroy and kill." Yet
Freud insisted that each is equally "essential" to our makeup
(Freud, 1964/1933, p. 209).
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Which tendency will triumph? Freud eventually postulated
that the death drive threatens to overwhelm the life drive in
each of us (rather than the reverse, or some state of equilibrium
being reached). Against this background, he saw civilization
as the somewhat precarious process whereby humans learn
to sacrifice raw expression of instinctual drives in favor of
stability, sociability, and the rule of law. Instinctual energies are
channelled into other avenues of endeavor, and although social
disintegration and war are constant disruptive tendencies
within the human condition, Freud paradoxically envisioned
the possibility that we all may even become pacifists one day
(Freud, 1964/1933).
Freud's death instinct has not gained much traction in
psychoanalysis and the social sciences, but it certainly appears
to have passed into the everyday and literary imaginations
as a way of capturing our predicament, and references to a
"collective death wish" are not uncommon in popular culture.
This is entirely understandable in view of the persistence
of warfare and violence as means of settling disputes and
conflicts of various kinds, dealing with offences and exacting
revenge, nefarious strategies for advancing interests, and the
like; the manufacture and proliferation of high-tech weapons
and weapons of mass destruction; and the burgeoning of
cultural products concerned with death, destruction, torture,
the symbolism of death and aggression, and so on. One might
likewise be forgiven for pondering a collective death wish
given the neglectful behavior of human beings toward their
own kind, and our abuse of other species, the environment,
and the planet as a whole.
Whether the idea of a universal death instinct in humans
belongs within the realm of fact or fantasy, I shall not judge
here. However, as even Freud himself realized, we must
resist entrapment by its deterministic tone; we can only act
meaningfully when we choose our own destiny as a species,
and this entails addressing and taking charge of both the best
and the worst in us. Once again, this insight beckons us toward
the study of peace as an alternative pathway.
The Costs of War

The devastating effects of war in the modern world need
little elaboration, nor does the non-productivity of aggressive
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violence on the individual and group levels. But it may help
to place the present investigation of peace in perspective if
we confront a few facts and figures. To start with, as Cortright
(2008) correctly argued, "the permanent mobilization for war
that emerged in the wake of World War II reinforced the predisposition of political leaders to use military force and created
greater institutional capacities to intervene in the affairs of
other countries" (p. 155). Superpowers and other major powers
among nations have followed this route numerous times in the
postwar decades, because adherence to militarized policy has
"devalued diplomatic approaches" (Cortright, 2008, p. 123).
War-preparedness is very costly and it inspires the mindset that: "we've paid for all this stuff, so we'd better use it" (to
justify the cost to taxpayers and legislators); or: "we might as
well use it" (because it can be used, needs to be tried out, and
so on). During the Cold War, there was also the motivation to
"use it or lose it," exacerbated by fears of a nuclear first strike.
This arguably caused much of the stress and social anxiety of
that era, for leaders and citizenry alike, although fortunately
the ultimate weapons were never deployed.
Annual global military expenditures in 2009 were reliably
estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute at 1.53 trillion U.S. dollars. This represents a six
percent increase in real terms over the previous year and a
forty-nine percent increase since 2000. Nearly half of the world
total is accounted for by the American defense budget. In
contrast, the entire budget of the United Nations is a pitiful 1.8
percent of the world military expense total (Shah, 2010b). This
is the "big picture" cost of war-preparedness. Meanwhile, the
gross disparity between the world's rich and poor continues,
and is appalling by any measure. Peace and development
activist and author Vijay Mehta observed that: "This emphasis
on militarism stands in sharp contrast to the social deficit of
humanity. Almost half the world's people live in abject poverty"
(Mehta, 2006, p. 1). It is easily concluded that diversion of a
substantial portion of the massive military costs borne by
nations today into solving global problems of living by means
other than the use of deadly force and threats is money better
spent on finding solutions to our common security issues. With
specific reference to the United States, the National Priorities
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Project, an Internet resource, invites viewers to see how tax
dollars spent on defense (including weapons development)
could alternatively be allocated to socially beneficial programs,
nationally, by state, by congressional district, and by city, town,
or county (National Priorities Project, n.d.).
There is also the "big picture" cost of actual warfare. As
can readily be seen, this cost is wholly disproportionate to
the investment in human well-being that good sense would
prescribe, and opens up a seemingly all-consuming, bottomless
pit of financial burden. The U.S.-led wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have had 1.26 trillion dollars allocated to them in
the period up to March 4, 2011 by the U.S. federal government
(National Priorities Project, n.d.). This unfathomable sum
does not include: costs to other countries participating in the
Coalition; costs borne by individual taxpayers, servicemen
and women and their families; loss of government services
traded off against military expenditures; and future costs
such as medical care for veterans and interest on the national
debt incurred by deficit financing (National Priorities Project,
n.d.). Nor, of course, does it include all the many costs to the
Iraqi and Afghan peoples; to neighboring countries that have
had to deal with refugees and other spillover effects; and
the collateral damage that is intangible, difficult to verify or
quantify, and far-reaching, such as increased hatred and anger
toward the U.S. and its allies, the use of Iraq as a terrorist
training arena, assaults on civil liberties and international law,
fanning the flames of other conflicts, aggravation of personal
risk in international travel, and so on. It is typical of warfare
to have a large range of costs (including unintended ones) and
"invisible," intangible effects that unroll for decades afterwards
(Tyner, 2010).
One of these "invisible" or little reported, little considered
effects is that on women and children, who traditionally bear
many of the costs of war. An example comes from the civil war
that has torn apart the Democratic Republic of Congo since
August 1998. Although "the world's deadliest conflict since
World War II," as one observer put it (Shah, 2010a, p. 1), this
horrible war is "forgotten" by most of us, notwithstanding the
involvement of seven countries, and a toll to date of 5.4 million
dead and 1.5 million people internally displaced or made
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refugees. While children comprise nineteen percent of the
population, they represent forty-seven percent of the fatalities
(Beaumont, 2010; Shah, 2010a). In addition, "thousands upon
thousands of women, girls and children ... suffer brutal sexual

violence, which is the worst in the world, the UN says" (Rice,
2008, p. 19). Rape is one of the most universal and egregious
forms of human rights violation during periods of armed
conflict, women and children having always been regarded as
among the spoils of war and as instruments for humiliating
the enemy (Jones, 2010).
A second example concerns Israel's invasion of Gaza that
began in late December 2008. In this operation over 1,400 people
were killed, a large majority of whom were noncombatants, and
more than 5,300 were injured. In excess of 5,000 homes were
destroyed or severely damaged, another 16,000 "moderately
damaged," and subsequent importation of essentials "has been
insufficient to meet the needs of the 1.5 million people trapped
inside the Gaza Strip" (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,
2009, p. 13). Estimates of total damage range up to two billion
U.S. dollars and above. The United Nations Committee on the
Rights of the Child has recently stated:
In particular, the Committee is deeply disturbed by
the psychological effects on children in Gaza resulting
from [Israel's 2008-09] Operation 'Cast Lead' and the
lack of assistance for these children. The Committee
is furthermore concerned over the lack of adequate
programmes for rehabilitation of children who have
been victims of anti-personnel mines. (United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2010, point 37)
Amore general finding is that: "Among the consequences of
war, the impact on the mental health of the civilian population
is one of the most significant" (Murthy & Lakshminarayana,
2005, p. 25) with children, not surprisingly, standing out as especially vulnerable.
Another background effect of war--collateral damage to
victor and vanquished alike-is the lingering impact upon
veterans. Up to twenty percent of service personnel returning from present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suffer from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but even more alarming

Thinking About Peace Today

29

is the fact that nearly sixty percent of those treated at veterans'
hospitals are veterans of a war that ended over four decades
ago. "Even as Vietnam veterans now enter their 60s and begin
to die off," it is reported, "the number seeking P.T.S.D. treatment is growing" (Winerip, 2009, p. 2). Leaving aside the monetary cost of veterans' payouts of all kinds (around 44.7 billion
dollars in 2009), one can easily see that a terrible price is being
paid by those who fought and still fight these wars.
A final example of the easily ignored or overlooked effects
of war is its environmental impact. According to geographer
Joni Seager, "Militaries are the world's biggest environmental
vandals, whether at war or in peace. ... [Tjhe environmental

costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the
costs of war" (Seager, 1995, p. xi). But beyond generalities, consider briefly the Gulf War (1990-91). Saddam Hussein's Iraqi
forces deliberately "dumped approximately one million tons
of crude oil [from Kuwait] into the Persian Gulf"; and "Crude
oil was also spilled into the desert, forming oil lakes covering
50 square kilometers. In due time the oil percolated into underground aquifers" (Enzler, 2006, p. 1). The effects on wildlife,
sea-dwelling food sources, and human health were predictably vast. Meanwhile, Coalition air attacks on Iraqi installations released quantities of nerve gas into the Tigris River, and
"Soon after the ceasefire was signed, U.N. observers declared
this salient river dead" (Thomas, 1995, p. 123). At the time, it
was reported that bombing campaigns in Iraq "consume 12
million gallons of fuel a day," and that the amount of bombs
dropped on Iraq and Kuwait "is generally believed to exceed
what was used in all of World War II" (Kifner, 1991, p. 1). In addition to obvious military targets, "Croplands, barns and grain
silos were ... attacked, along with irrigation floodgates that

caused vast incursions of seawater into southern Iraq, killing
crops and permanently salting farmland" (Thomas, 1995, p.
124). A group of scientific researchers, in the conclusion of their
article, noted simply that "The Iraqi occupation and the subsequent armed conflict devastated the terrestrial environment of
Kuwait" (Omar, Briskey, Misak, & Asem, 2000, p. 336).
The preceding account provides only a minute slice of the
actual or suspected environmental damage resulting from this
war. Recovery and rehabilitation of regional ecosystems have

30

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

been long-term processes and some good outcomes have been
claimed (Omar, et al., 2000; Brauer, 2009). In the larger context,
there are ongoing discussions in the literature aimed at defining accountability for ecological damage in wartime and developing guidelines that will help limit negative environmental consequences in military operations (Austin & Bruch, 2000;
Brauer, 2009). It is important to observe here that the issue
is not whom we should blame for starting a particular conflict; who did the most damage; whether recovery and rehabilitation are viable after technologically advanced warfare; or
whether national policies to restrict environmental destruction
in wartime can be framed (in the spirit of just-war doctrine).
The point is that war and a healthy planet are incompatible
states of affairs.
Ron Paul, a Texas Republican congressman, physician,
and U.S. Air Force veteran, has written that: "The cost of war
is always more than anticipated. If all the costs were known
prior to the beginning of a war, fewer wars would be fought"
(Paul, 2005, p. 1). This assessment may be too optimistic, as
it assumes a level of rationality tragically often bracketed out
of the equation that leads to war-making. Nevertheless, Paul's
conclusion that: "Most wars could be avoided with better
diplomacy, a mutual understanding of minding one's own
business, and respect for the right of self-determination" (p. 1)
shines forth as a truth we would all do well to memorize and
implement.
Why We Need Peace
Given the level of violence in the world today, as well as
the waste of resources and human potential that war and preparations for war represent, there is an acute need for peace everywhere. War and preparations for war are bad for all living
things-socially, economically, environmentally, and in terms
of survival and basic well-being. To say that war is bad for us
is one thing; to say that peace is good for us is another. Some,
but not all, will regard the latter, as much as the former, as
obviously true. I hope this essay will have shown it to be so.
Nothing can be lost, however, and much is to be gained, by
briefly reviewing why we need peace.
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One way to pursue this goal is to invoke the perspectives of
"negative peace" and "positive peace," as they are commonly
called. My argument is that we can readily discern the benefits
of peace under both of these headings. Negative peace refers
to the absence of war and violent hostilities. This includes or
may include the cessation of armed conflict, the ending of territorial occupation, the withdrawal and decommissioning of
armaments and armed forces, arms limitation treaties, amnesties, and the like. Negative peace offers relief or freedom from
war, which is an essential prerequisite for the resumption and
continuation of everyday life. Clearly, negative peace, if maintained, offers the benefits of security, repatriation, rebuilding,
and reconciliation. It doesn't take peace scholars, though, to
make people realize that this is only part of the story, and this
is where positive peace comes into the picture.
Positive peace signifies the domain of options afforded by
negative peace and what can be accomplished therein. We may
call this "real peace" because it embraces all the processes and
projects out of which a better world can emerge. Perhaps it
will be objected that to speak of a peaceful world as a better
world begs the question whether peace is a preferable state of
affairs. Against this, however, it must be observed that peace
offers many benefits that war and preparation for war grossly
stunt or eliminate, and that rational choice would clearly seem
to favor. Examples are: replacement of tension-driven rhetoric
by less alienating and more constructive forms of discourse;
greater scope for developing healthy, cooperative relations
among nations and peoples; the chance to improve national
infrastructures, education and other human resources; the
prospect of dismantling forms of structural violence (such as
poverty, hunger and political repression) with greater energy
and the redirection of effort to matters of equality and equal
opportunity; the chance to focus more carefully on environmental issues and even to exploit the potential for evolving
international environmental cooperation as a means to build
sustainable global peace; the opening up of space for personal
transformation (so-called "inner peace"); and in general, the
encouragement to think about alternative ways of coexisting
that have not been thought of or tried out before. Peace is not
an easy path, for very entrenched psychological traits and
habits stand in the way, but the rewards are worth the effort.
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The Appeal of Peace

Historian Michael Howard wrote: "Peace may or may not
be 'a modern invention' but it is certainly a far more complex
affair than war" (Howard, 2000, pp. 1-2). If so, then it may be
that peace needs to be "sold" after all, if only in the sense that
informing ourselves concerning what peace is and might be
all about is the first step toward achieving a peaceful world. In
keeping with this objective, I close with a series of observations
labelled "home truths," which I hope will reinforce the reflections on why we need peace offered in the previous section.
Specifically, these statements are intended to be expressions
of common sense that invite a more detailed consideration of
peace by each of us.
Home Truths
* All members of our species (not to mention other
species) have a common interest in survival.
* Humans have survived evolution thus far because
of their social skills (including caring and nurturing
behavior) as well as communication skills, rather than
because of their aggressive and violent tendencies.
* Security (a sense of safety and a positive quality
of life) is a common interest of all human beings.
Nationally, security signifies territorial integrity, the
preservation and flourishing of certain values and
ways of life, as well as self-sufficiency in defensive
strategies and economic, energy, and resource matters.
At the personal level, security embraces a safe and
healthy natural and social environment, well-being,
a decent standard of living, meaningful employment,
adequate housing, freedom of expression, participation
in decision-making processes that affect one's life, and
for children, being loved, looked after, and educated.
* In a rapidly changing, "globalized" world, the
vulnerability of every individual, group, and nation is
increasingly apparent. Given that security (on various
levels) is desirable, reducing levels of vulnerability
becomes a paramount goal.
* If we (no matter whom the word "we" designates)
have basic security needs, then it is fair to assume that
this is also true of everyone else (every other "we,"
whether a loose collection of individuals, an identifiable
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group, or a nation). In a global community, such as the
one that exists today, security cannot be unilaterally or
militarily assured; it must be a project of reciprocity.
* It is better (easier in practice, and more effective,
economical, and conducive to mutual security and wellbeing) to realize one's interests and achieve one's goals
by nonviolent rather than by violent means. It is better
to avoid or prevent violent conflict than to manage or
resolve it after the fact, just as it is better to prevent any
kind of damage than to repair it.
* True security entails attempting to remove or reduce
the causes of war and violent conflict, many of which
are well-known or obvious, even if not equally well
understood. Forexample:poverty;historicalinequalities
and injustices; colonialism; lack of access to resources;
abuse of power; unfair trade practices; unsustainable
development; unethical exploitation of markets and
foreign economies; violation and undermining of
international law; lack of trust; aggressive foreign
relations; proliferation of weaponry; inability to see
beyond narrow self-interest or national interest; and
lack of cooperation in defining and solving common
problems.
* Armed conflict cannot continue indefinitely without
destroying that for which we are fighting. In the end,
it must give way to communication and learning how
to coexist. Focusing on the latter processes instead of
the former is less painful all around and offers greater
positive benefits to all concerned.
* Notwithstanding what we constantly imbibe from
the media, everyday human life is largely based on
peaceful transactions, which, in normal circumstances,
we build upon, either instinctively or deliberately.
Pondering the above statements and others like them might
just help clear a space within which a constructive conversation
about peace can occur-one that invites all interested persons
to become involved therein. Either we will end war and preparations for war or they will end us. Ending them, therefore, is
not just a choice, it is also an imperative. Discussion of what
peace is, or could be, and of how we can obtain it must therefore be kept at the forefront of public dialogue and discussions
of social welfare.
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Humanitarian Aid and the Struggle
for Peace and Justice:
Organizational Innovation after a Blind Date
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Humanitarian organizations working in developing countries
have gone through a transformation since the thaw of the Cold
War. Their increased programming to promote justice and peace
has resulted in disparate partnership configurations. Illustrative examples of these configurations show how organizational
deficiencies and challenges have spawned innovation. These innovations provide insight about how similar organizationsmight
usefully be engaged in the struggle to promote greater justice
and peace in areas of the world suffering from violent conflict.
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Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and those that struggle for justice and peace have been developing various forms of partnerships at an accelerating rate.
Two developments have fostered this partnering. The first is
the greater awareness that humanitarian aid can have both
positive and negative impact on tensions of the host country
population. The second development is the increased funding
by donor governments and multilateral organizations for
conflict-related programming. For example, U.S. Agency of
International Development (USAID) created the Office of
Transition Initiatives (though this office has focused mainly
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on providing in-kind support to indigenous NGOs). More recently, USAID created the Office of Conflict Management and
Mitigation as a part of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance. These branches of USAID provide
funding for conflict-related programming.
In this article, I describe some of the reasons behind the collaboration of disparate types of organizations and some of the
challenges they face. I then present five examples of organizational innovation that, together, provide insights about how
configurations might be developed for effective programming
that combines humanitarian aid with the promotion of justice
and peace in developing countries.
Evolving Organizational Imperatives
For years, the objectives of humanitarian aid (such as providing food, potable water, and plastic sheeting after a flood)
and conflict transformation (such as training moderate religious leaders in anti-incitement or political leaders in negotiation skills) were distinct and separate from each other. Many
humanitarian NGOs were created in the wake of World War
II, and the Cold War between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States followed shortly thereafter. In
a Cold War context, conflict transformation was viewed as too
"political" for humanitarian organizations which prided themselves on that impartiality. Conflict transformation NGOs, on
the other hand, tended to utilize a relatively narrow repertoire
of methodologies, namely mediation techniques. Humanitarian
NGOs with an explicit conflict transformation agenda (focusing substantially on promoting justice and peace in addition to relief and development), such as Mennonite Central
Committee, were both atypical and modestly funded. The
larger humanitarian NGOs such as CARE, Save the Children,
and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), generally speaking, sought
to maintain their neutrality with a rationale that it was their
role to help the victims of conflict and the purview of diplomats and politicians to prevent or stop wars from happening.
This division of humanitarian from justice and peace programming changed gradually over the years following the
thaw of the Cold War. Skirmishes between groups within
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nation-states allied with the respective superpowers became
an anachronism while conflict between those of different identities (related to ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, tribe, or
a combination of these), including instances without external
encouragement and support, grew in frequency. No longer
were humanitarian NGOs kept at a distance from conflictrelated programming by the "high politics" of the Cold War.
Rather than encountering rebels or paramilitary factions fighting in "proxy wars," humanitarian NGOs were faced with internal and regional conflicts. These consisted of one identity
group pitted against one or more others in a bloody contest
for control, or of regional "warlords" with powerful armies
pursuing enormous financial gain, skillfully pitting one group
against another, often by enkindling or inventing ancient enmities related to past injustices (Rudolf & Rudolf, 1993). Local,
national, and regional disputes erupted without the influence
of bi-polar superpower politics. It became clear that aid itself
was often political and partisan, or perceived as such, when
victims of conflict and other disasters of one identity group
received support when others did not, or arrangements were
made with groups perpetrating violence as a way of securing
safe passage for relief supplies (otherwise known as "corridors
of tranquility"). Humanitarian NGOs found themselves in the
middle of disputes between people of different identities that
were fueled by "grievance," "greed," and "failure of the social
contract" (Korf, 2005; Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). A position
of standing in the background was no longer morally tenable.
In addition, humanitarian NGOs experienced an urging from
donors to become involved in conflict transformation, sometimes with diplomatic support in the corridors of political
power providing some leeway for programmatic inventiveness and assertiveness.
At the same time, humanitarian NGOs began looking critically at how their aid impacted inter-group tensions. For instance, some had distributed food aid for decades. They began
an introspective process of asking why people did not have
enough food and what could be done to change agricultural
and trade policies that would bring about greater food security. Many supported the "Do No Harm" initiative (Anderson,
1999), which sought to distill lessons learned about how to
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not inadvertently exacerbate tensions with humanitarian assistance. Some humanitarian NGOs took this evolution a step
further and developed free-standing conflict transformation
projects aimed at addressing such contentious matters as land
disputes.
Organizations and Challenges
There are five main types of entities that have engaged in
various organizational configurations to promote justice and
peace internationally. These are international humanitarian
NGOs, advocacy-oriented peace and justice NGOs, serviceoriented peace and justice NGOs, for-profit contractors, and
academic entities (such as peace institutes or programs at universities). Each type of organization, on its own, faces challenges that can conceivably be addressed by some form of
partnership with one or more of the other types of entities.

InternationalHumanitarianNGOs
Large international humanitarian NGOs have budgets in
the hundreds of millions of dollars, programs in as many as
110 countries, and thousands of expatriate and national staff
members. They typically encounter high staff turnover and
frequent reassignment, which makes being "learning organizations" difficult. Some of the larger ones develop their own
technical support units. CRS, for instance, has a Program
Quality and Support Department. But even when such a unit
is created, staff turnover and transfers are disruptive to institutional memory, especially when major disasters pull people
into emergency responses.
Peacebuilding technical support staff members are often
under pressure to do monitoring, evaluation and proposal
writing, the projects of which are often funded by government
donors like the USAID or by multilateral institutions like the
United Nations' Development Program, or a combination of
the two. This constrains the membership of their learning communities, because of their specialized terminology and acronyms. Engaging outsiders, including academics, is awkward
due in part to this specific vocabulary.
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Advocacy-Oriented Justice and Peace NGOs
Those NGOs that focus on justice and peace advocacy
typically have offices in Washington, DC, New York, or Brussels,
Belgium, or all three, to cultivate policy changes with the U.S.
Government, the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the United Nations (UN), or the European Union. These
organizations face daunting challenges in raising money from
individuals. At a meeting of the Peace and Security Initiative,
a collaborative effort of foundations and NGOs focusing on
foreign policy issues, it was acknowledged that NGOs involved
exclusively in research and advocacy on foreign policy issues
are overly reliant on foundations,' and foundation grants tend
to be fickle. They typically last between one and three years.
Foundations often expect unrealistically that these NGOs will
have sustainable funding after the grant funding discontinues.
What this means in practice is that advocacy-oriented justice
and peace NGOs will typically survive only if they develop
multiple foundations to support them, along with other major
donors (usually private individuals).
It is important to keep in mind that it is much easier to raise
money for humanitarian relief and development than it is for
advocating for policy change. As a result, advocacy organizations do not typically have the funding for programming that
can lay an educational foundation upon which to build a critical mass of involved citizens.
Service-OrientedJustice and Peace NGOs
In contrast to advocacy-oriented justice and peace NGOs,
those that provide conflict transformation services, primarily
in mediation, are more apt to develop sustainable funding by
charging fees. An example is Collaborative Decision Resources
Associates, based in Boulder, Colorado. It provides negotiation
support to foreign governments, federal government departments, state governments, and Native American tribes.
The challenge service-oriented justice and peace NGOs
face is in getting an adequate amount of steady business to
remain financially solvent. Financial survival sometimes requires that a few core staff members are on the payroll while
others are pulled into projects on an as-needed basis. The noncore staff members are typically on temporary contracts, and
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the revenue they generate is often a subsidy to their more reliable income in an academic setting.

Contractors
Contractors are for-profit entities (though some barely
stay solvent) and, supposedly, take on a higher degree of liability for program performance than those that receive
grants under cooperative agreements (which NGOs typically receive). Examples of contractors are Chemonics,
Development Alternatives Incorporated (now simply called
DAI), Research Triangle International (RTI), and Associates in
Rural Development (which is now simply called ARD since
becoming a subsidiary of Tetra Tech).
The volume of governmental funding going to contractors has increased in recent years. USAID, among others,
has awarded contracts to reach specific program objectives.
According to Rachel McCleary (2010) "United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) reported that from
fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2005, the share of funds awarded
to for-profit contractors rose from 33 percent to 58 percent" (p.
1).
Contractors are by nature project-oriented. They hire a
Chief of Party to oversee project activities. They typically do
not establish country programs but, instead, set up an operation for the specific purpose of project execution. Unlike NGOs,
contractors do not contribute matching funds, and they tend to
be willing to accept money from entities like the Department
of Defense in addition to the USAID.
Staff members of international NGOs sometimes generalize
about contractors, calling them "beltway bandits" (referring to
the location of many of the contractors' headquarters, near the
Beltway surrounding Washington, DC). One reason is due to
competition and the increasing amount of U.S. Government
funding going to contractors which NGO staff members feel
they could more effectively utilize. There is also a common
perception that contractors do not engage the local population,
and do not work with national NGOs and civic groups.
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Academic Institutions
Universities and colleges have supported NGOs and contractors engaged in justice and peace. Individuals and groups
of faculty members serve as consultants, usually by assisting
in conceptualizing a problem. The understanding that develops is then used in project design or in staff training programs. While academic institutions do not have the in-depth
knowledge from on-the-ground work as do staff members of
NGOs and contractors, they do bring theoretical and comparative perspectives that can be useful for some justice and peace
efforts. Academic institutions, especially those that engage
tenured faculty, can also provide added institutional memory
to NGOs and contractors that suffer from high staff turnover
and transfer rates. Faculty members, however, usually need to
be engaged over a period of years to develop an accurate understanding of the donor and political environment in which
NGOs and contractors work.
Organizational Innovation
In this section, I provide examples of some of the organizational configurations which have developed in justice and
peace programming. This is by no means an exhaustive list
but is meant to be illustrative of the kind of innovation that
has been taking place. It is hoped that these examples will shed
light on which combinations work well in achieving greater
justice and peace.
ProducingToolkits
CRS went through an organizational transformation in
the late 1990s, during which it developed what is commonly
called its "justice lens" (Fast & Lindsteadt, 1998). Rather than
simply trying to help pull people out of poverty, CRS leadership insisted that they ask why people were impoverished in
the first place.
As CRS leaders sought to imbue each of their country programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America with an orientation
aimed at addressing underlying causes of poverty and violence,
they sought the help of the Kroc Institute for International
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Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. The two organizations exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding that
stated, in part, that a regular "peacebuilding institute" would
be conducted in which CRS staff from all over the world
would get trained by Kroc Institute faculty Over the years,
a more substantial "learning alliance" was created with the
CRS' South East Asia Region. Insights from the annual workshops in South East Asia were documented by a CRS regional
staff member focused on justice and peace. Over three years,
enough common terminology and material had been produced to create Reflective Peacebuilding:A Planning,Monitoring,
and Learning Toolkit (Lederach, Neufeldt, & Culbertson, 2007).
The toolkit is in its second printing, has been translated from
English into French and Spanish, and has been downloaded
from the internet on a scale much beyond what either CRS or
the Kroc Institute anticipated.
Another example of developing a toolkit is a collaborative
initiative of Church World Service (CWS), the relief and development arm of a number of Christian Protestant denominations, and Eastern Mennonite University's Center for Justice
and Peacebuilding. CWS is a smaller organization than CRS.
In some respects, its size precludes achieving economies of
scale in technical support related to justice and peace. As a
result, CWS leadership explored a working relationship with
the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding's STAR Program
(Seminars in Trauma Awareness and Recovery). The Program
had been launched in the United States following the devastation of September 11, 2001. Church World Service leaders
were impressed by the project and asked Center for Justice and
Peace faculty and staff if they would be interested in doing the
same kind of work in war-torn countries. The two entities exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding and implemented
a week-long training program in Monrovia, Liberia, in 2004,
involving 45 civil society and church leaders (Church World
Service, 2004). As was the case of collaboration between CRS
and the Kroc Institute, STAR produced a toolkit that has been
disseminated widely (Eastern Mennonite University, 2010;
Yoder, 2005).
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Undergoinga Merger
Mercy Corps decided that its approach to building its capacity to engage in justice and peace programming would be
to merge with Conflict Management Group (CMG), a serviceoriented justice and peace NGO (Mercy Corps, 2004). CMG
was facing financial challenges, despite its stellar reputation
and credibility from being founded by one of the authors of
the classic conflict resolution book Getting to Yes (Fisher &
Ury, 1981) and being affiliated with the Harvard Negotiation
Project. Fees for services proved to be feast or famine, with
rather too much famine. 2
Mercy Corps, on the other hand, raised private, governmental, and multilateral support with relative ease. The merger, in
2004, was seen as mutually advantageous in that Mercy Corps
increased its conflict transformation capacity while CMG
staff members kept their jobs-even continuing to reside in
Cambridge, Massachusetts even though Mercy Corps' headquarters is in Portland, Oregon (Mercy Corps, 2004).
But the merger had a rocky start, due mainly to the type of
services that CMG staff members provided. They were experts
at mediation. And in war-torn countries, mediation is typically undertaken by diplomats, not NGO staff members. But by
2009, Mercy Corps' conflict transformation activities included
not only training Iraqi leaders in consensus building and negotiation, but also: resolving land disputes in Guatemala; supporting regional initiatives to reduce clan violence in northern
Somalia related to competition for firewood and water, youth
unemployment, environmental degradation and drug abuse;
working with over 400 tribal elders, government officials,
youth, women, and religious leaders in Kenya's Rift Valley to
reduce election-related violence; and supporting the creation
of 820 youth clubs in Nepal to minimize inter-ethnic conflict
following a decade-long civil war. Mercy Corps has been
pleased with the results of the merger. According to the organization's website, "Mercy Corps' 2004 merger with the Conflict
Management Group strengthened our ability to implement
conflict programs worldwide. Over its 20-year history, the
Conflict Management Group developed a widely acclaimed
reputation built on interest-based negotiation methodology.
By blending their vast experience in negotiations theory and
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practice with Mercy Corps' global experience in conflict and
post-conflict settings, the merger created possibilities that were
not possible as separate organizations" (Mercy Corps, 2009).

Making Handoffs and Building a Foundation
American Refugee Committee (ARC) works in war-torn
countries around the globe. ARC's staff members often see
gross violations of human rights. In one instance, one of ARC's
country directors communicated passionately with ARC headquarters in Minneapolis about the need to advocate with the
U.S. government and the United Nations about abductions
of children by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern
Uganda and southern Sudan. The conundrum facing ARC leadership in its headquarters was that if ARC was visible in such
advocacy, there could be repercussions for its staff members
working in those countries. This was especially so because
ARC's logo was prominently depicted on vehicles, in part to
make sure that government troops and LRA rebels knew of its
humanitarian identity.
ARC leadership overcame this challenge by communicating information gleaned from the Uganda/southern
Sudan program staff to one of the ARC board members. The
board member was an executive at Refugees International, a
prominent advocacy-oriented NGO in Washington. As such,
Refugees International benefited from the on-the-ground information while ARC did not compromise the safety of its staff
in Uganda and southern Sudan.3
Another example of a handoff relationship exists between
CRS and the Justice, Peace and Development Department of
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).
CRS was contacted by one of its country representatives about
a law in South Asia that resulted in the capricious prosecution of religious minorities. For CRS to have been visibly involved in advocacy with the U.S. Congress and the diplomatic
community to address this injustice would have put CRS staff
members in South Asia in a compromising position relative
to extremist groups. So CRS contacted the Justice, Peace and
Human Development Department in Washington about the
problem. The Department's advocacy did not implicate CRS'
staff overseas.

OrganizationalInnovation

47

But a more interesting organizational development occurred with CRS relative to the USCCB, whereby a more robust
foundation for advocacy is being laid. CRS and USCCB leadership recognized that advocacy on justice and peace issues
would be limited without educating the public. In this case,
the U.S. Catholic community comprises the largest single denomination in the United States-roughly 70 million people
in a population of 310 million. The Church has considerable
infrastructure-parishes, schools, colleges and universities.
CRS' budget dwarfs that of the Justice, Peace and Human
Development Department of the USCCB. People donate to
CRS primarily because of its humanitarian work. But some of
the donations are unrestricted as to their use. So CRS channeled some of its unrestricted funds to an entirely new department called U.S. Operations, opening regional offices in major
cities across the United States with the mandate to engage the
U.S. Catholic community in education and advocacy. This organizational innovation builds a foundation of educated supporters who can engage in public policy advocacy on behalf of
those suffering from injustice, violence, and poverty to address
root causes as well as immediate needs.
CRS' U.S. Operations efforts have also engaged academic
institutions. Rather than collaborating for technical support
and the creation of toolkits, a partnership with universities has
spawned an education and advocacy initiative on campuses
throughout the country (Catholic Relief Services, 2010).
Securing Community Involvement and Technical Support
In 2004, DAI was awarded a contract from the USAID for
its Sri Lanka Transition Initiatives Program. DAI established
offices in Colombo, Trincomalee, Ampara, Matara, and Batticalo
and provided grants totaling approximately $30 million to
"local government entities, nongovernmental organizations,
community-based organizations and, to a lesser extent, international nongovernmental organizations, chambers of commerce, trader and farmer associations, student groups, and the
media" (DAI, 2009).
Because of the technical challenges of meeting contract specifications for an early warning system that would incorporate
events data development, digital mapping, and mathematical
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pattern recognition, DAI engaged Virtual Research Associates,
another consulting firm, to provide technical support (Virtual
Research Associates, 2008).4 This specialized technical knowledge was unavailable in Sri Lanka.
In 2008, DAI received additional funding for its Sri Lanka
Transition Initiatives Program from the U.S. Department of
Defense to assist people displaced by conflict in Sri Lanka's
Eastern Province. DAI worked with local contractors to rehabilitate health facilities, schools, and other public infrastructure using "an inclusive participatory community consultation
process" (DAI, 2009).
This example illustrates how for-profit contractors sometimes work closely with national NGOs, government officials
and other entities. It also shows how the use of other for-profit
entities is typically related to areas where substantial technical expertise is needed. And, finally, it shows how contractors
are willing, unlike most NGOs, to accept funding from the
Department of Defense for humanitarian projects.
Conclusion
Supporting justice and peace while also engaging in humanitarian relief and development is perhaps analogous to an
emergency assistance social service agency developing an advocacy arm and the capacity to do group therapy. The skill sets
are different. The networks are different. The terminologies are
different.
Organizations have adapted, however, and aligned themselves in creative combinations that take advantage of their respective strengths. No single organizational configuration will
work all the time. Instead, it is helpful to ponder the experiences of those who have had the imagination and inventiveness to build creative partnerships.
What might we learn from these examples? First, international humanitarian NGOs that have staff members operating in developing countries can benefit from having a close
partnership with advocacy-oriented NGOs. Handing off information that could compromise the security of staff members
or the mission of the aid itself to an entity that specializes in
advocacy can enhance staff security in the field and provide
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needed on-the-ground information that can enhance the accuracy and authenticity of advocacy efforts.
Second, service-oriented NGOs that are skilled in mediation
will probably find it challenging to merge with humanitarian
NGOs. Those skilled in mediation, however, are likely to enjoy
greater job security and, over time, will learn how to adapt
their services to a wider range of humanitarian interventions.
Third, academic institutions can play a vital role in supporting the justice and peace initiatives of humanitarian
NGOs by assisting with workshops and producing "toolkits."
Furthermore, the research and instruction of faculty members
involved is improved by interacting with practitioners with
on-the-ground experience. Academic institutions can also help
NGOs promote greater engagement of the U.S. public in advocacy related to justice, peace, and poverty.
Fourth, on some projects, contractors work with national
and local NGOs, but also reach out to other for-profit firms for
technical support. While most NGOs neither pursue nor accept
funding from the Department of Defense for fear that staff security in conflict zones will be compromised, contractors are
more apt to pursue and accept such funding in conflict zones.
This reflects how NGOs usually operate in a specific country
or region for long periods, ideally getting to know the culture
and leadership of a given place, while the contractors discontinue project operations when a contract expires. In addition,
NGOs' security is usually based on "acceptance" by the local
population rather than "protection" from harm. Contractors,
in contrast, are usually more apt to hire armed guards, being
more inclined to use "protection."
And, finally, if one looks at these evolving partnerships
over time, from a social work perspective, it is evident that
systemic reasons for poverty, for violence, and for injustice are
increasingly being addressed. It is easy to understand and to
raise money for charity. It is difficult, relatively, to understand
and raise money to do systemic change. But with a "systems
theory" perspective, the tide is turning. More specifically,
NGOs are embracing a "strategic peacebuilding" version of
that theory, which holds that structures that lead to violent conflict must be addressed systematically. Specifically, it involves
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... the

creation

and

nurturing

of

constructive

relationships-at every level of society-across ethnic,
religious, class, and racial boundaries. ... [Practitioners]
seek the nonviolent and collaborative resolution of
social inequities and the transformation of structural
conditions that generate deadly conflict. The range of
relationship-building activities encompasses the entire
conflict cycle and includes conflict prevention, conflict
management, conflict resolution and transformation,
and post-conflict reconciliation. (Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, 2010, para. 1)
Those NGOs that pursue this approach are venturing
forward into relatively new territory, less focused on symptoms and more focused on causes. What more could one ask
for after a blind date?
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(Endnotes)
1. Comments about the difficulty of raising money were made
during Peace and Security Initiative meetings in Washington, DC in
2003 and 2004 which I attended.
2. At the time of the merger, I spoke with a number of CMG staff
members.
3. I know of this example personally because I was Vice President at
ARC at the time.
4. I am familiar with the involvement of Virtual Research Associates
through communication with its President, Doug Bond. I spoke with
him about my experiences with the Foundation for Co-Existence,
most of which was as a consultant with The Asia Foundation.
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There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to violent
conflict, some direct and some indirect. For ordinary citizens, the
experience of this nexus is the denialof basicfreedoms and rights. In
spite of such bleak circumstances, people can move from being victims and bystanders to becoming a force for transforming their societies. Citizens are engaging in civil resistanceto curb corruption
and win accountability and justice. This article: explores the linkages between corruptionand violence; identifies the conceptualand
practicallimitationsof top-down, technical approaches to combating corruption;articulatesa bottom-up approachin which the civic
realm is included in the anti-corruptionequation; and presents case
studies of civic action campaigns and movements under conditions
of violence, post-conflict transformationor state captureby violent
crime syndicates. From these, general lessons learned are distilled.
Key words: corruption, civil resistance, civic action, nonviolent,
people power,accountability,citizen, post-conflict transformation,
violent conflict

Corruption is intimately linked to violent conflict, human
insecurity, and oppression. In a checklist of the "root causes
of conflict and early warning indicators," the European
Commission (2008) includes the corruption troika of bribery
in bureaucracies, collusion between the private sector and civil
servants, and organized crime. At an aggregate level, corruption has been found to be positively correlated with higher
risks of political instability (Le Billon, 2003). Human Rights
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Watch (2007) cites a direct relationship between corruption
and political violence, in which state officials use stolen public
revenues to pay for violence in support of their political ambitions. A 2004 report of the Secretary General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change states that "corruption, illicit trade and money-laundering contribute to State
weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democracy. These activities thus create a permissive environment for
civil conflict" (United Nations, 2004, p. 20). Finally, corruption
also creates an overall climate of impunity (Kaufmann, 2006).
Human rights organizations link corruption to repression, as
it impedes government accountability, and can motivate officials and security forces to commit abuses for financial or other
forms of gain (Ganesan, 2007).
There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to
violent conflict, some direct and some indirect. War economies
by their nature function through malfeasance; the parties in
the conflict depend on fraud, bribery, and criminal groups to
expedite the smooth functioning of the system (ScharbatkeChurch & Reiling, 2009). Arms traffickers and trans-national
organized crime add to the deadly mix by readily providing
weapons. The global illicit arms trade is estimated at $200-$300
million annually and Africa is the largest so-called market. As
a result, the continent tragically suffers the most casualties
from it (United Nations News Centre, 2010).
Moreover, corruption can draw out or perpetuate bloody
confrontations. Violent groups themselves engage in illicit activities to acquire weapons and supplies. According to a confidential source, Al Qaeda has access to emeralds mined in the
Northern Frontier province of Pakistan, from which it has been
deriving approximately $150 million income per year. Nowhere
is this process more wrenchingly evident than in DR Congo,
where approximately 3.5 million lives have been lost since
the onset of war in 1998 and hundreds of thousands of girls
and women have been systematically raped (Global Witness,
2004; UNICEF, 2008). The military, rebel groups, and various
foreign allies have plundered the country's diamonds, gold,
timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt, not only to finance their atrocities but ultimately to enrich themselves, which has become an
end unto itself (Global Witness, 2004). Over the past decade,
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violent confrontations over the Casamance region have broken
out among Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal, and between
Cameroon and Nigeria in the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula for an
equal length of time. A USAID report concluded that corruption, more often than not, played a key role in fomenting and
protracting these conflicts (USAID, 2007).
When corruption is endemic, whereby a complex system
of graft permeates the political system, economic spheres, and
basic provision of services in a country, it can stimulate social
unrest and foment violent conflict. For example, in the Niger
Delta, insurgent groups are amassing weapons and recruiting young men from an impoverished, angry and frustrated
population that experiences little benefit from oil wealth while
living amidst horrendous environmental degradation from
its extraction and processing (United Nations Development
Program, 2006).
In the post-conflict context, corruption can function as an
inhibitor of sustainable peace, the latter needing human security and stability to take root and flourish (Ahtisaari, 2009).
First, graft can allow the entrenchment of the political status
quo that operated during the conflict (Le Billon, 2007). Second,
it undermines the new government's legitimacy, rule of law,
and capacity for reconstruction, economic development and
the provision of basic public services. For ordinary citizens, the
horrors of war are replaced with grueling hardship, to which
pervasive malfeasance adds another layer of tangible injustice,
such as in Afghanistan. In a 2010 poll, 83 percent of Afghans
said corruption affects their daily lives (United States Embassy
Kabul, 2010). As a result, the Taliban is recruiting new members
from among the marginalized population oppressed by unrelenting graft and poverty.
Corruption can be an enabler of state-capture in post-conflict or fragile democracies. Tragically on the rise in Central
America, "narco-corruption" refers to the interrelationship
between transnational drug cartels and state security forces,
as well as the infiltration of organized crime interests into
politics, governance and the actual functioning of institutions,
leading to countries such as Mexico and Guatemala being
called narco-states. In the first 2.5 years of Mexican President
Felipe Calderon's administration, drug violence took 12,000
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lives (Camp, 2009). The United Nation's Office of Drugs and
Crime chief has asserted, "Corruption, poverty and poor criminal justice capacity make Guatemala extremely vulnerable to
organized crime" (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime,
2010). Not coincidentally, the country is experiencing the
worst violence since the cessation of the 36-year civil war in
1996. Approximately 5,000 people are murdered each year due
to organized crime and gangs, now compounded by Mexican
drug-cartels expanding south across the border (Dudley,2010;
Sanchez, 2007). Narco-corruption, of course, is not limited to
the Americas. The drug trade in Afghanistan also serves as the
main source of financing for the private armies of local warlords, which are connected to parts of the post-conflict government (Confidential communication, 2009). The Taliban is in
on the game as well, exchanging drugs for weapons (Starkey,
2008).
A vicious cycle can develop, whereby authoritarian and/or
ineffectual governance paired with endemic corruption results
in the further de-legitimization of authority and rule of law,
leading to fragmented tyrannies, which in turn reinforces authoritarian and/or ineffectual governance, impunity, poverty,
and so on. In contrast, civil resistance has the potential to activate an anti-corruption cycle. Nonviolent social movements
and grass-roots civic campaigns can challenge the corruptionviolence nexus, which in turn create alternative loci of power,
thereby empowering the civic realm to continue to wage strategic civic campaigns and movements (Zunes, 2008). The civic
realm refers to the collective non-state, bottom-up initiatives
and relationships in a society. This includes: nonviolent civic
campaigns and movements; civil society organizations (CSOs);
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); community-based
organizations (CBOs); civic coalitions and alliances; unions;
professional organizations; grass-roots networks, committees,
and collectives; local citizen groups; activists, community organizers, and last but not least, citizens.
Echoing this dynamic, a Kenyan civic leader explained:
"If people are able to be encouraged to go out, today it's CDF
[Constituency Development Funds], tomorrow it's something
else, and another day it's another thing. So CDF is an entry
point to the realization of so many rights that people are not
getting" (International Budget Partnership, 2010). To target
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corruption is to simultaneously touch the myriad of injustices
to which it is linked, from violence and poverty, to impunity,
human rights abuses, authoritarianism, unaccountability, substandard social services, and environmental destruction. Thus,
fighting graft is not a superficial solution that avoids the underlying problem; it can be a direct attack on oppression.

Civil Resistance
Civil resistance expresses people power through the use
of nonviolent strategies and tactics. It is also called nonviolent struggle and nonviolent conflict. "People power" refers to
political, social and economic pressure that is exerted by significant numbers of people organized together around shared
grievances and goals.
The efficacy of civil resistance is not a matter of theory
(Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Nonviolent social movements
and civic campaigns have a rich history of ending oppression
and injustice and the apparatus of state and other forms of corruption. A 2008 study found that in the last century, violent
campaigns succeeded historically in only 26 percent of all
cases, compared to 53 percent in the case of nonviolent, civilian-based campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). A quantitative analysis of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy over the past three decades found that civil resistance was
a key factor in driving 75% of political transitions, and such
transformations were far more likely to result in democratic
reform and civil liberties than violent or elite-led, top-down
changes. Of the 35 countries subsequently rated "Free" according to a Freedom House index, 32 had a significant "bottom up"
civil resistance component (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005).
Over the past twenty years, from the 1986 "People Power"
uprising in the Philippines to the "Color Revolutions" in the
former Soviet Union, corruption has been a source of deep
public discontent and a key mobilizing issue of nonviolent
social movements. This shows that people themselves, who
increasingly experience the nexus of violent conflict, crime and
corruption as another form of tyranny, can move from being
victims and bystanders to becoming a force for transforming
their societies.
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Reconceptualizing Corruption
The global anti-corruption arena is relatively new, having
emerged over the past two decades. While there certainly has
been progress, change has been modest (International Council
on Human Rights Policy, 2009). Wide-scale, national anti-corruption programs, favored by donor countries and multilateral
institutions, have had less than consistent results (Hussmann
& Hechler, 2008). Transparency International's 2010 Global
Corruption Barometer found that 60 percent of those surveyed
in 86 countries and territories said that corruption has increased
over the past three years. Eighty percent stated that political
parties are corrupt or extremely corrupt and half asserted that
their government's efforts to stop corruption were ineffective.
Since 2006, pay-offs to police are said to have doubled, while
more respondents reported paying bribes to the judiciary, and
for registry and permit services than in 2005. Poorer interviewees were twice as likely as more well-off individuals to pay
bribes for basic services.
Through the framework civil resistance and people power,
it's not surprising that a predominantly top-down approach has
limitations. One must start with the definition of corruption,
commonly characterized as "the misuse of entrusted power
for private gain," or the "abuse of public office for private
gain" (Transparency International, 2010). While concise and
accurate, conceptually they do not convey the systemic nature
of corruption, which involves a complex set of relationships,
some obvious and others hidden, with established vested interests, that can cut across political, economic and social forces.
Moreover, how a problem is defined will affect how it is addressed. Thus, up until this decade, there was an over-emphasis on the state. Less attention was paid to other groups, such
as agricultural landowners, private sector, multinational corporations, oligarchies, crime syndicates, gangs, and paramilitaries, as well as their inter-relationships.
Second, the strategies have been top-down and elitedriven, with a focus on developing norms, rules and structures
that mainly target administrative graft. According to a former
World Bank specialist, there is the fallacy that one "fights corruption by fighting corruption" (Kaufmann, 2005, p. 41). This
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has translated into a preponderance of international agreements, policy diagnoses, legislation, and institution-building,
such as anti-corruption comnuissions, improvement of national and local government capacity, and public finance management. The underlying assumption is that once anti-corruption
frameworks are put in place, illicit practices will change. But
how can institutional mechanisms bring forth change, when
they must be implemented by the very institutions that are
corrupt? Those who are benefitting from corruption are expected to be the ones to curb it. It's not surprising then, that
even when political will exists, it can be thwarted, because too
many people have a stake in the crooked status quo.
Lastly, traditional strategies have not appreciably factored
people into the equation-although they are the ones who bear
the brunt of corruption, have direct experience of it, suffer its
ill-effects, and can contribute to curbing it. For those on the
receiving end, the experience of corruption can be oppression
and a loss of freedom. Aruna Roy, one of the founders of the
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) "Right to Information"

movement in India, characterizes corruption as "the external
manifestation of the denial of a right, an entitlement, a wage,
a medicine..." (Roy, n.d.). Viewed from this perspective, the
priorities shift to controlling those forms of graft and abuse
that are most harmful or common to citizens, particularly the
poor. The goals are accountability, participatory democracy,
and social and economic justice.
The Dynamics of a Bottom-Up Approach to
Curbing Corruption
To its credit, there has been a growing recognition in the
international anti-corruption community and among donors
and development institutions, especially over the past six
years, that corruption cannot be challenged unless the civic
realm is involved, including an active citizenry. This paradigm shift was encapsulated in the final statement of the 14 h
International Anti-Corruption Conference (2010), which stated:
"Empowered people create change ... This expanded element

of our conference points the way for the future of the anti-corruption movement, one incorporating citizen mobilization and
empowerment, as well as the inclusion of youth" (p. 7).
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Well-organized, strategic civic movements and campaigns
may be particularly suited to a systemic approach to curbing
corruption. First, mobilized people, engaged in organized
collective nonviolent action, constitute a social force that
can exert pressure on the state, as well as on other sectors in
society. Second, civil resistance can disrupt both vertical (up
and down within an institution) and horizontal (across institutions, groups, sectors) corruption. Third, civil resistance
has a strategic advantage, as it consists of extra-institutional
methods of action to push for change, when power holders are
corrupt and/or unaccountable, and institutional channels are
blocked or ineffective. This involves generating political will,
demanding specific measures, and reinforcing new patterns of
administration and governance centered on accountability to
citizens. Hence, top-down and bottom-up approaches are not
mutually exclusive. Civic campaigns and movements can complement and reinforce legal and administrative mechanisms,
which constitute the anti-corruption infrastructure needed
for long-term transformation of systems of graft and abuse.
Finally, civil resistance can also support honest individuals,
within state institutions and other entities, who are attempting
reforms and change. All too often, lone figures cannot challenge or dismantle entrenched, multi-faceted systems of graft
and unaccountability. Such attempts have been compared to
the actions of political dissidents, who stand in singular defiance before an entire undemocratic system and are easily suppressed (Martin, Callaghan, & Fox, 1997). This was the fate of
John Githongo, a former Kenyan anti-corruption chief, who
fled the country in 2004 after threats to his life.
Civic campaigns and movements, by their nature, emerge
from the civic realm and include the participation of ordinary people united around common grievances, goals and
demands. People power is generated through the sustained,
strategic application of a variety of nonviolent tactics that are
designed to:
* Strengthen citizen participation and campaign
capacity;
* Disrupt systems of corruption, including dishonest
relationships, illicit practices and the status quo;

Civil Resistance and the Corruption-ViolenceNexus

61

* Weaken the sources of support and control for
unaccountable and corrupt power holders; entities,
systems, and their enablers; and/or
* Win support of sectors, groups, institutions, and
over to the civic campaign or movement, the
latter including from the public and from within
corrupt systems, for example, political leaders and
honest officials.

feople

Nonviolent tactics constitute the methods of civil resistance. Scholars such as Gene Sharp have identified over 200
tactics, and most campaigns and movements create new ones.
Civic anti-corruption initiatives engage in varieties of:
* noncooperation, civil disobedience
* low-risk mass actions, displays of symbols
* street theatre, visual dramatizations and stunts
* songs, poetry, cultural expressions, humor
* civic "report cards" for political candidates
* citizen "report cards" for public services
* monitoring of officials, members of parliament,
institutions, budgets, spending and public services
* social audits and "face the people" forums
* social networking technologies (e.g., Facebook
organizing and petitioning, blogging, SMS
communication)
* education and training, youth recreation
* social and economic empowerment initiatives,
creation of parallel institutions
* anti-corruption pledges; citizen-sponsored anticorruption awards
* protests, petitions, vigils, marches, sit-ins, leafleting
* strikes, boycotts, and reverse boycotts (e.g.,
patronizing businesses that refuse to pay protection
money or bribes)
* nonviolent blockades, nonviolent accompaniment
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Civic Campaigns and Movements to Fight Corruption
Though not widely known, there has been a grass-roots,
bottom-up "eruption against corruption," to borrow a popular
slogan of the Fifth Pillar movement in India. The author has
been conducting a research project to document and distill
general lessons learned from civic campaigns and movements
to fight graft and abuse, demand accountability and win rights.
It is examining the skills, strategies, objectives and demands of
such civic initiatives, rather than the phenomenon of corruption itself. The focus is on what civic actors and citizens--organized together, exerting their collective power-are doing to
curb corruption as they themselves define and experience it.
Over 30 cases have been identified, of which 15 are being
documented and analyzed in depth. A number of common attributes of civic campaigns and movements to fight corruption
are emerging from the case studies. Bottom-up initiatives can
be found around the world, among democracies, semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes. Contrary to common misconceptions that civic mobilization is only possible when there
is political space, a relatively educated populace and a nonviolent legacy, they are prevalent in societies enduring poor
governance, poverty, illiteracy, repression, and violence, the
latter two perpetrated by the state, organized crime, paramilitary groups and gangs. Rather than spontaneous outbursts,
organization and planning precede action, even when a scandalous event first arouses public indignation. Taken together,
they confirm what some civil resistance scholars assert; skills
and strategy generally matter more than pre-existing conditions (Ackerman, 2007).
Women and youth are also playing galvanizing roles in many
campaigns, notably in Muslim settings. "Defining methods,"
around which a host of nonviolent tactics revolve, are common
(Schock, 2010). Success in one struggle or context inspires new
applications, knowledge-sharing and campaigns-locally and
even across borders and continents. Finally, the struggles are
quite often multidimensional in focus, reflecting the reality
that corruption does not occur in a vacuum; it is linked to other
forms of oppression and injustice.
The following four cases have been chosen for their
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relevance to peace building and conflict transformation contexts and strategies.
Guatemala: Grass-Roots Resistance to Violence and Impunity
In Guatemala, innovative grass-roots civil resistance
movements have been undermining the corruption-violence
nexus at the community level, maintaining resilience in the
face of brutal repression, and fostering social and economic
development. One particularly poignant case is in Santa Lucia
Cotzumalguapa, a mid-size town populated largely by indigenous people, which suffered great losses during the civil war
(1960-96). It was the cradle of the organized peasant movement,
and the site of persecution and mass murder of peasants, church
members and unions by state forces, which was sponsored by
sugar plantation (Finca) owners. Every guerilla faction had a
presence as well. Dozens of the organized paramilitary groups
have since been transformed into hit-men operations, and it is
now unfortunately situated in a geographical spot convenient
to cross-border narco-trafficking, from Columbia up to Mexico
for the North American market (C. Samayoa, personal communications, various dates, 2008-2010).
Reflecting a collective "outcry of despair," a local citizen's
movement emerged in the aftermath of the civil war. Its objectives were to recover the community and local government
from the hands of drug lords and organized crime, promote
economic and social development, create a collective sense of
worth and empowerment, challenge the climate of impunity,
prevent electoral fraud, and defend hard-won gains along the
way. Organizers put together a strong coalition that included
women, youth, and community groups. In spite of the legacy
of repression, they initially built alliances with Finca owners
(which later broke down) to support an honest candidate
in the local elections and kick out a drug lord from the local
government.
Over the years, they conducted a wide range of nonviolent actions, such as: civil disobedience; solidarity demonstrations; literacy, education and development programs; radio
call-in programs; theater; art festivals; and recreation projects
aimed at youth, who are often the targets of organized crime
recruitment. Their successes wrought severe counter-attacks.
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By 2007, 11 community leaders had been murdered, four attempts were made on an honest mayor's life, slandering and
defamation cases were lodged, electoral fraud was orchestrated, and the police, prosecutors and judges favored the drug
cartels, an odious confirmation of the extent of corruption and
state capture.
In spite of this extreme intimidation, citizens refused to be
subdued. Solidarity demonstrations and civil disobedience persisted. People engaged in new methods to disrupt the corrupt
status quo, such as monitoring the actions and spending of the
new authorities in power, as well as criminal activities, reporting the latter to the newly instituted International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala, though it appears the case will
not be pursued. However, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has accepted the case of the first assassination
that struck the town, which will proceed in 2011.
A significant dimension was added to the struggle-the
international community. Guatemalan human rights defenders drew world attention to the movement. They garnered support for civic initiatives from the United Nations
Development Program and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. A security plan was devised, bolstered by human rights organizations that networked to bring international observers and nonviolent accompaniment to protect people at risk. Santa Lucia
Cotzumalguapa became the host of national and international
meetings, thereby sending a message to the corrupt power
holders that the country and the world were watching and
stood together with the townspeople. Finally, home-grown,
grass-roots solidarity and coordination networks have been established with other indigenous communities engaged in civil
resistance both in Guatemala and across borders. They share
information, experiences, and strategies, send out alerts, and
even have come to one another's aid, for example, by blocking
a road.
In extending the arena of resistance from the local to the
regional and international, the community is increasing its capacity of people power, the source being strength in numbers.
From unity within, they are building a broader front involving
allies at all levels. In confronting a system of violence, graft
and impunity involving the state and transnational organized
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crime, in essence, the citizens' movement is now creating an
alternative system of civil resistance, involving national and
transnational networking, solidarity and action. In seeking to
overcome marginalization and poverty through education and
development initiatives, for women and youth as well as the
town at large, the movement calls to mind Mohandas Gandhi's
"constructive programme in the nonviolent effort," (Gandhi,
1945) in which equality, education, and economic self-reliance were core elements. Finally, the people of Santa Lucia
Cotzumalguapa embody what Gandhi observed decades ago,
"Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from
an indomitable will" (Gandhi, n.d.).
Indonesia: People Power Provides Protection
After 32 years of authoritarian rule and state violence
under General Suharto, the multi-ethnic Indonesia began
a new chapter of governance in 1999. Nonviolent civic coalitions played a significant role in his demise (Karatnycky
& Ackerman, 2005). The fledgling democracy inherited a
multitude of ills not unlike those of post-war contexts, from
widespread poverty to a 30-year armed conflict in Aceh that
resulted in close to 15,000 deaths (World Bank, 2005), dysfunctional state institutions, security force impunity, and corruption, the latter embedded into the power structures and social
fabric of the country. Into this mix was born the Corruption
Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2003. When both the institution and leading figures in it were assailed, a nationwide civic
campaign came to its rescue, providing a rich example of how
civil resistance can protect government structures and honest
officials in fragile states.
While some anti-corruption commissions are dismissed
as "window-dressing" to satisfy donors and multilateral institutions, others are at the forefront of fighting corruption
and gaining transparency. The KPK has earned the public's
respect and admiration since it was created in 2003. It was
seen as the "hope to fix a broken country" (confidential source,
2010). KPK did not hesitate to confront the powers that be,
and expose corrupt behavior and relationships among the
local and national governments, Parliament, Administration,
private sector, and police, the latter having a particularly
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negative reputation with the public. It convicted politicians,
governors, judicial figures, and in 2008, the Deputy Governor
of the Central Bank, who is also the father-in-law of President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's son (Lindsey, 2009).
By threatening the entire tangled system of influence and
graft benefitting the ruling elites, KPK soon became a target.
Since early 2009, efforts to weaken, if not destroy, it have intensified, including police criminalization of some of its activities,
the arrest of its Chairman for murder, investigations of deputy
commissioners, and parliamentary attempts to cut its budget
and authority. The situation came to a head mid-year, in the
wake of ongoing investigations of embezzlement in the infamous Bank Century bailout, in which a wiretapped conversation documented the senior police officer handling the Century
case and a politically connected tycoon, Boedi Sampoema, discussing an arrangement to safely withdraw Rp 2 trillion deposited at the bank in return for a Rp 10 billion payoff.
By July 2009, a core group of civil society leaders-veterans from the Reformasi civic movement against the former
Suharto regime-"saw the signs" (non-attributable activists,
2010). They decided it was necessary to proactively develop a
strategy to protect KPK-the institution, its mandate and authority. One activist said, "We realized that what we faced was
so big and so strong and has so much authority, we needed
to come together." (non-attributable personal communication,
April, 2010). They launched the CICAK campaign, which had a
dual meaning. It's an acronym for "Love Indonesia, Love AntiCorruption," but it also refers to the gecko lizard. During the
Bank Century investigations, the Chief of the Police's criminal
department said that the KPK was like the gecko fighting the
crocodile. One hundred civic organizations joined, and a graduate student on his own accord created a CICAK Facebook
group, which soon played a role bigger than anyone imagined.
CICAK groups formed in 20 of the country's 33 provinces and
well-known public figures came on board.
On October 29, the police arrested two KPK deputy
Chairmen, Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto, on
charges of abuse of power. The arrests came a day after
President Yudhoyono ordered an investigation into wiretapped
telephone conversations involving a senior Attorney General's
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Office official, in which the president was said to support
efforts to quell KPK. On October 30, the President gave a televised address stating he would let the police continue with the
case. People were furious with the police and embittered with
their leader, who had recently been re-elected on an anti-corruption platform. This repression backfired; CICAK was ready
to channel popular anger into civic mobilization. The Facebook
group grew so quickly that television news ran hourly updates
of the numbers, which reached 1.3 million and became a key
tool through which to communicate with and rally citizens.
CICAK organized actions in Jakarta, while local chapters and
high school and university students spontaneously initiated
events throughout the country.
Campaign tactics included demonstrations, marches to the
Presidential palace, petitions, wearing a black ribbon symbolizing the death of justice, gecko T-shirts, pins, stickers, leaflets,
banners reading "Say no to crocodiles," street murals, sit-ins,
gatherings in front of police stations, a hunger strike, street
theater, concerts, and "happening art" that often involved
humor and garnered national media coverage, for example,
jumping off the KPK building with parachutes. Popular singers
added their support and composed an anti-corruption song,
which people used for ringtones, with the refrains "gecko eats
crocodile," and "KPK in my chest." Citizens of all ages, socioeconomic groups, and religions participated. CICAK leaders
report that the upper middle and middle classes joined in
streets actions; professionals could be seen standing together
with students and poor people. Senior clerics of Indonesia's
five faiths paid solidarity visits to KPK.
CICAK demanded an immediate independent investigation and called on the President to save the KPK. As people
power escalated, he agreed to it, and the investigation began
soon after. Millions around the country heard a wire-tape in
which senior officials from the police and attorney general's
office and a big businessman planned to frame the KPK officials, including killing Chandra. The independent commission recommended the charges against the KPK officials be
dropped. Bibit and Chandra were released and went back to
work. Senior figures in the police and attorney general's office
resigned and other investigations have been launched. The
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CICAK campaign was the single largest social mobilization in
Indonesia since the Suharto dictatorship. Civic leaders remain
vigilant against new attacks on the KPK, but also exert pressure
on the KPK itself, in order to keep it clean and accountable.
Kenya: Overcoming Marginalization,Winning Accountability
Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) based in Mombasa that operates
among impoverished communities in the area, which was a
site of political and ethnic violence in 1997 and after the 2008
elections. It is catalyzing grass-roots civic campaigns to access
information about budgets, curb corruption, win accountability, and ultimately, fight poverty. It empowers poor communities in making their voices heard to their elected representatives
and local officials, thereby channeling frustration, hopelessness and anger away from hostilities to changing unjust conditions. The immediate focus is on the use, or rather, misuse of
constituency development funds (CDFs), which are annual allocations of approximately one million dollars to each Member
of Parliament for his/her district. MUHURI's long-term vision
is to cultivate a sense of agency among Kenyans (International
Budget Partnership, 2010; Ramkumar & Kidambi, 2010).
CDF is the result of a popular idea in the development
world; devolve power and give local communities resources
for their own development schemes. However, when there
is no meaningful independent oversight and corruption is
endemic, the end result is often mismanagement and graft.
For MUHURI, it's up to the people to provide the oversight.
Since 2007, the NGO has worked to animate and train citizens in civic mobilization. Through a pioneering collaboration with the International Budget Partnership and veteran
activists from the MKSS movement in India, it has developed
a defining nonviolent method-the five-step social audit. The
first step is information gathering-records from the local CDF
office. MUIHURI representatives are initially sent, because it's
daunting for ordinary citizens to approach officials and obtain
information. The second step is training local men and women
to become community activists. They learn how to decipher
documents and budgets, monitor expenditures and scrutinize
public works.
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The third step is inspecting the CDF project site. Newly
trained activists conduct systematic, meticulous documentation, comparing records to the reality on the ground. They also
use site visits to speak with local people, in order to generate interest in the social audit, get them to attend the public
hearing, and gather additional information about corruption
and abuse. The fourth step is educating and motivating fellow
citizens about the CDF and their right to information and accountability. Community activists and MUHURI attract attention, directly engage people, and encourage them to attend
a "public hearing" through nonviolent tactics such as street
theater, puppet plays, trumpet and drum processions, and
leafleting by volunteers. Information about CDF misuse and
graft is shared and people's reactions and input are gathered.
The final step is the public hearing with CDF officials, the
media, and in some cases, the Member of Parliament. MUHURI
first leads a procession through the community, complete with
slogans, chanting and a youth band. It gathers dancing children
and adults as it goes along. Once the forum begins, local activists present the results of their investigations, CDF officials are
questioned, and citizens demand accountability of them. At
MUHURI's first ever public hearing in August 2007, approximately 1500-2000 residents in the Changamwe slum attended,
many standing for over four hours. The MP finally agreed to
register their complaints and charges against the concerned
contractors. MUHURI then rolled out a cloth banner petition
demanding that accountability and transparency measures be
added to the CDF Act and the RTI law be passed. The MP initially refused to sign it, but after all the people and opposition candidates signed it, he acquiesced to civic pressure and
added his name.
In 2009, whilst conducting the Likoni constituency social
audit, MUHURI's office was ransacked and their guard was
stabbed. The intimidation backfired. The next day a popular
radio station interviewed the Executive Director and a local
activist, which gave them another platform to communicate
with people and increase attendance at the public hearing.
That same year, activists from eight constituencies that conducted social audits joined a national campaign, transcending
ethnic and social divisions, to change the CDF law. By June, the
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Kenyan government set up a task force to review it. MUHURI
is increasing its efforts to develop new campaigns (H. Khalid,
personal communication, November 12, 2010). For instance,
during the final week of October 2010, a social audit was conducted in the Mwatate constituency. Earlier that month the
local public Chair and Secretary had been arrested and charged
in court for misappropriation of funds. The audit is investigating whether or not other project funds had been embezzled in
addition to those under scrutiny in the court case.

Turkey: Low-Risk Mass Actions Surmount Fear and Apathy
Public apathy and fear of reprisals from either the state or
vicious non-state actors are common among countries engulfed
in violent conflict or emerging from it. Nonviolent street actions,
such as protests, marches and sit-ins may, at least initially, be
too risky. As was the case in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, this
did not mean that people were powerless. To the contrary, the
brilliance and creativity of ordinary citizens to disrupt systems
of malfeasance and impact the corruption-violence nexus is
staggering. The following case illustrates the force of civic
pressure from low-risk, mass actions.
In 1996, Turkey was plagued by a nationwide crime syndicate that involved paramilitary entities, drug traffickers,
the mafia, businesses, government officials, members of parliament, and parts of the judiciary and media. Extra-judicial
killings were common, some linked to the mafia and some political in nature. That November a speeding car crashed on a
highway late at night near the town of Susurluk. Among the
passengers were a police chief and police academy director, a
member of parliament, and an escaped criminal and paramilitary member (wanted by the Turkish courts, Swiss police and
Interpol) who possessed a fake ID signed by the minister of
internal affairs. The car contained cash, cocaine, and weapons.
The following day students held unplanned protests throughout the country, but were harshly repressed by police, while
other youth already on trial for previously breaking the "demonstration law" were sentenced to 15 months in prison (Akay
& Mahoney, 2003; E. Salman, personal communication, June
24, 2010).
A small group of professionals, lawyers and civil society
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advocates decided that this scandal provided an opportunity to tap public disgust, mobilize people to action, and
push for definable measures. Their demands were to remove
parliamentary immunity, prosecute the founders of the
criminal groups; protect judges trying such cases; and reveal
the crime syndicate relationships. They formed the Citizen
Initiative for Constant Light. From the outset, they made strategic choices-citizens should feel a sense of ownership in the
effort and the campaign would be apolitical-in order to build
a broad alliance, protect against smear attacks, and attract the
widest possible base of people. Prior to taking action they
defined goals, analyzed the media's views on corruption,
and developed a publicity strategy. Because the mafia had recently been taking control of a major broadcasting corporation
through manipulating legislation and business links, the press
and National Broadcasters Association were looking for ways
to improve the media's image, and prior to the Susurluk crash,
had hired a PR expert to help them. Following the scandal, he
personally became involved in Citizen Initiative for Constant
Light.
The civic group systematically built a coalition by reaching out to non-political entities, including the Istanbul
Coordination of Chambers of Professions, the Bar Association,
unions, nongovernmental organizations, and the professional
associations of pharmacists, dentists, civil engineers and electrical engineers. The organizers sought to create an innovative
nonviolent action that would overcome real obstacles, such as
violent crackdowns, imprisonment, and public fear and feelings of powerlessness. The teenage daughter of a lawyer involved in the campaign came up with the idea of turning off
lights. A chain of mass faxes and press releases signed by "an
anonymous aunt," who became the image of the campaign,
got the word out.
On February 1, 1997, citizens began to turn off their lights
at 9:00 p.m. for one minute. After two weeks, approximately
30 million people participated throughout the country, adding
their own embellishments such as banging pots and pans and
staging street actions. Neighborhood squares took on a festive
character as people overcame their fear and gathered together.
The campaign lasted six weeks. In the short-term, it broke the
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strong taboo over confronting corruption. It empowered citizens to fight corruption and forced the government to launch
judicial investigations. What was not anticipated was that the
military would remove its support for the government, which
was forced to resign. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan remained in power until a new government was approved by
the parliament six months later.
The next prime minister continued the court cases, handed
out verdicts, and set up an investigative committee, which prepared a report listing the names of all people murdered by the
crime syndicate. A parliamentary committee was also created
to document the syndicate's activities. In 2001, the interior minister launched a series of investigations. In cooperation with
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, widespread
embezzlement was exposed, and well-known business executives were arrested. What was not achieved, one of the original
objectives, was the removal of parliamentary immunity, which
would have allowed an investigation of the Susurluk parliamentarian. However, by 2003 most of old guard was voted out.
Analysts believe that voters punished both the political establishment and the military by electing the AK (White) Party, the
moderate Islamic party.
Lessons Learned
The case studies provide general lessons learned about
the application of civil resistance to curb corruption and win
accountability, rights and equity. Whether within one community or on a larger front, unity is essential. This includes
unity around goals, and among people and groups wanting
change. This goes hand-in-hand with shared ownership, the
sense that everyone is part of the struggle and can play a role
in it. Both unity and ownership can be strategically cultivated.
Civic campaigns and movements link corruption to widelyheld concerns, such as state capture to grievances and tangible injustices that impact people's daily lives, including basic
human security, poverty, lack of medical care, access to water,
etc. Information itself, in the form of budgets, spending, and
power holders' assets, is a source of power when accompanied by civil resistance to demand accountability and change,
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as was the case in Kenya.
Creativity is a hallmark of effective mobilization, tactical development, and communication. Effective tactics can
derive from local circumstances and reflect local culture.
Consequently, while a particular tactic may not necessarily be
transferable across situations, the strategic considerations and
impact can be emulated. For example, low-risk mass actions
can activate people power even under conditions of intimidation and public resignation, and once enacted, can embolden
citizens to further action. In Turkey, it began with coordinated
switching off of lights, soon augmented by unanticipated outpourings on the street. In the digital age, joining a Facebook
group and uploading SMS ringtones in Indonesia had a similar
function, and led to further dissent.
Communications are strategically important to build awareness, win support and actively involve citizens. Depending on
the audiences and objectives of the messaging, the medium of
communicating can be the media itself, from songs to street
theater. Though not often considered part of the nonviolent
tactical repertoire, education, training and youth recreation can
be vital to build campaign capacity, confidence and resilience.
Tactical innovation, such as turning everyday actions into acts
of resistance, can thus be crucial to build support, overcome
repression, human rights abuses, and maintain campaign resilience. An honest image is critical for winning support. The
association of groups and individuals who are seen as incorruptible can have a galvanizing effect.
As in other nonviolent struggles, in disrupting systems
of graft and the corruption-violence link, power comes from
numbers-locally, nationally, and even internationally, in the
case of Guatemala, when citizens confront endemic corruption
involving national and cross-border relationships and actors.
Power is indeed not monolithic; allies and support can be
won from within corrupt systems and individual institutions,
which can yield information, access and strategic negotiations,
especially when backed by citizen mobilization.
Conclusion
An examination of the corruption-violence nexus presents
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a bleak picture of human anguish. In spite of difficult circumstances, or perhaps because of them, citizens are mobilizing,
engaging in civil resistance and wielding people power to curb
corruption and injustice, in some cases weakening linkages
with violence. They exemplify the capacity of civil resistance
to potentially prevent some forms of violent conflict, foster
conflict transformation, and strengthen post-conflict peace
building. As importantly, the achievements of citizen campaigns and movements fighting graft and abuse plant seeds of
hope-hope that those living under oppression have options
beyond quietly suffering or resorting to violence.
Acknowledgement: This project is supported through a grant from
the United States Institute of Peace and by the International Center
on Nonviolent Conflict.
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In an effort to counteract the growing militarizationof schools, militarycounter-recruitment(CR) hasemergedas an effective grassroots
movement across the United States. Led by a small number of local
activists, CR utilizes community organizingmethods to confront the
structuressupportingmilitary enlistment as a viable careeroption.
Despite operatingwith limited resources, counter-recruitmenthas
secured key legal and policy victories that challenge the dominant
social narrativeabout military service. Three examples of counterrecruitmentare profiled to illustratethe different tactics and strategies used for successful organizing within a culture of militarism.
Key words: militarizationof schools, counter-recruitment,community organizing, tactics,strategies, militarism

At a time of heightened militarism and involvement in
long-term wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are few overt
signs of an active and successful "peace movement" in the
United States. Despite significant opposition to the invasion
of Iraq and public apprehension over expanding the war in
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Afghanistan, two successive administrations have maintained
a notable consistency in the use of U.S. military force, ostensibly to "protect" American security. Presidents Bush and Obama
have also sustained record levels of military spending since
2002, while other forms of the U.S. national security state have
grown apace. Fear of additional terrorist attacks in the wake
of September 11 have led to an open-ended "War on Terror,"
including an expansion of domestic and international intelligence gathering-spying-on U.S. citizens and "foreigners"
alike (Murray, 2010). Popular culture, most notably film and
television, has largely avoided critical scrutiny of this "new
American militarism" (Bacevich, 2005), while public displays
of nationalism and support for the military have suppressed
political dissent.
In spite of this apparent hegemony of beliefs, a growing
movement of community organizers and activists opposed to
U.S. foreign policy and the growing militarization of schools
are engaged in a battle for the hearts and minds of young
Americans. Military counter-recruitment (CR), an effort to neutralize recruitment into the armed forces, has emerged as a key
method among those disillusioned with the more traditional
tactics and approach of the mainstream U.S. peace movement.
With an estimated 150 local CR groups operating in different
venues and utilizing various organizing tactics (Castro, 2008;
Friesen, 2010), counter-recruitment is focused on the increasing presence of military recruitment within public education. While CR organizing exists across the United States, it is
largely a grassroots effort to resist war and a broader culture
of militarism by emphasizing clearly defined-and what organizers see as achievable-goals linked to the "symbolic violence" represented by military recruiters in schools and local
communities.
In this article, we analyze three examples of counter-recruitment in the United States. We examine the respective strategies
and use of community organizing tactics by organizers, evaluate the similarities and differences in approach among these
examples, and assess the efficacy of CR efforts. After noting
the growing presence of military recruiters in educational settings, we locate the work of local CR groups within Friesen's
(2010) model of five symbolic struggles between CR activists
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and military recruiters. While CR organizing typically operates
with limited resources and staffing, in contrast to the massive
advertising and recruiting budget of the U.S. military, the
counter-recruitment movement has achieved notable victories
in local communities. We find that to be successful, CR groups
must utilize strategic framing of their activities to broaden
public support. In addition, choosing discreet targets of organizing efforts, careful recruitment of allies, and long-term coalition-building appear critical to positive outcomes. We frame
our analysis within a broader context of public support for and
acquiescence to a culture of militarism in the United States.
The Culture of Militarism in America
While mainstream accounts of American history have typically glorified the U.S. military, representations within popular
culture have intensified in the post-September 11 era. A recent
issue of Fortune magazine (March 22, 2010), for example, featured four different covers of uniformed soldiers, all but one
holding a rifle, under the heading, "Meet the new face of business leadership." The article noted that major U.S. corporations
are actively recruiting "the military's elite." The March 2010
cover of Vogue, tagged as the "Military issue," featured female
models in military-inspired clothing. "Heavy-duty utility
pieces in khaki and olive," it noted, "make up a distinguished
urban uniform that commands the season's attention."
In a September 2010 profile, Men's Journal lauded the
"gutsy" and "ballsy pilots" who fly the Kiowa attack helicopter in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the article included a
photo of a bare-chested, smiling pilot, it had no pictures or
little mention of the civilian casualties that often result from
the use of these weapons. Such examples depict soldiers as
modem day "heroes" and "warriors" representing an ideal of
American society, and have become deeply embedded within
popular culture. These and similar representations are thus so
normalized and ubiquitous that they may seem "invisible," as
the military is portrayed as vital and desirable, especially in an
increasingly "dangerous" world.
Like the growing use of the American flag-on bumper
stickers, advertisements, lapel pins-American soldiers are
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everywhere imaginable in mainstream culture. As important, the common portrayals of soldiers emphasize themes of
bravery and honor, avoiding critical scrutiny of the role played
by the military in foreign interventions (like the ongoing wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan), or the clear dangers that solders face.
The rise of the phrase "support our troops," is used ostensibly
to offer thanks "to those who do so much to protect us," as a
recent advertisement from Goodyear noted. But such references also imply only one acceptable way of thinking about the
military, while implicitly providing support for U.S. foreign
wars. Sports and other public events routinely utilize the military and those in uniform to promote a distinct form of nationalism and patriotism. Thus militarization takes place not
only at a military base, "in the classroom, or on the battlefield
(wherever that may be), but instead increasingly occurs in less
institutionalized settings such as state fairs, air shows, and car
races" (Allen, 2009, p. 10).
Ironically, at a time when the military draft is a distant
memory Lutz (2010) suggested that "war readiness is a way
of life" in the United States, a phenomenon that permeates
public life and social identity, yet is largely devoid of critical
scrutiny. She found that a "permanent and massive mobilization for war" has distorted the American Dream by increasing
corporate power in the public sector, promoting a culture of
government secrecy, and shifting critical resources away from
the struggle for social and economic equality (p. 45). The depth
of this cultural militarization, she found, is crucial to the lack
of public introspection about its implications.
Veneration of the military represents a recent cultural shift:
until the mid-20s century "military power and institutions"
were viewed with "skepticism, if not outright hostility. In the
wake of World War II, that changed. An affinity for military
might emerged as central to the American identity" as a global
power promoting freedom and democracy (Bacevich, 2010, p.
13). As a result, critical debate over the size of the U.S. military
budget remains a taboo topic for most U.S. politicians, helping
fuel a "permanent war economy." As Lutz observed, "there is
no institution that is more revered than the military and whose
financial and moral support is thought more unquestionable
in the halls of Congress ... " (2010, p. 55).
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NormalizingMilitary Recruitment
Of significance for counter-recruitment efforts, the culture
of militarism permeates key social institutions in U.S. society,
with public schools a prominent example. The use of primary
schools for presentations has become an ideal site of socialization by veterans and current soldiers, who use these opportunities to discuss their experiences "defending freedom." That
such events often attract local media coverage further normalizes the role of the military and serves as a potent and free recruiting tool by the armed forces. Another common practice is
for primary schoolchildren to assemble care packages or write
letters which they send to soldiers serving overseas. Such activities constitute a form of "symbolic recruitment" which educates children "to take the war effort for granted and to view
it as desirable, to consider it a privileged form of social participation, rather than question its necessity" (Givol, Rotem, &
Sandler, 2004, p. 19).
More pervasive is the growing presence of military recruiters in thousands of secondary schools across the United States.
Changes to federal law have gradually increased students'
exposure to the military in various ways. The 2001 No Child
Left Behind Act, for example, requires all U.S. high schools
to provide the Pentagon with contact information for high
school students or face the loss of federal education funding
(Tannock, 2005). As a result, recruiters now have access to
nearly all students, both directly on high school campuses and
via telephone and other communication tools. As a U.S. Marine
Corps strategist acknowledged, "the future of the all-volunteer armed forces are seventeen-year-old male high school
seniors ... but it is crucial that a recruiter contacts them during

their junior year of high school, which is why the provision of
student directory information is so critical" (Long, 2006, p. 8).
The Pentagon also pays handsomely for information obtained
by private data brokers, sometimes illegally obtained by the
third party (Goodman, 2009).
Anderson (2009) criticized the growing presence of recruiters in schools for targeting the most vulnerable segment of
American youth: low-income students with limited academic
and employment prospects. Noting the lack of research about
military recruiters in high schools, he finds that this "pipeline
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to the military" has largely avoided critical scrutiny while
schools have come under more pressure from recruiters: the
Pentagon's need for troops has increased since the invasion
and occupation of Iraq and, more recently, the escalating war
in Afghanistan. In the context of a call for a permanent war
against terrorism, troop levels are expected to remain high into
the foreseeable future (pp. 267-268).
The need to meet recruitment goals, especially among minority youth, has increased demands on the military and forced
recruiters to increase their exposure to school-aged youth. A
2009 study prepared for the Secretary of Defense notes the
recent difficulties of the Army in meeting annual recruiting
goals, resulting in lowered recruitment standards, recruitment
of "more lower-quality enlistees," and "several experimental
programs to allow applicants who failed to meet standards to
quality for enlistment" (Asch, Buck, Klerman, Kleykamp, &
Loughran, 2009, p. xxii). Future efforts to develop "recruiting
incentives" for less qualified Hispanic and African-American
youth, such as increased marketing of educational benefits,
were encouraged.
The military also obtains a wealth of student information
from the results of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB). The three-hour test is provided free to school
districts as a "vocational aptitude" exam, and many cashstrapped districts require their students to take it. Test results
are made available to recruiters, who can then use the data to
customize their recruitment "discussion" with students. Still,
the Pentagon publicly plays down the recruitment potential,
claiming that the ASVAB is just a way of "giving back" to communities by providing a public service to schools and often referring to the test as the innocuous-sounding "ASVAB Career
Exploration Program" (Castro, 2010).
The growing popularity of computer and video games,
many of which trace to Pentagon-funded research to create
training simulation for the armed forces, represent a related
means that supports a culture of militarism. Ottosen (2009)
linked military research and development and the creation of
new video games "as instruments for recruitment to the armed
forces and as a tool in the global battle for hearts and minds in
the so called Global War on Terror" (p. 123). Indeed, the most
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popular video games offer players fictional depictions that
mimic current U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and surreptitiously build support for the American military (Suellentrop,
2010). One such game, "America's Army," requires users to
"register" by providing personal data to military recruiters.

Alternatives to Militarism:
Counter-recruitment as One Model
It is within this context of deeply embedded militarism
that the practice of counter-recruitment exists. Despite the
growth of CR activities, counter-recruiters face significant odds
in their efforts to dissuade American youth from joining the
military. As suggested, they confront a society that encourages
youth-especially males-to demonstrate masculinity (and
patriotism) by becoming modem-day "warriors" and joining
the military.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, CR activists must also grapple with an environment where political dissent is increasingly suspect and subject to being labeled
"un-American." This is especially pronounced for those challenging cultural norms about the military and its use. Those
involved in counter-recruitment, like other forms of peace activism, therefore face claims of being unpatriotic, undermining
the morale of U.S. troops involved in war, and of jeopardizing U.S. security by (unwittingly) supporting "enemies" of the
United States (Coy, Woehrle, & Maney, 2008).
Nonetheless, there are successful precedents of efforts to
challenge war and militarization; resistance to the Vietnam
War is the best known example in the United States. On the
home front, draft counseling and conscientious objection (CO)
to military service in Vietnam received broad support, fueled
by recognition that racial minorities, and poor and working
class youth were disproportionately drafted to fight an unpopular war (Cortright, 1975). Draft counseling efforts assisted
soldiers and potential recruits by identifying options available
to those opposed to serving in the military or who felt that
fighting in a war contradicted their personal values. Much like
counter-recruitment employs community organizing, draft
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counseling utilized similar tactics as a way to deal proactively
with the Vietnam war. These activities were an integral part of
a broader anti-war activism that reshaped the American political landscape. Despite its disparate nature, "the Vietnam
antiwar movement was the largest, most sustained, and most
powerful peace campaign in human history" (Cortright, 2008,
p. 157).
Lainer-Vos (2006) noted that "more than fifteen million men
received legal exemptions and deferments (60% of the cohort)"
during the Vietnam War, while about 170,000 "obtained the
legal status of CO. As many as 570,000 men evaded conscription illegally" (p. 363). According to Cortright (2008), by the
last year of the draft "conscientious objectors outnumbered
military conscripts" (p. 167). In 1973 with the draft ended,
some activists viewed counter-recruitment as a more practical
option of opposing the military than claiming conscientious
objector status.
The first national counter recruitment conference was held
in Baltimore in 1974, and in 1976 the Task Force on Recruitment
and Militarism (TFORM) was formed by those involved in
draft counseling campaigns. The group, which later included
several national peace organizations, including the American
Friends Service Committee and the War Resisters League,
served as a network among activists and mobilized in the early
1980s to address the revival of the Selective Service Registration
System (Castro, 2008; Friesen, 2010). TFORM represented a
precursor to the current environment of local CR organizations
focused on challenging military recruitment. As described in
our examples, these groups have been active since the 1980s,
though up until the current Iraq war organizing efforts were
uneven. Despite a lack of media coverage and scholarship
about counter-recruitment, CR activists have scored important legal victories, forced changes to local school policies, and
broadened their base of support to include parents, teachers,
unions, and other key community actors.

Goals of the Counter-RecruitmentMovement
In the first empirical study focused on the counter-recruitment movement (CRM), sociologist Matthew Friesen (2010)
argued that CRs are involved in five symbolic struggles with
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military recruiters (MRs). Friesen's research, based upon interviews with movement activists, owes its theoretical underpinnings to the field of social movement studies and Pierre
Bourdieu's theory of "symbolic violence." His analysis revealed that "a series of contests is occurring between CRs and
MRs in public schools" over the following:
* RenditionofInformation:Counter-recruiters resist the
efforts of military recruiters to collect and use student
information to promote military recruitment.
* Educational Space: Counter-recruiters work to
restrict the physical presence of military recruiters on
the school campus.
* Heroic MilitaryNarrative:Counter-recruiters present
narratives of military service contrary to those related
by military recruiters.
* EducationalMission: Counter-recruiters resist efforts
to introduce military values into public education.
* Vocational Visions: Counter-recruiters challenge
descriptions of vocational
military recruiters'
opportunities provided by military service, and provide
alternative career options. (Friesen, 2010, p. 41)
We expand upon Friesen's (2010) model by construing
these symbolic struggles as common goals for the CR movement. As Friesen provided the first analysis of counter-recruiters' own perceptions of their work, and in the absence of
anything resembling a counter-recruitment movement manifesto, we are confident in re-branding Friesen's five struggles
as movement goals. Our analysis illustrates how three highprofile organizers reflect a commitment to achieving the same
goals while drawing upon community organizing tactics
to advance their agenda. Effective military recruiters essentially practice good community organizing: they talk to the
influential people in a neighborhood-a local minister, a high
school football coach-and build support for the military as a
viable option for young men. The fact that military recruitment
relies on organizing principles suggests a need for counter recruiters to do the same.
The first goal of CR, following Friesen (2010), aims at combating MRs' easy access to private student information. Nearly
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half of Friesen's interviewees cited "resistance to these data
collection efforts as a central activity" of their local CR organizing activities (p. 20). Recruiting for an all-volunteer military
depends on generating reliable leads and contacting young
people as early as possible in their high school careers. As a
result, military recruiters depend heavily on lists of student
data to generate solid leads and gain enlistments. Such data
comes from the variety of sources discussed above. Pat Elder,
profiled below, is one organizer who has successfully used the
tactic of lobbying for legislative changes to restrict military
recruiter access to student information at the school district,
county, and state levels. CRs who organize around this particular goal often report having an easier time gaining support
for their advocacy efforts from parents.
The second goal of CR aims at combating MRs' control
over educational space. In many school districts military recruiters currently enjoy almost unlimited access to students:
they often represent a grossly disproportionate number of occupational representatives at school career fairs, walk about
unsupervised on school property, and at times even intervene
to ensure that potential recruits get passing grades so they can
qualify for special service after graduation (Geurin, 2009). Since
the Pentagon can afford to inundate schools with recruiting resources, the result is that other post-graduation career options
are not as well represented in guidance offices, at school career
fairs, and in students' post-graduation plans.
Counter-recruiters rely on community organizing tactics in
their struggle over MRs' access to educational space. They often
stake out their own space within schools to undertake public
education efforts (e.g. tabling and distributing literature). They
may also engage in advocacy by lobbying local school boards
to restrict MRs' access to schools (Hardy, 2005). A remarkable amount of effort goes into both tactics. Organizers must
be persistent in trying to reach school administrators in order
to secure permission to set up a literature display or "peace
table." Furthermore, the legislative achievements that offer CR
activists the rare opportunity to see concrete results only come
after significant time spent networking and recruiting allies:
parents, students, teachers, and school board members.
The third goal of CR organizing aims at challenging what
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Friesen (2010) called the "heroic military narrative" endorsed
by MRs and reinforced by military recruiting advertisements
in the mass media (p. 22). A large share of the Pentagon's $1
billion annual public relations budget goes into promoting the
notion that serving in the military can be an exciting adventure-witness current Air Force Reserve television advertisements which play on young men's fascination with extreme
sports. MRs' more personal pitches aim at stimulating pride
and nationalism-that only the toughest join the Marines, or
that heroism is the exclusive domain of the military. As a counterpoint to this dominant narrative, counter-recruiters seek to
introduce young people to information that MRs are likely to
leave out of their marketing. In another instance of organizing
for public education, many of the brochures and fliers distributed by CRs in schools and at career fairs relate statistics on the
number of veterans who end up homeless or on the alarming
percentage of women soldiers who experience sexual violence
in the military.
In a key tactic used to achieve the goal of challenging the
dominant military narrative, CRs organize with veterans'
groups to deliver public education modules. Most of these
public presentations take on the topic of "what the military is
really like." Extensive outreach to classroom teachers and students is important here to recruit allies and ensure that counterrecruitment presentations will continue to be welcomed in the
future.
The fourth goal of CR seeks the demilitarization of schools.
Counter-recruiters are concerned with the way recruiters' presence in schools contradict "traditional educational values" like
creativity and non-violent problem-solving. Indeed, the schoolbased Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) program
shows how "military values that emphasize discipline, hierarchy, conformity, rigidity, uniformity, obedience, and training in
violence" can take hold in schools (Friesen, 2010, p. 26).
There are more than 3,000 JROTC programs in all branches
of service across the United States and its territories. Although
schools pay for most JROTC programming, the Pentagon
successfully sells the programs to often poorer and under-resourced communities with the promise that youth involvement in JROTC promotes "discipline" and even reduces the
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likelihood that at-risk youth may get involved in gangs.
Some public schools and charter schools have gone as far as
to revamp the entire curriculum along the lines of a military
school (Aguirre & Johnson, 2005). Therefore, in order to resist
the rising tide of militarized education, counter-recruitment
affirms the educational values of critical thinking and free
thought-principles antithetical to the military model of education. To advance their goal of resisting militarized education,
counter-recruiters rely on school-specific community organizing tactics such as curriculum development. CRs may also
lend their support to student-initiated extracurricular activities
like "peace clubs" or social justice magnet schools. As Friesen
stated (2010), the "promotion of anti-militarization curriculum
and teacher training, radical thought classes, and support of
peace clubs" will together "enable CRs to reaffirm traditional
educational values" (p. 27).
The fifth goal of counter-recruitment aims at contesting
what Friesen (2010) called the "vocational visions" offered
by military recruiters. Since the end of conscription in 1973,
military recruiting advertisements have heavily promoted
the opportunities for career-advancement found in the armed
forces (Bailey, 2009; Moore, 2009). Such sustained publicity
has been effective in attracting recruits interested above all in
the prospects of family insurance coverage or generous signon bonuses. With the armed forces now dependent on finding
more than 200,000 volunteer recruits annually (U.S. Department
of Defense, 2009), young men facing economic pressures and
those with few educational opportunities are especially vulnerable to recruitment, resulting in what some label a "poverty
draft." Not surprisingly, military recruitment continues to emphasize vocational and educational opportunities, along with
financial incentives to potential recruits. Anecdotal reports of
increased recruitment during economic recessions underscore
how many enlistees view the armed forces through a pragmatic, rather than a patriotic, lens (Massing, 2008). As Friesen
(2010) relates:
Fashioning a future for a potential enlistee through the
lens of military experience is one of the most powerful
tools at the MR's disposal. MRs describe military

OrganizingAgainst Militarism in Public Schools

91

service as an opportunity to receive technical training
that will further a civilian career, provide money for
college, offer a way out of difficult life circumstances,
infuse a vocation with patriotic service, and secure a
sizable retirement pension (p. 27).
Counter-recruiters contest the military's perceived monopoly on viable vocational opportunities by pointing out
that many military occupations have no civilian counterpart,
making employment upon discharge problematic; that military recruiters cannot guarantee an enlistee will receive the occupation or training of their choice; and that there is a much
higher unemployment rate for military veterans than non-veterans. At career fairs or at the growing number of CR-sponsored "social justice fairs," counter-recruiters engage in public
education by distributing literature and giving public presentations on non-military routes to learning a trade.
Counter-recruiters also recognize the abundance of research
which shows how many young people choose to enlist out of a
desire to serve one's country. They may be motivated by such
intangible vocational aims as "dignity" and "fidelity," two of
the leading themes identified by young recruits in Department
of Defense Youth Polls (Eighmey, 2006). Therefore, CRs must
"contest the collapse of serving one's country into a strictly
military narrative by sharing information about volunteer
programs such as AmeriCorps, National Civilian Community
Corps, City Year, and other not-for-profit service opportunities" (Friesen, 2010, p. 29). By offering information on non-military alternatives to national service, CRs are making a major
contribution to their goal of contesting the vocational visions
promoted by military recruiters.
Counter-Recruitment in Action
In the following we analyze how three counter-recruiters
(and their respective organizations) engage in community organizing to achieve the goals outlined above. We chose these
"cases" due to the visibility of each organizer in peace and
counter-recruitment publications, and based on the prominent
roles they play nationally, for example in terms of organizing,
public speaking and leading workshops at the 2009 national
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conference of the National Network Opposing Militarization
of Youth (NNOMY). Our analysis is based on multiple interviews with each of the organizers conducted by telephone
during the spring and summer of 2010. Follow-up interviews
were conducted via email and telephone. Informants were
asked to describe how they became involved with counter-recruitment, what tactics have proven to be the most successful
in their organizing, and to identify their larger organizational
strategies. In addition, through an analysis of primary and secondary documents related to the work of each organizer and
his or her organization, we sought to further assess their different organizing tactics, key barriers they confront in schools
and local communities, and the relative success of their efforts.
In our second example, in particular, use of these documents
helped provide a critical historical assessment of the counterrecruitment movement by exploring the contest over "equal
access" in public schools. We note that although all three of the
"cases" analyzed here make reference to the goals described by
Friesen (2010), this is coincidental; we selected our examples of
counter-recruitment prior to learning of Friesen's framework.
Pat Elder: Plucky Pragmatist.Maryland-based organizer Pat
Elder is a practical organizer concerned above all with getting
results. He advocates a legislative approach to counter-recruitment and presents workshops to activists interested in learning about the subject. In his pragmatism he shows the influence
of his organizing "guru," Rick Jahnkow, a San Diego-based
organizer who has been a consistent critic of the U.S. peace
movement's focus on traditional activities-like picketing and
marching-that produce little in the way of concrete results
(Jahnkow, 1989; Jahnkow, 2006a). According to Elder, the traditional peace movement views "countering recruitment and
militarization in the schools as just another tactic to use to fight
the wars du jour. On the other hand, many of my colleagues
and I with NNOMY feel countering recruitment is the strategy
to employ to resist war" (personal communication, June 26,
2010).
Elder was not always opposed to the traditional means
of protesting wars and militarism in the United States.
Having founded a non-hierarchical activist group, DC
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Anti-war Network or DAWN, he helped organize one of the first
anti-war demonstrations in Washington, D.C. after the attacks
of September 11. However, in 2004 he made what he calls a
"pragmatic shift" and decided that his efforts would be better
spent by focusing more narrowly on the issue of military recruitment. As a parent, a school teacher by profession and a
self-described "Bethesda type," the decision to focus on lobbying school boards to restrict military recruiter access to student
information was a natural fit. His efforts, falling under Friesen's
first goal of preventing the rendition of student information,
quickly bore fruit (personal communication, May 12, 2010).
As noted, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 mandates
that public high schools hand over their students' contact information to the Pentagon as a condition of continued federal
funding. However, an obscure legal loophole allows parents
or students to "opt-out" of what critics see as an invasive procedure. Elder's first victory was in persuading his own local
school district of Montgomery County, Maryland, to require
the "opt-out" form to appear on the emergency information
card that all parents or guardians must complete at the beginning of the school year. He and other organizers experienced
subsequent successes getting the same provision passed in
neighboring counties. But when they targeted school districts
far from liberal Montgomery County and ran into opposition,
"we decided it was time for some legislation." Elder gives all
the credit for what came to be known as the Maryland "optout" legislation to State Senator Paul Pinsky (personal communication, May 12, 2010).
Elder has shifted his attention in the last few years to the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). His
efforts to get legislation passed preventing the automatic transfer of student test results to the military is a useful example
of community organizing. Elder started by recognizing a pair
of organizing challenges that would make this campaign a
tougher fight than the opt-out efforts. First, the military would
put all its organizing efforts into blocking passage of any
ASVAB bill. As Elder noted:
The military didn't fight the "opt-out" (legislation).
... It didn't matter to the military, because the military
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can get names and phone numbers from a bunch of
other sources. The ASVAB is different. The military
really counts on the ASVAB because they get career
information, demographics-they get four hours of
getting into a kid's head! (personal communication,
May 12, 2010)

Elder also faced a second organizing challenge: he would
not be able to count on a sturdy advocate in government,
having recognized before starting the campaign that his old
ally Sen. Paul Pinsky would be perceived as too liberal to shepherd this bill through the Maryland Senate. To head off the two
challenges, he had to secure stronger support in the community by recruiting new allies and coalition building. Elder was instrumental in founding Maryland Coalition to Protect Student
Privacy, and gained support for the bill from the ACLU, the
NACCP, and the Maryland PTA. Along with recruiting allies
and coalition-building, the group was also careful to properly frame the public messages they were broadcasting. "We
never allowed anybody to suggest that we were anti-war
people" (personal communication, May 12, 2010). He credits
this public relations tactic with helping to get the bill passed.
As he told attendees of a workshop on legislative approaches
to CR at the NNOMY National Conference in 2009: "You can't
build a movement out of just the radicals in this country. There
just aren't enough of them." Hence, given the realities of the
American political scene, networking with groups like the decidedly un-radical local parent-teacher association becomes a
fundamental component of counter-recruitment.

Rick Jahnkow: Doyen of the CRM. Described above as Pat
Elder's organizing "guru," Rick Jahnkow represents the
counter-recruitment movement's historian, philosopher, and
chief strategist. With thirty years' experience in the San Diego,
California area, Jahnkow and the grassroots organization he
co-founded, Project for Youth and Non-Military Alternatives
(Project YANO) have achieved a number of successes. Among
them, probably the most significant was the successful 1986
suit in San Diego CARD v. Governing Board of Grossmont Union
High School. The decision in Grossmont, handed down by the
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U.S. 91 Circuit Court of Appeals, came at a time when many
in the CRM were resorting to litigation as an organizing tactic.
Grossmont effectively gave counter-recruiters a legal basis for
organizing in schools.
Jahnkow has always made tactical use of the alternative
press. He writes frequently for journals such as Draft NOtices
on topics pertaining to peace education and counter-recruitment. His careful framing of the public message means that
his opinions have remained remarkably consistent over the
years. Two points are worth noting. First, he believes that
the peace movement, used to thinking primarily in terms of
visible, public protest, must shift its emphasis to addressing
the "dangerous spread of military ideals and values in society,"
which constitutes the "root cause" of unending war and militarism (Jahnkow, 1989, p. 1). Counter-recruitment is the means
by which activists can address the "root cause" of war in the
places where military values are disseminated-the public
schools. The second element of his message targets those who
are doing counter-recruitment. Jahnkow urges activists to start
thinking strategically and adopt a "long-term vision" aimed
at combating the spread of militarism in schools (2006b, p.
19). A long-term strategy would be effective at not only opposing current U.S. wars, he argues, but possibly preventing
the outbreak of future wars (2006a). Jahnkow's emphasis on
long-term strategy stems from his experiences organizing in
conservative and highly militarized San Diego County. "That
long-term perspective is very important. But I feel it's that way
everywhere. Movements in other countries have learned that,
but that goes against the grain of our culture-we want immediate gratification" (personal communication, May 27, 2010).
The "Case History" of Project YANG, written by Jahnkow
(2006b) to educate other activists in the field, highlights specific
community organizing tactics the counter-recruitment movement draws on to achieve its goals. Jahnkow's primary affiliation, Project YANG, was formed in 1984 at a time when "only
a few organizations were engaged in similar efforts" (p. i). At
that time, the principle of equal access for counter-recruiters
had not yet been addressed in the courts. As a result, Project
YANO organizers had to think strategically about how best
to use their limited resources to gain access to schools given
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that their right to that access was often challenged by school
stakeholders. The first year of organizing was therefore spent
recruiting allies: targeting classroom teachers, sending out large
mailings about the Project YANO classroom presentations and
soliciting invitations from teachers. By the second year their
effort to recruit allies had extended to guidance counselors, a
group targeted with a special mailing "since they are frequently the primary source of information for high school students
looking for career and college opportunities" (p. 5). During
those first two years, when Project YANO activists were delivering classroom presentations and reaching out to guidance
counselors, the group was both countering the "heroic military
narrative" and providing information on non-military career
options (Friesen's [2010] third and fifth goals, respectively).
In 1988, Project YANO shifted its focus to Friesen's (2010)
first goal when they launched a campaign to raise awareness of
equal access and privacy issues around ASVAB testing in the San
Diego Unified School District. Jahnkow and his fellow Project
YANO organizers relied heavily on three community organizing tactics during this campaign: letter-writing, advocacy, and
recruiting allies. A letter-writing campaign led by parents and
religious groups, including the San Diego County Ecumenical
Society, lobbied the school district to change its policies regarding the automatic release of test results to military recruiters.
Organizers had early on recruited allies among the clergy at the
Unitarian church attended by the district Superintendent, and
this association paid off. As Jahnkow relates, "even at his own
church, Superintendent Payzant was approached by people
asking him to do something to stop ASVAB testing" (2006b,
p. 12). Ultimately, the district and Project YANO reached a
compromise on a policy which held that the district "would
no longer allow students to take the ASVAB unless they got a
parent's signature on an acknowledgment form that explicitly
asked if they wanted recruiters to receive their child's scores"
(p. 12). According to some accounts, the new policy had the
effect of halving the number of military recruitment leads generated by ASVAB testing in the district.
It is worth summarizing Jahnkow's own conclusions drawn
from the campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. Three in particular
best illustrate the use of community organizing. First, it was
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essential to embrace a long-term, incremental approach to
building support. The first- and second-year mail campaigns
to teachers and guidance counselors exemplify this approach.
Project YANO sought to build "community" support first,
rather than to risk closing doors in the future by getting turned
away at the school board and superintendent level. Second,
the group sought to strengthen "organizational credibility" by
working "in coalition with community groups" and soliciting
"key community endorsements." Project YANO's practice of
recruiting allies and coalition building with area clergy serve
as a good example of this approach. Finally, a letter-writing
campaign and lobbying from parents and clergy aided the
success of the anti-ASVAB campaign cited above. Jahnkow
notes that "complaints about the military from parents, students, community groups and school personnel are effective"
(2006b, pp. 19-20).
For contemporary campaigns, Jahnkow holds that there are
at least two important tactics to keep in mind while engaged in
counter-recruitment work in a highly militarized environment
like San Diego. First, it is necessary to control and tailor one's
message to suit different audiences. "You have to speak a language that is understandable to the people you're addressing
and not speak the language of other places, like Berkeley, when
you're in Phoenix," he noted. Second, considering the difficulty of securing funding and adequate staffing for counter-recruitment work, Jahnkow suggested that "you have to think
strategically about what you do choose to do, about the approaches you do adopt and whether they're going to have strategic value" (personal communication, May 27, 2010).
Arlene Inouye: OutreachArtist. In the months following the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, a speech and language therapist in
the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) was troubled
by a question. Arlene Inouye knew that the youth and militarism work done in her area by the American Friends Service
Committee (AFSC) was useful. But she wondered if there
wasn't something more that she and her colleagues could do
on a local level. Inouye describes herself a union person, thus
she approached the Human Rights Committee of her teachers' union with her question. At that time she did not yet have
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a clear idea about specific goals, only an interest in recruiting teachers who would want to develop "some kind of a response." To her delight, the union was receptive and "doors
opened right away" (personal communication, September 20,
2010). One of those doors led to a union-organized teach-in on
the Iraq war in June 2003, an event which attracted more than
one hundred area teachers. Inouye came away from the teachin with a list of names that would serve as the foundation for
the soon-to-be-formed Coalition for Alternatives to Militarism
in Schools (CAMS).
Inouye has been the chief coordinator of CAMS since its
founding. Lobbying and advocacy victories by the group
include a district-wide policy restricting the disclosure of
student ASVAB test results to the military. A public education
campaign, Operation Opt Out, has resisted the rendition of
student information (Friesen's [2010] first goal) by more than
doubling the number of students who return signed opt-out
forms each fall. Another form of public education, classroom
presentations, is organized by volunteers working with CAMS'
outreach arm, Project Great Futures. Similar to Project YANO,
these classroom presentations seek to achieve the third, fourth
and fifth goals identified by Friesen (2010). Inouye's innovative
Adopt-a-School program shows more clearly how community
organizing tactics facilitate counter-recruitment work.
Employing a tool-kit approach to Friesen's (2010) second
goal of counter-recruitment (resisting the "physical presence
of MRs on the school campus"), the Adopt-a-School program
empowers stakeholders in the school community-teachers,
parents, or concerned citizens-to take concrete steps toward
demilitarizing their local schools. Preliminary work involves
strategic targeting of individual schools. In her capacity as
mentor to novice teachers, Inouye makes regular visits to many
of the schools in her district. This enables her to be a listening post, getting a feel for any special issues that a school may
have with regard to military recruiters. Such regular contact
with schools also enables Inouye to recruit allies for CAMS
from among the staff she encounters. Once target schools have
been identified, Point Persons (supportive school stakeholders) work together with a CAMS representative to identify and
discuss the chief characteristics of their particular school, determine whether there have been complaints from parents or
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students about military recruiters, and to develop a strategy
based around that data.
What also makes the Adopt-a-School program unique
is its online trove of documents. These materials constitute
a program of public education in community organizing.
"Strategies for Operation Opt Out," "Working With Union
Reps at the School," and "People Skills: How to Frame the
Issues" are among the resources available online. As the title of
the last document demonstrates, the group places great stress
on properly framing the public message in counter-recruitment work. Inouye also cautions counter-recruiters against
using anti-military rhetoric in their organizing: "It's not a black
or white thing. You have to be really flexible and you have to
adjust your message, your approach" (personal communication, September 20, 2010).
The Tides Foundation, which funds other peace and social
justice organizing efforts, originally provided CAMS seed
money for its Adopt-a-School program which the foundation
felt had shown "great promise as a national model" (personal communication, September 24, 2010). The grant allowed
CAMS to identify and organize 35 schools. Five years later, 50
schools in the LAUSD have a designated Point Person, and elements of the Adopt-a-School program have been implemented
by CRs in other parts of the country, most notably in New York
and San Francisco.
As noted, aside from success in lobbying for legislative
changes at the school district level, CAMS monitors compliance with the new policies at both the school district and the
local school level. Past experience observing school administrators' lax approach to upholding new policies has taught
Inouye that "once something passes you really have to have a
mechanism in place where you can monitor compliance." To
better advocate for demilitarized schools at the school district
level, the group initiated a process of creating a military advisory committee on the school board. "We went to the board and
they actually formed a committee around us," Inouye noted,
"where I drive the agenda and we're able to keep a watch over
policies, practices and everything having to do with military
recruiting." Aside from Inouye, the committee includes the
school district official in charge of secondary schools, as well
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as the district supervisor for JROTC (personal communication,
September 20, 2010).
Within the Adopt-a-School program, school stakeholders in
the form of Point Persons (usually teachers) function as "force
multipliers." Thus the Point Persons often work as CAMS informants in the schools, monitoring compliance with relevant
district policy at the school, or alerting CAMS in the event of
non-compliance. For instance, a Point Person on the teaching
staff at one district school informed Inouye that a military recruiting van was planning to visit the school without gaining
prior approval. The point person's early alert allowed Inouye
time to contact the school principal to discuss her concerns.
Shortly thereafter, Inouye dispatched volunteers to the school
who distributed CAMS literature. Those volunteers were later
joined by representatives from the student peace club, also
sent to the scene by Inouye. In the end, the principal arranged
to have the recruiting command cancel the visit. "That to me
was a really exciting example of how when you work things
at multiple levels you can actually stop something from happening," Inouye said (personal communication, September 20,
2010).
Discussion
Counter-recruitment demands that its activists perform
the same sorts of functions normally associated with community organizing. Our analysis illustrates the following implications for CRM strategy: (1) CRs must avoid taking an overtly
anti-war position, stressing instead the anti-militarism of the
movement. To do otherwise and frame CR as a form of opposition to particular wars runs the risk of alienating key community leaders whose support may be needed to build future
coalitions; (2) While the CRM is explicitly inclusive, in that
it is multi-generational and multiracial, CR organizing paradoxically needs at the same time to be somewhat exclusive in
recruiting activists. Not everyone can be a community organizer, and those who lack good interpersonal skills and a feel
for the political will fail to advance the movement's goals; and
(3) Given the long-term dimension of this work, CRs would
do well to focus their efforts on achieving some of the goals
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identified by Friesen (2010). With the possible exception of
Arlene Inouye, none of these examples of counter-recruitment
sought to organize around all five of the goals at once. Indeed,
one of the counter-recruiters in this study compared his role in
fighting the Goliath of American militarism to the plucky determination of the American bull terrier highlighted in James
Thurber's short story, "Snapshot of a Dog." "You pick a bit,
you become an expert in it, and you don't let go" (Pat Elder,
personal communication, May 12, 2010).
Counter-recruitment organizing starts with recruiting
allies to build effective local coalitions. The examples of CR
analyzed in this study demonstrate that the best allies are typically school stakeholders: parents and teachers. With a coalition firmly in place, these groups seek to clarify goals and objectives. Counter-recruiters do this by framing their coalition's
public message in non-threatening, inclusive language. The
activists we interviewed all agree that an anti-war or antimilitary message will end up alienating the coalition from the
community whose support it needs to survive. If these groups
cannot transmit their finely-honed message to enough people,
or to those they want to target, counter-recruiters then try to
utilize alternative media outlets.
The counter-recruiters profiled here lobby policy-makers
and relevant public officials when they want to see concrete
(policy) change. They get on the phone, write letters, and reach
out to local places of worship to influence decisions. As another
means of advocacy, counter-recruiters may get themselves
seated on committees. If none exist they may start the process
to create one so that there will be some forum to address the
concerns of their coalition. And finally, if their coalition isn't
getting a chance to be heard, and if those in power won't let
them be heard because they are ignoring a law, counter-recruiters first try and cajole them or convince them to come to
their senses. And, if all else fails, they litigate.
Current counter- recruitment strategy can be summarized
in three key phrases: anti-militarist, long term, and inclusive.
CR strategy is anti-militarist,not simply anti-war. It is aimed
at countering that part of U.S. culture which promotes violence and war as the optimal response to conflict. Anti-militarism is seen by movement organizers as a way to keep the

102

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

movement viable for the long-term. One lesson CRs must learn
from the Vietnam war is that to focus on individual issues (a
specific war) and tactics (like draft resistance) may result in
sacrificing long-term relevance for short-term goals (Jahnkow,
2006a). Counter-recruitment is thus a means of resisting not
just one war, but the larger culture of militarism whose survival depends in part on young people's passive acceptance of
military values and ideals.
CR strategy is also focused on a long-term vision of incremental gains. If the CRM had a symbol, it would surely be the
tortoise. As the anti-ASVAB campaigns in Maryland and San
Diego attest, when activists win, it may be only be one local
school district. Thus, as the movement goes forward, activist
victories will be measured by the "summation of a series of
small, incremental struggles" (Theberge, 2005, p. 16). For CR
strategist Rick Jahnkow, "people have to be operating from a
very long-term perspective and be willing to accept that you
might not achieve real measurable and visible victories quickly,
that it requires time, it requires dedication" (personal communication, May 27, 2010).
Finally, CR strategy is inclusive in that it is a multi-generational, multiracial movement and needs to be to remain a credible force for change in the communities most heavily targeted
by military recruiters. However, there are obstacles to keeping
the movement inclusive. Older CRs often have trouble working
with the co-leadership of younger, high-school-age CRs. This
reluctance reflects an authoritarian thread of movement culture
and must be addressed for a truly multigenerational movement
to flourish (Jahnkow, personal communication, May 27, 2010).
Further, despite its success, CR has trouble attracting attention and respect from the broader peace movement, a problem
which will ensure that the counter-recruitment movement
remains under-resourced in terms of volunteer recruitment
and fundraising. Interestingly, Rick Jahnkow (2009) identified
class divisions as a barrier to greater (movement) solidarity:
peace activists "generally come from a more affluent part of
society than those who are targeted by recruiters." As a result,
Those of us who have been doing this work have
sometimes felt that the struggle to educate the peace
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movement about the social injustice dimensions of this
problem has been just as frustrating at times as trying
to break through the pro-military biases of school
officials. (p. 2)
As important, CR activists recognize the ways that public
policy serves to reinforce a culture of militarism. At over sixhundred pages, the mammoth No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
Act of 2001 is the best-known example of such legislation.
Section 9528 of the bill requires all U.S. high schools to provide
the Pentagon with contact information for their students or
face the loss of federal education funding. That directive was
added in the final hour "by a Louisiana congressman who was
offended that some high schools chose to protect their students' privacy by not giving out student information to military recruiters" (Anderson, 2009, p. 275). Parents and students
can still "opt out" of having their private information rendered
to military recruiters. Indeed, as shown, counter-recruitment
organizers have increased the number of students who opt out
every year by, for example, lobbying school districts to send
opt-out forms home for parents to sign. While such efforts
surely make a difference, the lack of an opt-out provision on the
national level means that CR successes will retain the limited
impact of local campaigns. But even if CRs and their allies
were to gain repeal of Section 9528 of NCLB, it would probably
fail to have the desired effect. When it comes to collecting the
kind of student information most helpful to military recruiters, the Pentagon is hardly dependent on NCLB; it can and
does get private student information from elsewhere. Other,
lesser-known pieces of legislation (e.g., the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2002) give military recruiters practically
the same level of access as NCLB (Anderson, 2009).
Although the legislative outlook may be bleak-Congress
remains staunchly pro-military and the repeal of NCLB is
unlikely-the counter-recruitment movement has to exploit
what little advantage it has within the existing legal framework. For example, Section 9528 of NCLB not only includes
the mandate noted above, it also requires that military recruiters be given the same level of student access enjoyed by other
types of recruiters. An example of what the CRM could do
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with this "equal access" provision is provided by the students
of Watervliet High School in New York State. Fed up with the
military recruiters who stalked the school cafeterias almost on
a daily basis, Watervliet students and their adult allies successfully lobbied their local school board to pass a policy limiting
visits by all types of recruiters to one per month (Geurin, 2009).
As their example shows, there is a growing recognition that effective counter-recruitment can be done even when schools are
forced to open their doors to military recruiters.
Regardless of tensions with the broader peace movement,
and despite legislative obstacles that make it difficult to eliminate militarism in schools, since the 1980s counter-recruiters
have scored significant victories. Project YANO's successful
use of litigation as a tactic won the equal access rights critical
to counter-recruitment in schools. And as the military devised
new methods of securing the private information of students,
CRs joined outraged parents and teachers in launching a
counter-attack. Organizers like Pat Elder and Arlene Inouye
have also successfully used legislative tactics at the state and
school district levels. Charting the ways in which the CRM
achieves its victories represents an important contribution
to the social sciences literature, which until now has all but
ignored the counter-recruitment movement.
Conclusion
Counter-recruitment has been criticized for its narrow
focus and lack of engagement with the larger aims of U.S.
militarism abroad and structural inequality at home (Tannock,
2005). Nonetheless, though it only has limited support from
some national peace organizations, properly understood, CR
remains a viable method of addressing U.S. foreign policy and
a culture of militarism. In what amounts to a division of labor
among antiwar activists, Travieso (2008) identified counter-recruitment as one of three strategic interests to develop out of
the U.S. peace movement following the invasion of Iraq (along
with targeting multi-national corporations like Halliburton,
and lobbying members of Congress to cut off war funding.)
Ultimately, he suggested, this "professionalization" of strategy
represents a marked improvement over the non-hierarchical
and largely ineffective peace movement represented in the
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run-up to the war in Iraq. Where does this leave the future of
counter-recruitment?
In terms of scholarship, academics and others concerned
with the impacts of increased militarism should consider
work on this and related topics. Ironically, colleges are being
pushed to roll out the welcome mat to the armed forces and
increase the university presence of ROTC nationwide (Lewin
& Hartocollis, 2010; Nelson, 2010). Instead of uncritically accepting a military presence on campus, colleges and those who
teach in them could more effectively confront American militarism through focused research and vigorous public debate.
In spite of stereotypes about American universities as bastions
of radicalism, these institutions and those working inside their
ivy-covered walls have failed to adequately grapple with the
reality of U.S. militarism.
The time to turn the tide is now. With Pentagon spending
at record levels, the occupation of Afghanistan in its tenth year,
a long-term American military presence in Iraq likely, and military operations expanding in places like Yemen and Pakistan,
the stakes could not be higher. If colleges are to be more than
mere incubators of military values, scholars-social scientists in particular-must critically examine America's culture
of militarism and its domestic and global impacts. Research
on counter-recruitment as one aspect of peace activism offers
such an opportunity.
Despite the utility of Friesen's (2010) study, for example,
larger sample sizes are needed to better assess the similarities
and differences among groups engaged in counter-recruitment
organizing. Evaluation of the success of counter-recruitment
is also needed. Field research and in-depth case studies could
help explain the strengths and limitations of CR, along with its
relationship to other forms of peace activism. NNOMY supports a directory of nearly 150 U.S.-based groups engaged in
some type of counter-recruitment and demilitarization work.
Absent a national magazine or information source devoted
to counter-recruitment, this presents a vital opportunity for
scholars and others to follow such activism.
The study of international counter-recruitment efforts
offers another line of inquiry, given the lack of such research.
In countries with a military situation similar to the United
States (no draft, an all volunteer army), there is little evidence
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of counter-recruitment organizing per se. Instead, we do see a
growing interest in the issue of military recruitment and youth
militarism in places like the United Kingdom, where Scottish
parliamentarian Christine Grahame has criticized the Army
for making visits (often uninvited) to elementary schools, high
schools and even preschools (Johnson, 2010). In Spain, Canada,
and Italy, activists have gone beyond an idle interest in this
issue; they have spontaneously organized counter-recruitment
events in their schools, colleges and communities.
From the limited information on international CR-related
activities we draw two conclusions. First, the United States is
the only country with a well-organized network of counterrecruitment groups. Outside U.S. borders the most obvious
examples are demonstrations targeting military recruitment
kiosks (in Spain and Canada) or against groups perceived
to be promoting or profiting from youth militarism (Italy)
(Alacant, 2010; Denomme, 2005; Micci, 2010). Second, we
suggest that these limited international efforts underscore that
the American model of recruiting for the military is uniquely
dependent upon the schools. While these countries are similar
to the United States by virtue of their reliance on all-volunteer
forces, only two (Spain and Italy) ended conscription within
the last ten years. More research is needed to determine the
extent to which a military recruiter presence in schools grows
in proportion to the length of time without conscription. It is
interesting, in this regard, to note a possible correlation. Only
the United Kingdom has had a longer period without conscription (since 1963) than the United States. Today the UK's
school recruitment program is just as robust as the U.S. model.
The armed forces seek recruits starting at age 16; army visits to
schools are also an integral part of the program.
As opportunities for transnational peace organizing increase, counter-recruitment may emerge as an essential activity in other countries. Trends in key western states indicate a
shift away from conscription, and toward all-volunteer, professional armies. At the same time, military forces from NATO
countries are increasingly being called upon to support U.S.
foreign policy goals-which often means sending troops into
combat in Afghanistan or other neo-imperial outposts. This
suggests an opportunity for counter-recruiters in the United
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States to collaborate with European peace movements with the
aim of promoting CR as a viable anti-war organizing strategy.
For U.S. activists, outreach efforts could be as simple as
monitoring peace movements outside the United States. They
could also involve leading workshops on counter-recruitment
at international peace conferences or writing guest editorials
on blogs and in magazines read by the European peace community. Regional networks of counter-recruitment activists
organizing their own conferences will likely assume a greater
role in the future; as an example, we note the contingent of
Micronesian counter-recruiters that grew out of the 2009
International Network of Women Against Militarism conference in Guam (Kershner, 2010). Promoting dialogue on issues of
mutual concern thus offers the potential to build a CR network
in other countries and regions within established peace and
anti-war organizations. If successful, such efforts will not only
build bridges of understanding between U.S. activists and
their international allies, they will also bolster global defenses
against militarism at a time of increasingly global war.
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This article traces the development of peace activism among undergraduate social work students. In doing so, it explores how
social statuses, political contexts, and collective action frames
affect the likelihood of joining the movement against the Afghanistan war (2001 to current). After analyzing data from a multicampus sample of Bachelors in Social Work (BSW) students (n
= 159), results show that peace activism was predicted by level
of education as well as perceptions of proper foreign policy, the
relative efficacy of social movement tactics, and identification
with specific activist ideals. Finally, being situated in activist networks fostered greater peace activism while the ascribed statuses
of race, class, and gender were poor predictors of peace activism.
Key words: peace activism, students, antiwar,BSW, social movement, collective action

In the last twenty years, the United States has initiated
three major wars: twice in Iraq, and once in Afghanistan. In
each war, most Americans initially supported the war policies,
but a noticeable segment of the U.S. population also mobilized
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into new incarnations of U.S. peace movements (Meyer &
Corrigall-Brown, 2005). While demonstrations against the
Afghan and Iraq wars were large, little analysis exists about
who joined these recent peace movements (Bogdan Vasi,
2006; Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007). To
date, no studies have explored the extent to which employed
social workers or social work students have contributed to the
recent protests against the U.S. invasions of Middle Eastern
countries.
In its most abstract terms, the social work profession has a
commitment to achieving global and local peace through political and non-political means. The social work literature contains many essays on why and how social workers can work
for peace making and human rights at international, national
and local levels (e.g., Adams, 1991; Lundy & van Wormer,
2007; Moshe, 2001). The National Association of Social Workers
(NASW) code of ethics reads: "Social Workers promote social
justice and social change with and on the behalf of clients."
Some of the ways to achieve social justice is through "direct
practice, community organizing, social and political activism."
Moreover, the NASW Peace and Social Justice Committee has
urged social workers to work for an absence of war as well
as reducing the size of the federal military budget, greater
cooperation with the United Nations, total nuclear disarmament, stopping the poverty draft and a general de-escalation
of violence.
While professional organizations have urged social workers
to engage in peace activism, there is an absence of empirical
studies on how often or why social workers join social movements against an ongoing war. When addressing political activism in general, many impressionistic essays suggest that the
social work profession has become too "micro orientated" and
has neglected its activist mission (Abramowitz, 1998; Davis,
Cummings & MacMaster, 2007; Specht & Courtney, 1993).
Coates (2003) warned that "many social workers consider the
area of policy and actions to change policy to be the concerns
of others-administrators, academics, government-but not
themselves" (p. 138). Likewise, when discussing social work's
role in international relations and peacemaking, James Midgley
wrote (2001): "It cannot be claimed that social activism has
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been popular in social work or that it has inspired many social
workers" (p. 10).
College students have often been a central force in peace
movements in the past (Van Dyke, 2003) but there is little
knowledge of how social work students might fit into these
dynamics. On the other hand, there is some research on the
reformist tendencies of social work students. The empirical literature suggests that only a small percentage of social work
students see social reform as a primary role for social workers.
While one study contends that a "desire to create social change"
is a major motive for students choosing social work (Hanson
& McCullagh, 1995), other studies suggests that social work
students are not enamored with political activism and prefer a
career in micro practice (Aviram & Katan, 1991; Butler, 1990).
To address peace activism among social work students,
this paper asks two related questions: (1) What proportion of
undergraduate social work students have protested against
the U.S. war in Afghanistan?; and (2) What are the factors that
differentiate the students who have and have not joined this
recent peace mobilization in the United States?
With a focus on factors that may inspire and hinder activism, this work integrates insights from many academic disciplines. The much cited "resource" model of political science
guides our theoretical conceptualizations (Brady, Verba, &
Scholzman, 1995), as do the sociological theories of "mobilization structures" (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Passy, 2001) and
"collective action frames" (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997;
Snow & Benford, 1992). This work also taps the nascent literature on peace activism among social work faculty (Davis et
al., 2007; Van Soest, Johnston, & Sullivan, 1987) and political
participation among social work students (Aviram & Katan,
1991; Butler, 1990; Rocha, 2000; Weiss, 2003) and employed
social workers (Dudziak & Coates, 2004; Ezell, 1993; Hamilton
& Fauri, 2001; Parker & Sherraden, 1992; Reeser, 1992; Ritter,
2008; Wolk, 1981).
Literature Review
Variable selection in this study is partially guided by the
"resource-model" of political participation (Brady et al., 1995).
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Offering a succinct answer as to why people refrain from politics, the resource-model asserts: "because they can't, because
they don't want to, or because nobody asked" (p. 271). "They
can't" suggests a dearth of necessary resources to be political. While crucial resources may come in many forms, these
authors emphasize the importance of financial situations, free
time, and civic skills in civic engagement. "They don't want
to" deals with a lack of psychological engagement in politics.
This indifference to politics is sometimes seen as political ignorance, but the resource model assumes that this is a reaction to
a lower sense of political efficacy and greater levels of individualism. "Nobody asked" implies that people are isolated from
the recruitment networks that move citizens into action.

They Can't: Class, Race, and Gender Cleavages
According to "resource-model" scholars (Brady et al.,
1995), socioeconomic standing (SES) is a powerful variable
that drives political participation for members of every social
group in society (e.g., SES works across race, gender, and occupational boundaries). In the simplest of terms, a person's class
location grants or impedes access to opportunities and financial resources that make political activism easier. Consequently,
people in higher socio-economic levels amass and retain the
structural elicitors of activism (be it more money, wider educational opportunities, or greater amounts of free time).
Numerous studies argue that affluence predicts political activism in samples of the general pubic (Barkan, Cohn,
& Whitaker, 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999;
Oliver, 1984; Tate, 1991; Wallace & Jenkins, 1995) and collegiate undergraduates (Paulsen, 1994). When moving to social
workers, the impact of income on activism is a bit less clear. A
few studies argue that social workers are more political when
they have higher incomes and more financial assets (Parker
& Sherraden, 1992; Wolk, 1981). However, other studies find
no such relationship (Andrews, 1998; Ezell, 1993; Hamilton &
Fauri, 2001; Ritter, 2008).
The resource model also asserts that greater educational
attainment leads to greater political engagement (Finkel &
Muller, 1998; Hillygus, 2005; Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Leighley
& Vedlitz, 1999, Lim, 2008; Stake & Hoffman, 2001; Verhulst
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& Walgrave, 2007; Wallace & Jenkins, 1995). Studies among
social workers often highlight the effects of education. Higher
levels of educational attainment seem to inspire greater levels
of activism among practicing social workers (Andrews, 1998;
Chui & Gray, 2004; Ezell, 1993; Parker & Sherraden, 1992;
Wolk, 1981). Among social work students, it is possible that the
completion of certain classes can make students more politically active (Rocha, 2000; Van Soest, 1996). However, Van Soest
(1996) cautioned that finishing a class on oppression did not
lead to higher advocacy intentions, while Weiss & Kaufman
(2006) noted that BSW students were less willing to engage
in social action after they did a field placement in organizations that emphasized political change. Finally, educational attainment measures were insignificant in the only multivariate
study on social worker political participation (Ritter, 2008).
Previous studies sometimes found links between political
participation and one's gender and racial background (Niemi
& Hanmer, 2010). For example, African-American high school
and college students protested more regularly than did EuroAmerican students in the 1970s (Paulsen, 1994) and the 1990s
(Dolan, 1995). Social work studies have occasionally confirmed
this pattern. Two studies found that African-American social
workers and MSW students wrote more letters to Congress,
attended more political meetings, and joined more community organizing efforts than white Euro-Americans with lesser
academic degrees (Ezell, 1993; Rocha, 2000). Another study
found that minority social work faculty were more likely to
wear a peace button or attend an antiwar rally than their EuroAmerican counterparts (Van Soest et al., 1987). Nevertheless,
four studies argued that the race of respondents was irrelevant
when addressing the electoral activities of social workers in
Michigan (Wolk, 1981), South Carolina (Andrews, 1998) and in
national samples (Parker & Sherraden, 1992; Ritter, 2008).
The relationship between gender status and political participation is far from certain. Some studies suggest that until
the 1970s women were slightly less likely to vote or join political protests (Barkan et al., 1995; Kingston & Finkel, 1987;
Wallace & Jenkins, 1995). Conversely, studies on contemporary
populations suggest that this gender gap disappeared or has
even been reversed (Eckberg, 1988; Hillygus, 2005; Hritzuk &
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Park, 2000; Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010;
Paulsen, 1994; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Tate, 1991). Studies
on a political action "gender gap" among peace activists and
social workers were more conclusive. A study on protests of
the second Gulf War found that women outnumbered men
(Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007) as did a study on peace activism
among social work professors (Van Soest et al., 1987). Only one
study of social workers in Hong Kong found that male respondents were more politically active (Chui & Gray, 2004), while
gender failed to predict the political engagement of social
workers in most other studies (Andrews, 1998; Ritter, 2008;
Rocha, 2000; Wolk, 1981).
Some studies suggest that the transition into marriage or
divorce can influence a person's political activities (Fahs, 2007;
Stoker & Jennings, 1995). The early stages of marriage can suppress political engagement for men and women (Cole, Zucker
& Ostrove, 1998; Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Opp, 1990; Stoker
& Jennings, 1995) while other studies contend that long-term
married people are more likely to vote (Leighley & Vedlitz,
1999). Ending marriages can also politicize women, since divorced women are more likely to engage in feminist activism
(Cole et al., 1998). Conversely, another set of studies concluded
that marital status was a poor predictor of political practices
(Dolan, 1995; Hillygus, 2005; Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Paulsen,
1994; Schussman & Soule, 2005).

They Don't Want To: FramingGrievances, Efficacy, and Collective
Identities
Frames are generally conceived as cultural tools or schemas
that provide "tacit theories about what exists, what happens,
and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). While frames help with
the classification and organization of incoming stimuli, they
also serve a political function. Conventional frames acquire the
consent by portraying the social order as proper, normal, and
inevitable. By seeking widespread conformity, mainstream narratives get people to subscribe to values, ideals, and self-definitions that bind them to their social location. While conservative frames prioritize deference to conventional standards,
collective action frames do the exact opposite. Collective action
frames are the set of beliefs that motivate people into joining
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collective efforts that publicly seek social change.
Movement theorists have identified several dimensions
of collective action frames (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLuaghlinVolpe, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). First, collective action frames initially render some societal norms as
wrong, unacceptable, and unjust. By naming the injustice,
Snow and Benford (1992) suggested these frames serve as
"accenting devices that either underscore or embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine it as
unjust (or/and?) immoral" (p. 137). These injustice frames can
highlight many sorts of maltreatments but they often generate greater salience when they focus on violations of fairness
or equity norms. Second, frames identify the causes of the injustice. By serving a diagnostic function, frames are etiologies
that explain why problems exist and assign levels of blame or
capability to different entities. By making these attributions,
frames highlight the sorts of practices that should be modified, transformed, or eliminated. Third, frames also convince
bystanders that they should use political tactics to stop these
violations. This prognostic aspect of frames usually emphasizes the urgency of political action and a sense that challenges from less powerful constituencies can force concessions
from a reluctant target (this confidence in movement tactics
is sometimes called "agency" or a "sense of collective efficacy"). Finally, frames must foster a collective or shared identity
among the aggrieved. In doing so, collective identities establish social boundaries of "us" and "them" by specifying who
belongs to the righteous in-group of the mistreated and who
represents the antagonistic wrongdoers against whom the
in-group must be mobilized. These collective identities often
contest and refute societal claims that members of their group
are inferior, worthless, sick, or maladjusted. Instead, collective action frames offer narratives about the virtues of similar
people and claim that their group is illegitimately threatened,
deprived, or treated badly. These collective identities enhance
a sense of solidarity and loyalty for the people who share the
same problems, while fostering some distrust or contempt for
the people or institutions that maintain these problems.
Numerous studies concur that injustice frames are relevant
to joining social movements (Finkel & Muller, 1998). Feminist
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activism occurs more often when women notice power imbalances among men and women (Cole et al., 1998; Kelly &
Breilinger, 1995; Stake & Hoffman, 2001) while civil rights activism is more common when African-Americans see systematic forms of racial discrimination (Beyerlein & Andrews, 2008;
Tate, 1991). Antinuclear activists believe that atomic energy is
dangerous (Opp, 1990) and antiwar activists see foreign policy
as immoral or driven by corporate profit seeking (Duncan
& Stewart, 1995; Swank, 1993; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007;
Woehrle, Coy, & Maney, 2008; Wood & Ng, 1980).
Social work research on political participation has mostly
ignored the role of injustice frames. Two of these rare studies
noted that MSW Students who believed in a just world were
less likely to advocate on the behalf of women, people of color,
and homosexuals (Morrison Van Voorhis & Hoestetter, 2006;
Van Soest, 1996). Moreover, a study from Israel found that BSW
students endorsed political activism more freely when they
saw poverty emanating from a lack of jobs and discrimination (Weiss, 2003). Finally, social work faculty were more likely
to join a peace march when they thought there was excessive
spending on military issues and that the U.S. should stop embarking upon military interventions in Central America (Van
Soest et al., 1987).
While perceptions of social biases and discriminations
offer an impetus for political activism, these thoughts by themselves do not guarantee political action will occur. People who
see unfair practices may be resigned to endure or cooperate
with oppressive institutions when they think the status quo
is unable to be changed or altered by non-elites. Accordingly,
some argue that sympathetic bystanders must feel that their
contributions will add to a movement's success before they
join political movement.
To date, the role of power interpretations in political activism is far from settled. Some studies contend that perceptions
of personal efficacy (Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Leighley & Vedlitz,
1999; Lim, 2008), and/or collective efficacy, are crucial to activism (Barkan et al., 1995; Beyerlein & Andrews, 2008; Stake &
Hoffman, 2001; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007). Accordingly, it has
been found that college students are more likely to be politically active when they think that the government is responsive to
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citizen demands (Dolan, 1995), while women were more likely
join feminist mobilizations when they felt they understood
political affairs and felt the women's movement was powerful (Cole et al., 1998; Stake & Hoffman, 2001). Conversely,
some studies insist that a sense of efficacy has little to do with
participation in the women's movement (Kelly & Breilinger,
1995), liberal activism (Schussman & Soule, 2005), antinuclear
protests (Opp, 1990), youth movements (Paulsen, 1994) and
antiwar protests (Swank, 1993).
The occasional social work activism studies have found
credence in the efficacy hypothesis (Ritter, 2008). Hamilton
and Fauri (2001) noted that politically engaged social workers
expressed more political efficacy; Pawlack and Flynn (1990)
noted that social work administrators refrained from political activism when they believed that their activism could
lead to negative repercussions for themselves or their place of
employment.
Issues of collective identities and self-concepts can change
a person's political behaviors in many ways. Advocacy on
behalf of oneself and others is often interwoven with issues
of self-conceptions, moral obligations, and the personal salience of political events (Hillygus, 2005). Accordingly, activist
identities are often connected to narratives of how to display a
desired or idealized self and how to live a principled life (Kelly
& Breilinger, 1995; Oliver, 1984; Opp, 1990; Polleta & Jasper,
2001). To people who internalize activist identities, political
engagement can be conceived as an opportunity to express key
moral convictions and to act upon obligations of reciprocity,
fairness, and concern for the common good.
Empirical studies have noted that the purposive incentives
of adhering to moral codes and commitment to social justice
were strong predictors of antinuclear activism in Germany
(Opp, 1990), feminist activism in Britain (Kelly & Breilinger,
1995), and peace activism in the United States (Swank, 1993).
In studies of social workers, ethical reasons for activism seem
especially important. A study of Israeli social work students
discovered a greater willingness to be politically involved
when the students saw a congruency between social work and
social action (Weiss & Kaufman, 2006). Similarly, two studies
found higher political participation among professors who
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thought social work was "inherently political" and that it was
an ethical responsibility to engage in political activities (Mary,
2001; Van Soest et al., 1987); another found that social work
agency directors were less politically active when they thought
such actions were inappropriate for a person in their profession (Pawlak & Flynn, 1990). Finally, Ritter (2008) noted that
interest in politics motivated activism among licensed social
workers, while Reeser (1992) discovered that social workers
whose primary loyalty was with clients were more committed
to social action than employees who voiced a stronger loyalty
to their agency's rules and regulations.

Nobody Asked: Social Networks and Mobilizing Structures
The proposition that social networks shape political behaviors has drawn considerable interest in movement and participation studies (Cole et al., 1998; Finkel & Muller, 1998; Lim,
2008; Passy, 2001; Tate, 1991). While the exact mechanism for
this relationship is still up for debate, many movement scholars agree that personal networks often inspire and draw people
into political mobilizations.
Many sorts of contextual and institutional settings can make
people predisposed or receptive to political activism. The messages received in familial and peer groupings can have a major
impact on political inclinations (Chorn-Dunham & Bengston,
1992; Dolan, 1995). Accordingly, studies of the general population suggest that citizens are more likely to be antinuclear,
civil rights, and gay rights activists when they think that their
friends and acquaintances approve of such actions (Beyerlein
& Andrews, 2008; Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Opp, 1990; Simon,
Lowry, Sturmer, Weber, & Freitag, 1998). Such associations may
be linked to the emotional rewards of adhering to the directives
of significant others who encourage political engagement.
While general population studies often discover a link
between referent attitudes and political activism, this has not
always been the case in studies on social work activism. Some
studies confirm this socialization argument. Recently both
Ritter (2008) and Chui and Gray (2004) concluded that social
workers were more engaged in activism when they discussed
politics with colleagues and family members. Nevertheless,
other studies have yielded contradictory results. Ezell
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(1993) and Hamilton and Fauri (2001) found no relationship
between the frequency of political conversations among one's
coworkers, one's family of origin, and the amount of political
activism among employed social workers.
While social networks either encourage the acceptance or
rejection of specific collection action frames, they also serve
as conduits of important information about political events.
Political parties, committed partisans, and movement activists often try to motivate activism through different persuasive
techniques (e.g., face-to-face conversations, phone calls, email,
direct mail, etc). While each of the recruitment pitches convert
some sympathetic bystanders into activists, people engage
more often in political actions when encouraged or asked to
be active by someone whom they personally know (Finkel
& Muller, 1998; Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Lim, 2008; McAdam &
Paulsen, 1993; Nepstad & Smith, 1999; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010;
Ritter, 2008; Schussman & Soule, 2005).
Method
Sample

This study drew on the responses of 159 BSW students from
throughout the United States. To establish a stratified research
design, this study selected participants through two means.
By seeking a pool of fully engaged student activists, the lead
researcher distributed surveys at several college-based protests throughout the Midwest and South (Indiana University,
Ohio State University, University of Kentucky). Two of these
protests focused on antiwar activism (protests occurred from
Winter 2001 through Spring 2002). To maximize the likelihood
of receiving completed surveys, we asked the protesters to
complete the survey before they left the event. Eight of 37 BSW
students from these protests said that they had done some
form of peace activism.
To create a comparison group of non-activists, this study
also distributed surveys to students who belonged to twelve
colleges through the entire U.S. (Fall 2000). To create this comparison group, we initially separated all public campuses into
research, doctoral, masters, or baccalaureate clusters using the
Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education.
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This creation of four clusters enabled access to students from
many sorts of colleges, including large research campuses and
smaller, state-run commuter colleges. Next, three schools were
randomly selected from each of the four strata'.
After selecting these twelve colleges, we contacted faculty
from each institution (via email). Professors in the natural sciences, humanities, social sciences, and business were asked to
administer surveys in their classrooms, since student attitudes
have previously differed by such majors (Astin, 1993). With
participation being purely voluntary, 28 of the 338 contacted
professors decided to distribute and collect the surveys during
one of their class sessions (8.2%). Four of these professors
taught in BSW programs and these four provided the comparison data for this study.2
In total, 159 BSW students completed the survey. As expected, this sample had a higher proportion of women (89.3%
female). The racial breakdown seemed to mirror that of
many public institutions, since 85% of the sample was EuroAmerican, 7% was African-American, 5% was Latino/a and
less than 1% were Native or Asian-American. Likewise, the
age pyramid conforms to familiar trends, since the mean age
was 26.4 years and 48% of the students were between 18 and 22
years of age. Finally, the social-class composition of the sample
was slightly skewed toward lower-middle incomes. Twentyseven percent of the students report a family income of less
than $20,000 a year, another 28% had incomes between $21,000
and $40,000, 40% had incomes from $41,000 to $80,000, and
15% had incomes above $81,000.

Measures
Participation in the peace movement was based on a political activities approach. Respondents were given a checklist of
17 ways to be politically active. Eleven of the behaviors dealt
with electoral means of influencing governmental policies
(e.g., voting, making financial contributions to elected officials,
writing a letter to a politician, signing a petition) while six items
dealt with more unconventional and protesting tactics (going
to a legal demonstration, doing civil disobedience, boycotting
products, protesting another group). Students were also asked
about the political causes that motivated such actions. If the
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students indicated that they engaged in any of these political
actions for antiwar or peace reasons, they were deemed peace
activists. In the end, 10 of the 159 students were considered
peace activists through this approach.
Most of the demographic variables were measured through
dichotomous dummy variables. For sex, respondents were
asked "What is your sex?" (Female = 1, Male = 0). Responses
were recorded as being single or not since studies suggest that
married and single are the crucial distinctions for predicting
political activism (Single = 1, Other = 0). Race was determined
by their response to the question: "How would you classify
your race/ethnicity?" Although it is often methodologically
more sound to identify variance by all races, the small number
of Asian, Latino/a, and Native-American students lead to two
binary variables for race (Euro-American = 1 and Others = 0;
African-American = 1 and Others = 0).

Some of the other demographic factors were measured
through closed-ended scales. Social class was determined
through a family income scale (10 categories that started at
under $10,000 and ended with above $151,000). For educational
attainment, students were asked, "Please indicate your highest
level of education." People who said they were first-year students were coded 1 while senior students were coded 4.
The concept of mobilizing structures has been operationalized several ways in earlier studies of political participation.
Most often, studies have explored the value expressed by other
people, the way a person was recruited to activism, and types
of group affiliations. The "Activist Friends" measure dealt with
the approval of activism among peer referents (see Opp, 1990).
The prompt asked respondents if their friends generally condoned activism: "My friends think that activism is a positive
thing" (Strongly agree = 5). The "Activist Networks" question
dealt with the availability of "micro-mobilization moments" in
which bystanders may meet political recruiters. To address explicit face-to-face requests for participation, we asked: "Have
any friends ever asked you to go to a political event?" (similar
to Eckberg, 1988).
All of the collective action frames were measured through
Likert scales. The "Foreign Policy Injustice" item dealt with the
debunking of the United States as the protector of freedom and
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democratic processes: "American foreign policy supports democracies throughout the world" (Strongly disagree = 5). We
also inquired if students recognized heterosexism by asking
participants to respond to the statement: "Too often heterosexuals are unfairly accused of being homophobic" (Strongly
disagree = 5).

The concept of collective efficacy was assessed through interpretation of the potential efficacy of protests and demonstrations (Finkel & Mueller, 1998). A single item declared that
political demonstrations helped a social movement achieve its
goals ("helped a lot" = 5, "hurt a lot" = 1).

The attributes of social identities have often been delineated as an individual's awareness that he or she belongs to a
certain social group, together with the evaluative and emotional significance of that membership (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995).
While closeness to one's social groups can inspire collective
action, some studies suggest that the best predictor of activism
is overtly defining oneself as an activist (Kelly & Breilinger,
1995). Accordingly, activist identities were traced through a
four-item composite scale that dealt with several dimensions
of politicized self-concepts (Cronbach alpha = .736). The first
two questions addressed the internalization of protest norms
or the extent that people felt obliged to protest: "I see myself
as someone who is involved in promoting social justice" and
"I feel guilty when I am politically active" (Kelly & Breilinger,

1995; Opp, 1990). Activist identities also compensated for
the "free-rider" dilemma of people benefiting from activism
even if they remained politically disengaged (Oliver, 1984).
Accordingly, one item tapped the conviction that participants
are personally active in order to atone for the political apathy
of others: "I must be politically active since most people are
politically inactive" (Strongly agree = 5). With activist identities concentrating on the need to generate new recruits and political sympathizers, participants responded to the statement:
"I try to initiate political conversations" (Strongly agree = 5).

Analytical Strategy
Given the binary nature of our dependent variables,
we deemed a discriminant analysis the most appropriate
multivariate technique (Aldrich & Cnudde, 1975; Klecka,
1980; Sherry, 2006). Approaches like discriminant analysis
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proficiently highlight crucial independent variables that maximize the likelihood of a participant belonging to a particular group (i.e., doing a political action or not). Discriminant
analysis shares many qualities of more familiar general linear
regression models. By exploring the squared canonical correlations, researchers can also uncover the amount of total variance explained by all of the independent variables found in
the regression (this effect size is akin to R2 in Ordinary Least
Square Regressions). A Wilks' Lambda (X) provides the chisquares (x2 ) that test the significance for the entire function.
When exploring the importance of specific variables, the
calculated standardized discriminant functions are analogous
to P weights in Ordinary Least Squares regressions. As such,
standardized discriminant functions convey the unique contribution of each independent variable after the contributions
of other independent variables are controlled. Like P weights,
the relative strength of the predictors can be gleaned by comparing the size of the standardized discriminant functions
(strength is determined by how far the coefficients move away
from zero).
Results
Our primary objective was to determine, using a discriminant regression approach, the effects of resource, mobilizing,
and collective action frames on participation in the current
peace movement. To assess the relative strength of resource,
mobilization and framing variables, Table 1 displays the
effects of different variable types through a series of step-wise
regressions.
Model 1 suggests that the resource variables were relatively inept predictors of peace activism among undergraduate students. The cumulative effects of the resource variables
generated could only account for 9.7% of the variance in peace
activism and the x 2 of 15.37 rejects the null hypothesis (p <
.05). Among specific independent variables, the variables of
educational attainment and being single were the only significant predictors of peace activism (.583 and .359, p <.05), while
income, gender, and race variables did not significantly predict
peace activism.
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Table 1. Standardized Discriminant Coefficients of Involvement in
the Peace Movement (n = 159)
Independent Variable

Resources
Family Income
Education Level
Female
Single
Euro-American
Afro-American

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-.285
.583*
.118
.359*
.135
.149

-.213
.389*
.068
.247
-.094
-.103

-.076
.430**
.041
.111
-.088
-.060

.392**
.442**

.250*
.419**

Mobilizing Structures
Activist Friends
Activist Networks
Collective Action Frames
Foreign Policy Unjust
Recognize Heterosexism
Activist Identity
Activist Tactics Efficacious
Wilks' X
x2 test of Wilks'
Squared Canonical Correlation
Overall % correctly classified

.409**
.387*
.354*
.299*
.903
15.37*
9.7%
79.2%

.858
22.82**
14.2%
88.1

.773
37.70***
21.8%
93.1

Note: *p<.05; **p<.Ol; ***p<.o1

The mobilization factors in model 2 offered better predictors of activist outcomes. When inserting the two contextual
factors into the formula, the X2 grew to 22.82 (p < .01) and
the squared canonical correlation grew to 14.2. Both of the
network factors showed significance, as activist networks
were the most important predictor of peace activism (.442, p
< .01), and having activist friends also inspired peace activism (.392, p < .01). Similar to the earlier regression, education
levels still influenced political involvement but the importance
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of being single lacked significance. This suggests that single
people probably have greater access to the sort of mobilizing
structures that generate more activism.
The framing variables in model 3 provided better predictors
of activist outcomes. When adding the three framing variables,
the X2 increased to 37.70 (p < .001) and the amount explained
increased to 21.8%. All four framing factors also attained sig-

nificance. Net of other factors, seeing an unjust U.S. foreign
policy had the strongest association with peace activism (.409,
p <.01). Recognizing discrimination against gays and lesbians
and having an activist identity were almost as strong as having
grievances with U.S. foreign policy (.387 and .354, p < .05).
Lastly, students who thought that protest tactics were relatively effective were more likely to join the peace movement than
the students who considered movement tactics unproductive
tools of social change (.299, p <.05). Finally, educational attainment, activist friends, and activist networks remained significant in the last regression as well.
Discussion
Strengths and Limitations

This study offered some theoretical and methodological
rigor. Our list of predictor variables was theory-driven and the
breadth of variables lessened the chance of having extraneous
or spurious variables. Moreover, our use of a stratified design
allowed for a sufficient comparison of students who did and
did not join these peace protests. Also, our sample of students
from different colleges throughout the nation lowered problems of representativeness because this study is less inclined
to suffer from the idiosyncratic side effects of studying a single
campus.
That said, research designs can also play havoc with the
accuracy and generalizability of research findings. We caution
that these findings may not perfectly apply to students from
all majors, since social work students are often more politically engaged than business or natural science majors but less
engaged than sociology, political science and women's studies
majors (Astin, 1993; Hillygus, 2005; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010).
Several research decisions could have undermined this study's
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external validity for the social work student population. First,
the small sample size can lead to Type II errors in hypothesis
testing (e.g., there are few men and racial minorities in the
sample of undergraduate social work students). Second, the
sampling procedures were not identical for activist and comparison groups, so problems of selection bias can exist. Third,
measurement errors regularly haunt survey data. Problems of
over-demanding recall could hurt our mobilization measures,
in that people may have difficulty remembering whether
anyone asked them to join a political event. Questions of social
desirability may be especially relevant to our activist identity
measures, as participants may want to sound socially desirable to themselves by overstating the amount that they fight
for social justice. Moreover, students may have difficulty identifying the actual amount of income that their families have,
as other family members may not share such information or
people may not similarly judge who "counts" as a member of
their family.
Conclusions
When exploring peace activism among BSW students, this
study offers a unique look into a retrospective sample of activists and non-activists. While peace activism was relatively rare
among our sample, our analysis reveals the value of an integrated theoretical model. Variables from each of the resource,
framing, and mobilization theories yielded significant results.
Only one of the resource factors consistently drove involvement in the peace movement. With greater educational attainment being significant in each regression, it is clear that activism
was more prevalent among the students who have completed
more course work. This finding might be the result of effective classroom interventions or issues of self-selection among
social work majors, as students less inclined to protest wars
may remove themselves from the social work major during
their junior and senior years in college. While both options
suggest that social work curricula inspire greater peace activism, future research should identify what classroom content
and assignments are better at inspiring political participation
and activist commitment.
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Marital status was the only resource factor that was temporarily significant. Being single initially was important but this
importance notably disappeared when mobilizing structures
were entered into the mix of variables. This might suggest that
single students were more active than married or divorced students because they were more likely to have activist friends.
Perhaps married students embraced more traditional and conservative values compared to single students (especially given
their age cohorts and young people generally delaying marriage more). Further, single students may have more free time
to participate in activism due to fewer caretaking responsibilities or living situations that contain more like-minded activists
of the same age cohort (e.g., dorms or student ghettos).
The rest of the resource variables were irrelevant to peace
activism. Levels of family income never swayed involvement
in this peace movement. This suggests that students from affluent, middle-class, and working-class backgrounds are equally
drawn to antiwar activism. This result may have occurred since
social work majors have less variance in family incomes than
students in other majors (Caputo, 2004), or because framing
factors were simply more important than resource variables
for people who attend college (itself a relatively narrow
demographic).
Matters of gender and racial status seemed equally inept
at forecasting peace activism. While women and racial minorities were more likely to object to the Afghan and Iraqi wars
(Kaufman, 2006), the demographic forces behind war opinions and political activism were not the same. That is, being a
woman or person of color might make students slightly more
suspicious of war rationales, but these differences in attitudes
didn't always translate into greater peace activism behavior.
Instead, the true catalysts of peace activism were the collective
action frames and mobilizing networks that motivated action
against the American invasion of Afghanistan.
This study also highlighted the importance of mobilizing structures. Peer attitudes were crucial to peace activism. Predictably, students who socialized with activists were
more likely to be peace activists themselves. However, there
could be temporal ordering problems in this association, in
that students who were already politically active may have
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intentionally sought out people who supported such tendencies. Additionally, being embedded in pre-existing activist networks certainly predicted future peace activism. Accordingly,
these findings suggest a couple of things: first, substantial political tutoring must occur before a social work student takes
up the struggle against U.S. war policies; and second, students
who attended colleges that lack thriving activist networks
may never transform their political attitudes into political
behaviors.
Our data also suggested that framing variables were especially important in predicting peace activism. Grievances with
the federal government led to more peace activism among our
sample. Students who disputed the nobility of U.S. foreign
policy and challenged issues of heterosexual privilege were
more likely to join the peace movement. Also, activism was
more prevalent among students who characterized themselves
as workers for social justice. That is, peace activism was partially contingent upon the internalization of a personal commitment to working for oppressed peoples. Some constructed
this as desire to be an "honorable" citizen and some responded
to the guilt of implicitly supporting injustice through political
inactivity. Activists also had greater confidence in social movement tactics and clearly believed that these were an effective
way to enact social change. This suggests that some students
were opposed to U.S. war efforts but remained politically inactive because they felt that social movement tactics were unable
to alter the George W. Bush administration's war plans.
Implications for Social Work Education
This paper can inform social work education in several
ways. With injustice frames being essential to protest activities,
social work programs should try to reveal the discriminatory
and exploitative nature of many U.S. institutions (e.g., unjust
foreign policy or heteronormativity). Similarly, because activist identities mattered in predicting peace activism, professors
must reveal the connections between client well-being and injustices in families, agencies, and political arenas. Moreover, instructors should find ways to move students beyond a narrow
focus on the well-being only of U.S. citizens. That is, professors
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must help students become committed to improving the lives
of people who live outside of the U.S. by expanding notions of
what an "us" actually looks like. Likewise, educators should
convince students that politics is not a "spectator sport," that
is, social work ethics requires involvement in political struggles. More concretely, educators should create assignments
and exercises that offer opportunities to practice advocacy.
The social work profession as a whole can also modify its curricula. Programs should provide a greater emphasis on foreign
policy and the ways that the United States supports dictators
throughout the world. Content can also explore the relationships between war and economic hardships, governmental
debt, PTSD for soldiers and civilians, forced migrations, systematic rape, and spillover effects of greater familial violence
in the U.S. and elsewhere. Departments can augment their
policy classes by providing more social work classes on social
action and by enrolling students in the sorts of sociology and
women's studies classes than inspire the most progressive activism among their students (Hillygus, 2005; Niemi & Hanmer,
2010; Stake & Hoffman, 2001). Practice classes can also connect
students to issue-based advocacy groups, and typically offer
greater access to political field practicums (Rocha, 2000; Van
Soest, 1996). Finally, programs can emphasize international
travel or studying abroad, since these experiences can enhance
students' cultural awareness and their commitments to social
justice (Lindsey, 2005).
Broader Implicationsfor Education
Ultimately, these findings also suggest that teaching about
antiwar activism can enhance existing curricula in other departments, particularly sociology, psychology, ethnic studies,
women's studies, and American studies. Such classes often
focus on the relationship between individuals and social movements but too often fail to precisely examine the differences
between those who are politically active and those who remain
more politically disengaged. Further, the study of peace broadly
defined allows students to imagine not only how peace functions in a conflict and military sense, but also how peace might
inform other social relationships in their lives; for example,
by engaging in peace activism, they might learn to value the
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diverse lived experiences of their fellow activists, or they may
gain exposure to new ways of seeing or embodying identity
(e.g., heterosexual students confronting the lived experiences
of homophobia in their peers' lives). Moreover, the study of
peace from a social justice perspective can also work against
the more intimate manifestations of violence (e.g., domestic violence, racism, sexism and homophobia). Because most classes
in social work, sociology, and critical fields have as their goal
the cultivation of critical thinking and enhanced political engagement in students' social environments, the examination of
political socialization, political activism, social relationships,
and peace studies plays an integral part in shaping the future
of socially-engaged education.
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1. Research schools: University of Delaware, University of
Oregon, University of Texas; Doctoral: University of North
Carolina-Greensboro, University of Mass-Lowell, Rutgers;
Masters: Longwood College, University of Southern Maine,
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay; Baccalaureate: Evergreen
State College, Mesa State College, Southeast Arkansas College
2. Clearly this response rate was neither high nor random.
Professors who never read email automatically removed
themselves from the sample and the willingness to distribute
the surveys was not constant throughout the different sorts
of schools and disciplines. For the sample of all professors,
around 2% of the Research professors distributed surveys,
while 13% professors at masters granting universities
did so. Likewise, less than 1% of Chemistry, Biology, and
Physics professors assisted in this project while professors
in Political Science, Sociology, and Social Work were most
receptive to our requests (11%). Of the social work professors
who actually distributed surveys, all of them either taught
research or policy classes.
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The Qur'anicperiod of Islamic history took place in a social context of significant diversity. A number of important verses in the
Qur'anreflect this diversity and encourageIslamic believers to seek
peaceful coexistence with those of otherfaiths, especially those designated as "people of the Book," specifically Christians,Jews and
Sabeans. In the later classicalperiod of Islamic history, the exegesis
of Islamic jurists markedly de-emphasized peaceful coexistence in
favor of interpretations encouraging conquest and religious uniformity. Although the classical jurists have exercised enormous
interpretiveauthority in subsequent Islamic history, their authority was never understood to be absolute or equal to the authority
of the Qur'an itself. It is the challenge for Muslims in contemporary times to recover the authority of Qur'anicverses encouraging
peaceful coexistence and respect for human diversity, not merely
as a social strategy, but as an integral devotional aspect of better
understandingthe God who transcendsall human understanding.
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Until recently, nations lived in relative isolation. But with
the advancement of communications technology and increased emigration, the many different religious and ethnic
traditions must now share common space. More than ever it
is imperative that they learn to understand, respect, and live
with the "other." More importantly, citizens of all nations must
come to terms with the human diversity that characterizes our
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existence on this planet. Dealing with human diversity requires
a proper articulation of the means of peaceful coexistence.
While there has been plenty of public discussion concerning violence and Islam, Islam as a religion has all too often been
singled out and targeted as violent and extremist. A reasoned
discourse on the issue of peace within the Islamic tradition has
been sorely neglected. In this paper, therefore, I will delineate
the Qur'anic position on peaceful coexistence with the "other."
I will also examine the classical Sunni and Shi'i pronouncements on peace and war. In the final section, I will assess the
possibility of an Islamic theology of peace in modem times.
Peace and Coexistence in the Qur'an
Historically, the Qur'anic view of engagement with the
"other" was shaped by the socio-political milieu in which it
originated. Islamic revelation found expression in a pluralistic
world in which Muslims had to deal with Arab pagans and
adherents of other monotheistic religions. To comprehend the
Qur'an's response to the Muslims' interaction with the "other,"
it is essential, at the outset, to examine the moral basis of such
interaction and the Qur'an's teachings on human diversity.
The Qur'anic view of peace and tolerance is interwoven
with its view of a universal moral discourse uniting all human
beings. According to the Qur'an, human beings are created
with an innate disposition (fitra) that leads to knowledge of
and belief in God. In fact, the Qur'an posits a universal morality for humankind that is conjoined to values ingrained in the
conscience of all human beings (30:30). This suggests a universal, ethical language to which all human beings can connect
and engage. As the Qur'an states, "He (God) has inspired in
[human beings] the good or evil [nature] of an act, whosoever
has purified it (the soul) has succeeded, one who corrupts it
has surely failed" (91:8-10).
The Qur'anic concept of a universal moral order is thus
grounded in the recognition of an innate disposition engraved
in the human conscience. Through this notion, Islam embraced
certain universal human values that could form the basis for
interaction with a diverse "other."
The basis of such a universal moral order can also be traced
to verses like the following: "Humankind, be aware of your
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duties to your Lord, who created you from a single soul, and
from it created its mate, and from the pair of them scattered
abroad many men and women" (4:1). The verse suggests a
common genesis and unity of human beings based on God's
creation. It also implies that human beings must recognize and
live with their differences. On the basis of universal guidance
and a common human origin, the Qur'an posits the presence
of an objective and universally binding moral standard that
is accessible to all intelligent beings. A striking feature of the
Qur'anic discourse is an emphasis on the capacity of human
beings to use their innate intelligence to comprehend universal truths. It is on the basis of their innate capacity and shared
moral values that human beings can deal with others based on
principles of fairness and equity.
The ramification of the preceding passages is that, since
guidance is the function of God, it is He alone who has the
right to decide the "spiritual destiny" of human beings. The
Qur'an categorically maintains that the ultimate fate of human
beings is left to God, the true judge of human conduct. Not
even the Prophet has the right to judge the ultimate fate of
human beings. As it states, "Upon you [0 Prophet] is the deliverance [of the message], upon us is the reckoning [of the
deeds]" (13:40). In another verse, the Qur'an states, "Had God
willed, they would not have been idolaters. We have not appointed you as a watcher over them, neither are you their
guardian" (6:107). By elevating judgment to the divine realm, the
Qur'an creates the necessary space for peaceful coexistence on
the human plane.
The tolerant and universalistic tone of the Qur'an can be
further discerned from the much-cited verse, "There is no compulsion in religion" (2:255). The famous twentieth-century Shi'i
exegete Muhammad al-Husayn al-Tabataba'i contends that
faith is a matter of individual conscience and as such it cannot
be created by coercion and compulsion. "Belief," al-Tabataba'i
continues, "follows reason and understanding; and nothing
but reason and understanding can create it" (Tabataba'i, n.d.,
Vol. 3, p. 342). According to Zamakhshari (d. 1144), not only the
people of the book but all human beings have the right to exercise free volition in matters of faith. The "no compulsion" verse
is not to be limited to the people of the book (Zamakhshari,
1987, Vol. 1, p. 387). The Qur'an clearly does not advocate the
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use of force in matters of faith. Thus, verse 10:99 further states,
"And if your Lord had willed, whoever is in the earth would
have believed, all of them. Can you [0 Muhammad] coerce the
people to believe?" The overall emphasis in the Qur'an is on
voluntary consent to the will of God, which is predicated on
the universal guidance of reason and understanding engraved
in all human beings.
Fundamental to the Qur'anic conception of peaceful coexistence, then, is the view that human beings are united under
one God (2:213). They are to strive towards virtuous deeds
(5:48), for the most noble person in the eyes of God is the one
who is most pious (49:13). These and other verses command
Muslims to build bridges of understanding and cooperation
with fellow human beings so as to create a social order rooted
in and reflecting the highest ideals of justice and equality.
The Qur'anic Vision of Religious Pluralism
The modern era has accelerated the intensity and pace of
interaction among believers in different religious traditions.
However, intense awareness of and interaction with other
faiths has been present in the Islamic tradition from its inception and are not characteristics unique to the modem era
(Eickelman, 2002). The Qur'an originated in the multicultural
milieu of seventh century Arabia, and thus addressed topics
such as freedom of conscience, rights of minorities, human
rights, and religious pluralism-all issues with which a multifaith community is bound to encounter and grapple with.
Among Muslim scholars, both those who favor and oppose
religious pluralism have invoked Qur'anic verses to support
their positions. The pluralistic outlook of the Qur'an is expressed by verse 2:62, which appears to provide salvation to,
"whoso believes in God and the Last Day among the Jews, the
Christians, and the Sabeans." This inclusive position is then apparently contradicted by verse 3:85, which states that, "whoso
desires another religion than Islam, it shall not be accepted of
him. In the next world he shall be amongst the losers." This
verse is often quoted by those who claim it abrogated the
promise of salvation offered to the people of the book in 2:62.
Verse 3:85 provided a major impetus to those who see salvation restricted to Islam, and interpret the Qur'an according to a
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hermeneutic that later verses trump earlier ones. However, it is
important to bear in mind that the verse that affords salvation
to other monotheistic religions (2:62) is repeated almost verbatim in 5:69, which was apparently revealed after 3:85 (Hashmi,
2002a, p. 34).
Peaceful coexistence further necessitates that people abstain
from abusing those who do not share their beliefs. Deriding
and mocking others can often engender violence and hatred.
Therefore, the Qur'an urges respect for the beliefs of others.
The Qur'an further states, (this is a repeat of an earlier page)
Had God willed, they would not have been not
idolaters; and we have not appointed you a watcher
over them, neither are you their guardian. Abuse not
those to whom they pray, apart from God, otherwise,
they will abuse God in revenge without knowledge.
So we have decked out fair to every community their
deeds; then to their Lord they shall return, and He will
tell them what they have been doing. (6:107-108)
Qur'anic tolerance extends protection not only to Muslims
and the people of the book but even to strangers who openly
declare idolatry. As it says, "If one of the idolaters seeks protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the word
of God, and after that, send him to a place of safety" (9:6). This
verse instructs Muslims not only to protect but also to ensure
that no harm comes to them when they leave Muslim territory,
and to send them to a place of safety. The discussion above indicates that the Qur'an envisioned a diverse community that
was united under common moral values. Human beings are
to coexist in peace and harmony. Diversity and differences in
faith are to be judged by God only since, "Isn't He (God) the
best of judges?" (95:8)
Jihad in the Qur'an
The Qur'anic vision of tolerance and peaceful coexistence
is mitigated by verses that encourage Muslims to wage war.
It is important, therefore, that we properly understand the
Qur'anic pronouncements on jihad. The Qur'anic world-view
is to bring the world under the sway of God's guidance so as to
establish a righteous order based on justice and equality. Thus,
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jihad is envisioned as an important tool in the community's
attempt to build a world order in which peace, justice, and
equality prevail according to God's providence. According to
Esposito (2002), the rationale of the wars was to "spread its
(Islam's) righteous order so that ignorance and unbelief could
be replaced by just societies throughout the world" (p. 33).
The Qur'anic understanding of jihad as warfare is evident
in verse 2:193, "Fight them until there is no persecution (fitna)
and the religion be only for God." In another verse, the Qur'an
states, "Fight in the way of God against those who fight against
you, but do not transgress. God does not love those who transgress. And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them
out of the places from where they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter" (2:190-191).
The Qur'an sanctions jihad to establish a moral order that
will protect the welfare of the Muslim community against both
internal and external enemies. Permission to engage in hostilities was evidently a response to the threat posed by the
powerful Meccan tribes. A prescriptive measure was needed
to redress the harm and the wrongs suffered by the Muslims
in the face of Meccan aggression. These divinely sanctioned
campaigns were a response to the hostility of the Meccan
pagans. The Qur'an does not state that force was to be used
against all unbelievers; only those who demonstrate their
hostility to Islam by trying to undermine Islamic polity and
by persecuting Muslims were to be targeted. It is Meccan
hostility, rather than their disbelief, that is the target of the
Qur'anic verses on jihad.
The Qur'an does not accept the idea of unlimited or aggressive warfare. By the assiduous usage of the term la ta'tadu (do
not transgress) in the context of warfare, it can be argued that
the Qur'an qualifies jihad with a moral condition of restraint. It
also exhorts Muslims to seek avenues of peace. Thus it restricts
rather than gives free license to recourse to war. The Qur'an
also outlines rules of engagement, that is, who is to fight and
who is exempted (48:17; 9:91), when hostilities should cease
(2:192) and how prisoners should be treated (47:4). As there is
no compulsion in religion (2:256), Muslims are not to use jihad
as a means to impose their beliefs on others.
Other verses stipulate that Muhammad should accept peace

Peace and War in the Qur'anand JuridicalLiterature

143

overtures (8:61) from the enemy. Verses 2:192-93 command the
Prophet to cease hostilities if the enemy desists. In order not
to transgress, Muslims are required to respond proportionally
to the injury done to them. Even here, the Qur'an urges restraint by accepting blood money and forgiveness. The Qur'an
suggests that jihad is a product of defense against aggression
rather than initiation of hostilities against enemies (22:39-40).
The People of the Book in the Qur'an
The discussion on pluralism in the Qur'an is essential to
our understanding of peace in Islam. Confinement of salvation
to a particular religious tradition frequently leads to marginalization and demonization of those who espouse other religions. As I shall discuss, by characterizing the "other" as nonbelievers and therefore doomed, Muslim jurists justified the
humiliation and even killing of non-Muslims.
In the sectarian milieu of seventh-century Arabia, Muslims
encountered other monotheists like the Christians and Jews.
These encounters generated inter-religious polemics, which
are reflected in the Qur'anic verses, especially those revealed
in Medina. In its discourses with the people of the book, the
Qur'an invites them to the notion of a shared religious community based on the belief in one God. Thus, the Prophet is
instructed to tell them, "Say! 0 people of the book! Come to
a word common between us and you, that we serve none
but God, and that we associate not aught with Him, and do
not some of us take others as Lords, apart from God. And if
they turn their backs, say, 'bear witness that we are Muslims'
(3:64).
The ahl al-dhimma in the Qur'an and early history of Islam
were the protected minorities, both Jewish and Christian,
who had chosen not to convert to Islam. They were allowed
to follow their own laws and modes of worship, provided
this would not impinge on the Muslim community. The term
dhimma refers to a pact drawn up with the people of the book
which the believer agrees to respect, the violation of which
makes him liable to blame (dhamm).
In return for security and protection, the people of the
book were required to pay a poll tax (fizya), mentioned in verse
9:29. The poor and dependents were exempt from paying this
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special tax. The jizya was also levied in compensation for exemption from military service in Muslim forces. If a dhimmi
joined the service, then jizya was not levied (Safi, 1988, p. 39).
But later on, this jizya became symbolic of Muslim ascendancy
and subjugation of non-Muslims.
Initially, the issue of the collection of a poll tax and the circumstances under which it could be collected were not fixed.
Umar, for example, is reported to have accepted the zakat rather
than jizya from Banu Taghlib, when they argued that as Arabs,
they should not be treated differently from their Muslim compatriots (Abu Yusuf, n.d. pp. 120-121). He also refused to accept
the jizya from a group that he could not offer protection against
Byzantine aggression (El Fadl, 2002, p. 21).
Early Sunni schools of law adopted different positions on
the question of the collection of jizya. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis
claimed that jizya is acceptable only from the people of the book
and the Magians. It is not acceptable from any of the polytheists.
The Hanafis and Malikis and several other jurists stated that jizya
is acceptable from all non-Muslims except the Arab polytheists
who had incited war against the Prophet (Sulayman, 2001, p.
67).
Al-Shafi'i (d. 820) also ruled that if a person was introduced to Islam when he was not one of the peoples of the
book, and he made an offer to the imam to pay the tribute in
return for permission to remain in his religion, then it was
not permissible for the imam to accept that offer. Rather, the
imam was obliged to fight him until he surrendered, just
as he was required to fight idol worshippers until they surrendered. Al-Shafi'i further stated that if the Muslims fought
those about whose religious affiliation they had no information, and who claimed to belong to the people of the book,
Muslims had to ask them when they and their ancestors accepted that religion. If they said it was before the Qur'an
was revealed to the Prophet, the Muslims could accept their
statement and allow them to remain in their ancestral religion. But if Muslims suspected that what they were saying
was not true and could establish proper evidence to that
effect, then the Muslims had to spurn the tribute and challenge them to surrender or to fight (as cited in Sachedina,
2001, p. 49). The clear understanding is that if non-Muslims
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refuse to accept Islam or pay the jizya, the male unbelievers
may be killed. This implies that the guilt of refusing to adopt
Islam deprives a non-Muslim of the right to life, and therefore, such a person deserves whatever harm may come to
him. Clearly, such rulings contravened the Qur'anic vision
of peaceful coexistence.
The Qur'anic discourse with the people of the book indicates that, despite the polemics and differences with the
dhimmis, it encouraged the Muslim community to seek means
of peaceful coexistence. Recipients of earlier traditions were
acknowledged by the early Islamic state to be autonomous religious communities, to be governed in their communal affairs
according to their own laws. As long as they did not threaten
the Muslim community, and paid the jizya, the Islamic state
was to assure their security and autonomy.
However, subsequent interactions between the Muslims
and the people of the book did not reflect these principles of
peaceful coexistence. Instead, Muslims often imposed discriminatory measures on the people of the book. Qur'anic verses
urging tolerance towards them were often considered abrogated by verses requiring jihad against them.
The HistoricalEncounter with the People of the Book
The historical record of Muslim engagement with peoples
of other faith lies in stark contrast to the tolerance and awareness of other religions set forth in the Qur'an and the practices of the early Muslim community. The distinction between
the Qur'anic concept of coexistence with non-Muslims and the
policies advocated by subsequent Muslims can be seen from
the following comparison. The Qur'an allowed the evidence
of non-Muslims when no Muslim was available to witness the
will of a Muslim who died on a journey (5:106). Abu Hanifa (d.
767), however, rejected the evidence of non-Muslims in such a
case, and Abu Yusuf (d. 798) declared the Qur'anic passage to
have been abrogated by verse 65:2. The Medinese jurists went
even further, rejecting the evidence of non-Muslims altogether,
even against one another (Schact, 1950). Gradually, a series of
restrictions were regulated so as to enforce Muslim supremacy
and to reflect the inferior status and identity of non-Muslims.
Several discriminatory measures such as the prohibition
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against building new churches or repairing old ones were
enacted. Muhammad b. 'Abdun (d. 1100), for example, stated
in his treatise
that priests must be forcibly circumcised simply
because they persist in following the example of Jesus
Christ who was, states Ibn 'Abdun, circumcised. A Jew
or Christian should not be allowed to dress like an
important person. A Muslim may not wash a Jewish or
Christian toilet. (Williams, 1971, pp. 159-160)
Other jurists held that Muslim authorities may prohibit
dhimmis from marrying Muslims. Dhimmis were to wear distinctive clothing, or more specifically, special emblems on their
clothes as a token of their inferior or different status.
They were to live in houses that were smaller than Muslim
houses. They were not permitted to ride horses, which was
public proof of one's affluence. Most schools, apart from the
Hanafis, paid a lower blood price for a dhimmi who was killed.
Jizya, said Zamakhshari (1987), should be taken from them
with belittlement and humiliation. "The dhimmi is to come
walking, not riding. When he pays the jizya, he shall be slapped
on the nape of his neck" (Lewis, 1984, p. 15). Others added
symbolic acts of humiliation-for example that the dhimmi's
hand was to be lower than the tax collector's hand when he
pays the jizya. These regulations were incorporated into the
jurisprudence as a divinely sanctioned system of discriminatory provisions (Khadduri, 1955). Not all jurists agreed with
such acts of humiliation. Abu Yusuf, for example, stated that
dhimmis should not be treated harshly or humiliated, rather,
they should be treated with considerable leniency (Abu Yusuf,
n.d., pp. 122-125).
Such discriminatory regulations contravene the spirit of
peaceful coexistence and egalitarianism in the Qur'an. The
tendency among jurists of the eighth and ninth centuries was
to seek justification for the discriminatory rulings by claiming
that the unbelievers had chosen to refuse the offer to convert.
Hence, their inferior status was the product of their own
choice.
Overall, Muslims discriminated against but did not persecute the dhimmis. According to Bernard Lewis, "... in contrast

Peace and War in the Qur'an and JuridicalLiterature

147

to Christian anti-Semitism, the Muslim attitude toward nonMuslims is one not of hate, or fear, or envy, but simply of contempt" (Lewis, 1984, p. 33). It is plausible to maintain that the
policies of the state and political exigencies were incorporated
in the body of the emerging Islamic law at the time. Rather
than reflecting divine sanctification of the law, the various regulations regarding the dhimmis were enacted to justify the political and military realities of the time. Rulings on the dhimmis
also demonstrated Muslim ascendancy over the people of the
book.
Peace in the Juridical Literature
There has been limited discourse on peace in the exegetical
and juridical literature. For the jurists, the discourse on peace
was set in the context of a general theory, which presupposed
that peaceful coexistence with a Muslim state was possible only
when those areas where Muslims were in the minority or were
persecuted (dar al-harb)were subdued. Anything less than that
was construed as a compromise of Muslim ascendancy and an
act of relinquishing power.
When jurists discussed peaceful coexistence, it was in the
context of measures that would allow for a temporary cessation of hostilities. Shafi'i jurists interposed, between dar alIslam and dar al-harb, a third category, dar al-sulh, the abode
of truce. Dar al-sulh refers to the territories where peace exists
with an Islamic state based on treaties, alliances, and cooperation.
During the period of the truce, dar al-sulh would have to pay
the jizya or cede a portion of its territory (al-Shafi'i, 1990, p.
103-104).
According to al-Shafi'i, the imam could contract the
truce if the welfare of the Muslims required it. However,
al-Shafi'i's theory only suspended warfare, it did not eliminate it. Based on the precedent established by the Prophet's
agreement with the Meccan tribes at al-Hudaybiyya in 630
C.E., the truce could not exceed ten years.
The jurists were divided on the question of the duration of
the peace treaty. Malik b. Anas (d. 795) and Ahmad b. Hanbal
(d. 855), two prominent jurists, supported the notion of an indefinite peace treaty as long as it served the interests of the
Muslim community (Zaman, 2002). However, not all jurists
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recognized the existence of dar al-sulh. The Hanafis did not
accept it, whereas Ibn Taymiyya argued against putting a restriction on the length of the peace treaty (El Fadl, 2001)
The jurists conceived of another scenario for temporary
peace. One of the most important aspects of the body of Islamic
law regarding international relations (siyar)was the guarantee
of free passage or security (aman)which any Muslim could grant
to a visitor from dar al-harb (called harbi)(Khadduri, 1955). The
aman is a pledge of security through which the harbi would be
entitled to protection for up to a year while he is in dar al-Islam.
The holder of the aman (called musta'min) is not considered to
be a dhimmi, neither is he required to pay the jizya. The aman
can be renewed at the end of the period if he agrees to pay the
jizya and to become a dhimmi. The aman suspended, albeit temporarily, the state of hostilities.
Despite the juridical rulings on Muslim and non-Muslim
relations, there have been many instances where Muslims
coexisted peacefully with non-Muslims. Indeed, to portray
Islam as intrinsically violent and incompatible with Western
values is to ignore Muslim engagement with and contribution
to Western civilization. The tendency to view Islam through a
lens of violent militancy distorts the fact that Islam has a rich
cultural heritage and precepts that strongly encourage coexistence with others. In Spain, for example, Muslims not only coexisted peacefully with Christians and Jews, but also protected
them and shared scientific achievements with their counterparts. For much of Islamic history, Muslim societies have been
remarkably open to the outside world (Eickelman, 2002).
The vast expanse of the Muslim world inevitably meant
that it came to encompass a variety of civilizations and cultural forms. By the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Muslimmajority world showed a remarkable variety of institutional
forms, from North Africa to South Asia, up to and including
the hinterland of the Chinese empire, and soon emerged as
a dominant force in Southeast Asia. Historically, Islam has
exhibited remarkable tolerance toward people of other faith
communities, as in Spain, India, the holy lands, Turkey, Africa,
and Indonesia.
In the past, Muslims not only tolerated but even protected
minority groups, especially Jews and Christians, the people
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of the book. In ninth-century Baghdad, Hunayn ibn Ishaq, a
Christian, directed the translation academy when the classical
Greek works and Hindu and Persian scientific treatises were
translated into Arabic. The Caliph al-Ma'mun (d. 833) would
send emissaries to Constantinople to bring back manuscripts
written in Greek so that they could be translated. Greek works
such as Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics and Plato's Dialogueswere

preserved mainly through these translations. It was through
the works of Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198) that
Aristotelianism and neo-Platonism came into Europe (LopezBaralt, 2003). Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle were indispensable to Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Moses Maimonides
(d. 1204) (Bill & Williams, 2002).
As noted above, the era of Muslim rule in Spain (approximately the 9h through the 12th centuries) provides an excellent precedent where Muslims not only lived peacefully with
Christians and Jews, but also shared their scientific accomplishments with them in the construction of a great civilization.
Although treated as second-class citizens, the Jews of Spain
were given religious liberty; they could run their own affairs
based on their own laws. This was in stark contrast to how
Jews were treated in any of the Christian lands during that
time. Cordoba was the center of a brilliant Jewish culture epitomized by Hasday b. Shaprut, a scholar and physician serving
the caliphs 'Abd al-Rahman III and al-Hakam (Hillenbrand,
2003). He was a Jewish physician in the Caliph's court, who, at
various times, held important diplomatic and financial responsibilities. Like Hasday, Isma'il b. Naghrila (d. 1056), known in Hebrew
as Samuel the Nagid, was also a central figure in the Jewish community (Scheindlin, 2003). Bearing the Hebrew title Nagid (prince)
he not only supported Hebrew poetry and Talmudic scholarship,
but was himself one of the most accomplished men of his time in
both fields.
Christians and Jews were also involved in the Royal Court
and in the intellectual life of Cordoba. Muslim-Christian
interaction can be discerned from the following remark made
by the Bishop of Cordoba, Alvaro. He stated regarding his
Christian co-religionists, " ... hardly one can write a pass-

able Latin letter to a friend, but innumerable are those who
can express themselves in Arabic and can compose poetry
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in that language with greater art than the Arabs themselves"
(Hillenbrand, 2003, p. 115). Other Christians served as administrators, financiers, physicians, artists, and craftsmen in the
royal court (Hillenbrand, 2003).
The discoveries by Muslim scientists were transmitted to
the west. Cordoba's mosque was famed as a center for higher
learning on a par with Cairo and Baghdad and was the earliest
medieval university in Europe. Major contributions were made
in music, philology, geography, history, alchemy, chemistry,
medicine, astronomy, philosophy, botany, mathematics, and agriculture (Hillenbrand, 2003). Hellenism was largely reintroduced into Europe by way of Spain and Sicily, thus facilitating the
European Renaissance itself (Lopez-Baralt, 2003). Such accounts
are important to mention as they remind us of how, by adopting
a nonviolent posture, Muslims, Jews and Christians established a
brilliant civilization for posterity.
Due to the status and protection the Qur'an accorded to
the people of the book, violence and genocide against them
became virtually impossible. Jews in Islamic lands did not
face a tradition of anti-semitism, even though the dhimmis in
general were regarded as second-class citizens. Jews had full
religious liberty and were allowed to manage their own affairs.
They were also able to participate in mainstream culture and
commerce. It is generally acknowledged that Sephardic Jews
were treated much better by Muslims than Ashkenazi Jews
were treated by Christians. As Marc Gopin stated, "there is a
qualitative, not just quantitative difference between the two"
(Gopin, 2002, p. 107.)
Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam
Many Muslims have questioned the formulations of the
classical jurists, claiming that their interpretations are no
longer binding in contemporary times. In particular, the scholars of al-Azhar in Egypt, one of the oldest institutes of Islamic
learning, have emphasized the social rather than militant dimension of jihad. According to them, jihad is a peaceful social
struggle against illiteracy, poverty, and disease. They underline the peaceful nature of the Islamic message (Tibi, 1998).
Muhammad Shaltut (d. 1963), the rector of al-Azhar, asserted that Islam is open to pluralism. He claimed that the Qur'an
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does not require Muslims to resort to warfare when they proselytize. Fighting cannot be a part of the Islamic mission, for the
heart of Muhammad's mission is to bring good tidings and to
warn humanity (Kelsay, 1993). Since war is an immoral situation, Muslims are required to live at peace with non-Muslims
(Tibi, 2002).
In recent times, both the Research Council and the chief
rector at dar al-ifta' in Egypt, Muhammad Said Tantawi, have
spoken out against the militant fundamentalist movements
and suicide bombers. More specifically, they have condemned
the targeting of innocent civilians. These are indicative of a new
trend among many Muslim leaders to accentuate the peaceful
rather than militant dimension of Islam. It also shows the disparate views maintained within the various Muslim groups.
An important theme in the Qur'anic view of peaceful coexistence is forgiveness. Retaliation is a strictly defined legal
principle that can perpetuate a culture of violence and a cycle of
killing. The Qur'an evidently wants to replace this with a culture
of peace. While permitting retaliation, the Qur'an urges the
victim to forgive and eschew revenge (2:178). To inject peace
in a series of retaliatory measures requires forgiveness as a
healing and empowering process so as to restore human relationship (Sachedina, 2001).
Whereas a punitive response is often considered necessary
when harm is inflicted, retribution should be linked to a restorative process. Thus, verse 2:179 states that, "In [the law of]
retribution is a source of life, 0 people of understanding." The
verse invites people to replace the cycle of violence by considering retributive justice as a process of rehabilitation. In this
way, the Qur'an replaces death caused by retaliation with life
through forgiveness.
Retributive justice, according to the Qur'an, should aim
at redressing the wrongs by making the offender acknowledge responsibility and by encouraging the victim to consider
alternatives to the perpetuation of violence through retribution
(Sachedina, 2001). The offender acknowledges the harm his
acts have done so that a repaired relationship between the offender and victim can reinstate the dignity of both (Sachedina,
2001). Acknowledgement of injury inflicted is the first step
in seeking forgiveness. Repentance and a genuine sense of
remorse is another. The Qur'an also offers an alternative to
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violence by recommending the acceptance of blood money as
compensation.
There is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence and forgiveness over retribution. The Qur'an is also concerned about proportionality even in retribution. By stipulating
appropriate levels of punitive response when attempting to
restore violated rights or correcting injustices, it regulates acts of
retribution, for these should not exceed the extent of the original
injury (Gopin, 2002).
On the part of the victim, forgiveness is preferred over retribution, as he foregoes the moral right of demanding injury by inflicting more injury. As verse 42:40 states in this context, "... whoever

forgives and thereby brings about a reestablishment of harmony,
his reward is with God; and God loves not the wrongdoers." By
his acceptance of compensation in the face of repentance and
the acknowledgement of the harm that the offender has inflicted, the victim demonstrates willingness to rehabilitate the offender in society. The victim is, in turn, rewarded by God.
If forgiveness is merely a religious requirement but is not seen
as some form of empowerment, then its effectiveness in resolving
conflicts may be limited. The act must address a person's deeper
wounds. It is vital that forgiveness be seen and felt as empowering, as this would affirm this inner process. The Qur'an describes
this as an act of courageous will (42:43) (Gopin, 2002).
Approaches to conflict resolution in Islam reflect religious
values and traditional rituals of reconciliation. Scholars also
recognize the role that culture plays in conflict and peacemaking, and affirm the potential contributions of diverse institutions
to conflict resolution. Cultural modes of reconciliation include
acceptance of individual and collective responsibility of
wrongdoing, attentiveness to face-related issues (public status,
shame) and the achievement of restorative justice. (Said, Funk,
& Kadayifci, 2001).
Conflicts are also resolved based on local customs, such as
public acts of repentance, compensation for losses and acts of
forgiveness. Frequently, communal leaders and village elders
facilitate a process of reconciliation (Said et al., 2001). Muslims
have delineated other processes for resolving conflicts in a
peaceful manner. Although we cannot examine each more
closely here, these include repentance, (Gopin, 2002, pp. 118-
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119), sulh (reconciliation) (Gopin, 2002, p. 136-137), and tahkim
(arbitration) (Gopin, 2002, p. 97).
Challenges for Muslims in Contemporary Times
Muslim discourse on war and peace has been defined primarily by the juridical literature. Especially after the events of
September 11, 2001, we are witnessing a period of reinterpretation and redefinition of the notion of fihad in the Muslim community. It has been argued that the Qur'an offers a distinctly
modem perspective on tolerance and respect in a multi-ethnic,
multi-communal world (Eickelman, 2002). The challenge for
Muslims in contemporary times is to recover the tolerance and
means for peaceful coexistence through the Qur'an rather than
the juridical and exegetical understanding which, as noted,
were formulated to assert the subjugation of the "other" in a
particular historical context. As they engage in a re-exammation of traditional exegesis, the point of departure for Muslims
has to be the Qur'an itself, rather than the multi-faceted and
multi-layered scholarly discourse that has accumulated since
the eighth century.
The moral tenor of the Qur'an shows that it wants to
engage humanity in a moral discourse where all human
beings can connect with the Qur'an and with each other based

on universal values. As Sohail Hashmi argues, there are few
ethical works that outline the Qur'anic vision of coexistence
or warfare. Muslims need to disentangle Islamic ethics from
medieval Islamic law and to re-examine the Qur'anic pronouncement on war and peace in light of its ethical axioms
(Hashmi, 2002b). Thus, the challenge for Muslims is to draw
on this Qur'anic vision so as to develop just interreligious and
intercultural relationships in a world of cultural and religious
diversity.

Muslims are also confronted with the challenge of contextual hermeneutics in dealing with the pronouncements of
the Qur'an on specific legal issues like hostility and warfare.
Verses on jihad must be understood as taking into account the
particular conditions of persecution and oppression in which
they originated. Returning to interpretation of the Qur'an and
prophetic traditions in their proper historical context is often
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circumvented by the juridical interpretations that promote the
hegemonic interests of the Islamic state, thus ignoring, in the
name of Islam, the ecumenical and universal message of the
Qur'an. Muslim scholars and jurists have to engage in hermeneutic and interpretive exercises to provide a coherent re-evaluation of classical formulations and to reassert the Qur'anic
inclusive and ecumenical vision of peace. In other words,
modem Muslims need to go beyond the classical formulations
on dhimmis, siyar, and non-believers. The delineation of dar
al-Islam and dar al-harb no longer applies, and thus boundaries have to be re-imagined. Furthermore, Muslims must articulate a theory of international relations that incorporates
notions of dignity, freedom of conscience, rights of minorities,
and gender equality based on universal moral values.
A major impediment to this approach is that many Muslims
simply reject the idea that the classical juridical decisions are
reflective of eighth century political, cultural, or historical circumstances in which they originated. They refuse to acknowledge that while the Qur'an is a fixed text, the interpretive applications of its teachings will vary with the changing realities
of history. Traditionalists maintain that Islamic law, as it was
formulated by the jurists in the first three centuries of Islamic
history, was in strict conformity with the divine will expressed
in the Qur'an. Thus normative textual sources are treated as
timeless and sacred rather than anchored to a specific historical
context. This traditionalist view is challenged by the fact that
there was much disputation on what constituted the divine
will among the classical jurists themselves, and by the fact that
they proffered a wide range of views on the issues with which
they were confronted.
As Muslims search for ways to chart out peaceful coexistence with others, they also need to reevaluate their normative
texts. This exercise is contingent on recognizing that Muslims
are not bound to erstwhile juridical or exegetical hermeneutics. Communities often construct a paradigmatic interpretation on the text and assert it on the readers. Once it is defined,
the authoritative legacy of the text is transmitted to the next
group of scholars and becomes entrenched as the normative
and "authentic" position. Gradually, the texts construct an increasingly restrictive and specific well-defined position on an
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issue. The contents of the sacred texts are frequently less important than the social and historical settings in which they are
interpreted (Kurtz, 2002).
The reading of a text is interwoven with the closing of the
interpretive process, thereby restricting the text to a specific
determination. This determination is then submitted as the
final and only possible interpretation of the text (El Fadl, 2001).
In this sense, juridical hermeneutics are no different from the
interpretive activities evident in other fields. The interpretive
strategy can shape both future readings and the texts themselves, thus constructing the texts rather than arising from
them. Hence, there is a need for Muslims to find reliable ways
of separating the voice of God from the voice of human beings,
and to differentiate between the Qur'anic vision and the sociopolitical context in which that vision was interpreted and articulated by classical and medieval exegetes.
Contemporary Muslims are confronted with hegemonic values of the past and an emerging political reality that
often challenges the applicability of those values. The tension
between the peaceful and militant strains of Islam can be resolved only as Muslims undertake the task of re-evaluating
historically the classical and medieval juridical corpus.
Conclusion
Spiritually, the Qur'an accommodated and extended salvific space to other monotheistic faiths; subsequent Muslim
jurists not only passed the verdict of non-belief to them but
also treated adherents of these faith groups as second class citizens, a position that has no basis in the Qur'an.
For all people, peace requires changes in our world-views.
The quest for peace challenges us to reevaluate how we have
viewed the other. This requires a shift in paradigm, asking us
to embrace those we have previously excluded or demonized.
The challenge is to seek opportunities for interpretations that
can make a community see the enemy in a new way (Gopin,
2002). Concurrently, we need to move beyond defining ourselves over and above an enemy "other." The starting point
is to re-examine traditions that draw boundaries of exclusion
and marginalization. Peaceful coexistence is only possible
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when we no longer see a group as the other but as a concrete
human community with ancient values and norms. Ultimately,
peaceful relations between human beings must be grounded
in a community's construction of order based on egalitarianism, justice, and a concern for the moral and social well-being
of all its citizens.
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Contesting Buddhisms on Conflicted Land:
Sarvodaya Shramadana and
Buddhist Peacemaking
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Buddhism in its various incarnations has both aided and hindered the peace processes in Sri Lanka. Sarvodaya Shramadana,
a Buddhist development organization, stands out in the way it
uses religion to promote peace through a more humanist interpretation of Buddhist teachings. While Sarvodaya's alternative
approach toward the religion provides an optimistic space for
promoting peace, its connections to and dependence on populism can also complicate its politics. This article argues that the
most effective means of peace work can be found through the same
channel of collective mobilization that hindered it, Buddhism.
Key words: Buddhism, peace, Sarvodaya Sharmadana,collective
mobilization, populism

We believe in one undivided Sri Lanka; we believe that
without any discrimination to any race or religion, we
in Sri Lanka can live together in a righteous society. We
can build such a society! Ariyaratne (1989, p. 244)
In July of 1983, when the mostly Hindu Tamil population
of Colombo and other major Sri Lankan cities were persecuted,
killed, and expelled from their homes, Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne, the
founder of Sarvodaya, took the risk of housing seventeen Tamil
people in his own home. When a Sinhalese gang came to his
house for the Tamil inhabitants, they found Dr. Ariyaratne's
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daughter, who explained to them, "My parents' instructions
are that if my father is here, he will have to be killed before
any Tamil family member is touched. If my mother is here,
she will die first. Now, as I am the oldest in the family and
my parents are not home, I will have to die before you touch
them" (Ingram, 1990, p. 128). The Sinhalese gang, recognizing the gravity of her words, apologized and left. A few days
later, Ariyaratne published a statement chastising the nominative Buddhists who participated in and allowed the riots. He
wrote:
For the ensuring of narrow political tribal, religious
and economic gains should we be participants in the
destroy[ing] of human qualities of kindness, truthfulness
and justice-the patrimony of Sinhala Buddhists?
To deviate from neutrality is against the Buddha's
words 'Dammohave Rakkathi Dhammachari'. Should
we deviate from the Dharma path and help to build
a society that adulates violence, bribery, corruption?
Should we reinforce a party system that ruptures the
fabric of the Sinhala race? If we do not indulge in such
a train of thought, nothing would be left of the Sinhala
race and Buddhism. (2001, p. 834)
In his statement, he emphasized that the state of Buddhism
in Sri Lanka was in crisis on account of the violence. If Sri
Lanka had any hope for peace, its majority Sinhalese Buddhist
population would have to return to its doctrinal and spiritual
roots that recognized the sanctity of all life.
The story of Buddhism in Sri Lanka is both long and
complex. In Sri Lanka, a country known today as the traditional home to Buddhism, the religion has transformed in
many diverse ways. Since the introduction of Buddhism to the
island in the third century BCE, the religion came under attack
during the colonial period, was re-invigorated in the post-colonial era, and, subsequently, became politicized as a national
project (Gombrich & Obeyesekere, 1998; Obeyesekere, 1991;
Scott, 1999; Seneviratne, 1999; Tambiah, 1992).' Buddhism in
one of its current incarnations has been implicated in an exclusive nationalist project that abstracted it from its spiritual
identity. Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism, in conjunction with
Tamil nationalism, has polarized the population of Sri Lanka
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and has often justified the use of violence under the pretext of
identity preservation.
Operating within this context is Sarvodaya Shramadana-a
Buddhist development organization earnestly trying to apply
Buddhist ideals and principles to its work in order to differentiate itself from the politicized forms of Buddhism in the country.
Sarvodaya has participated in supporting Buddhism as an
anti-imperialist project, yet it has also promoted Buddhism as
an open, non-exclusive religion-making it popular among its
majority Sinhalese constituency, while pushing them towards
a more progressive ethnic perspective. While Sarvodaya's use
of Buddhist principles in programs for general welfare can be
extremely helpful, the Buddhist political agenda in Sri Lanka
puts Sarvodaya in a delicate position. Sarvodaya's effort to
maintain a strictly spiritual, humanized, and non-political
Buddhist approach to its peace work is difficult in the context
of high Buddhist politicization and a political conflict.
The Sri Lankan war, which ended in 2009, is best known
for the tactics of terror employed by the Tamil insurgent group,
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and counter-insurgency warfare conducted by the Sri Lankan government.
However, the conflict has much deeper roots seated in the
greater consciousness of the population where ethnic animosity and fear has been brooding for decades.
In Sri Lanka, one peace solution comes in the form of
Engaged Buddhism. The term "Engaged Buddhism" is applied
to the use of Buddhist practices and principles to combat situations of oppression, marginalization, and suffering. Activists
within this field are largely informed by Buddhist principles
of nonviolence, interdependence, and inward meditation
and reflection (Jones, 1989; Queen & King, 1996). Currently,
the scholarship on Engaged Buddhism within Sri Lanka has
focused on grassroots connections and holistic peacemaking
(Almeida, 2008; Ariyaratne, 1978; Bond, 2004; Macy, 1985).
Engaged Buddhism, as operated by Sri Lankan grassrootsoriented Sarvodaya Shramadana, establishes itself in direct
contrast to international interventionist approaches, making
it more appealing to the Sri Lankan populace. Sarvodaya is
a very large and encompassing organization whose work
extends far beyond the scope of nominative peacemaking activities. Although Sarvodaya mostly focuses on development,
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it adopted an identity as a peace organization when it directed
its efforts towards addressing the escalating ethnic conflict in
the 1970s. Since this shift in focus, it has won numerous peace
awards. In the realm of peacemaking, Sarvodaya provides an
intriguing vernacularized and popular model that incorporates the often-ignored aspects of spirituality into its work.
Sarvodaya has called itself, among other things, a social
movement. This self-identification comes from their commitment to envisioning change through mobilizing the grassroots, marginal, and/or subaltern populations. Academic
trends within the social movement field have placed a large
emphasis on studying movements in terms of collective identity and alternative forms of resistance within new sites of conflict (Kelley, 1993; Melucci, Keane, & Mier, 1989). Within the
discussion, theorists such as Alberto Melucci have argued that
resistance within the realm of conventional political channels
can limit the scope of social movements, and that new sites
of resistance provide metapolitical challenges to modernity
(Melucci et al., 1989). James Scott extended this concept to the
"infrapolitical" level through his explanation of a "hidden transcript" of a subtle dissident political culture in which larger
issues of hegemony can be challenged by small acts of everyday unorganized resistance (Scott, 1985, 1990). In this sense,
social movement approaches towards peacemaking can both
center on goals of institutional change, yet have also recently
shifted to validate a more decentralized, identity-oriented approach towards change-making that widens the concept of
socio-political citizenship (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). While
large parts of the peace process will depend on political and
governmental change, a change within the rest of the population is also necessary to reinforce an infrastructure conducive
to maintaining peace. The conflict in Sri Lanka is not only an
elite-centered case of insurgency and counter-insurgency, the
conflict also has popular participation, and popular consent.
For this reason, Sarvodaya's work with the grassroots populations is extremely important to the equation of peace work in
Sri Lanka.
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Nationalist Buddhist Activism in Post-Colonial
Sri Lanka
In the post-colonial years, Buddhist activism became
mostly synonymous with pro-Sinhalese activism. A prominent
instance of this can be traced to 1956-1958 when the Sri Lankan
political elite drafted a new constitution for the country. In
1958, the government tried engaging in the BandaranaikeChelvanayagam Pact, which would have instituted more linguistically equal options for its constituents. One of the first
monastic political parties, the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna (EBP),
or "United Front of Monks," led rallies at the state building
with other monks and put up a strong resistance to the pact,
claiming that it would denigrate the role of the Sinhalese. Some
monks claimed that it would "lead to the total annihilation of
the Sinhalese race" (Tambiah, 1992, p. 50). The monks organized marches from the capital to the most prominent temples,
participated in sit down protests, and were known to have
been involved in anti-Tamil riots. The activism was successful to the point that the pact was dissolved, and subsequently
Tamil was excluded from future legislation establishing significant barriers between the Tamil constituency and the Sri
Lankan government.
As tensions between Tamil and Sinhalese people were exacerbated and violence between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
government intensified, political Buddhist monks also intensified their own activism. Often these monks based their arguments on Sinhalese protectionism and against making any
concessions to the LTTE or Tamil people (Seneviratne, 1999;
Tambiah, 1992). An interesting debate that grew during the
increasing violence between the government and the LTTE
was that of "just war." While Buddhism is considered to be a
peaceful and non-violent religion, Sri Lankan monks during
this time began to back the anti-LTTE violence using Buddhist
principles to support their politics. Some monks, such as the
Venerable Professor Bellanwila, explained that sometimes war
is inevitable. Others, such as the Venerable Athurliye Rathana,
crafted comparisons of the LTTE to Hitler, explaining that maitriya, or compassion alone, is not sufficient to eradicate evil
(Frydenlund, 2005).
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More recently, Buddhist monks have organized to create
their own influential political party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU) in 2004. Described by Iselin Frydenlund (2005) as a
"protest party," (p. 14) the JHU advocated for Sinhalese rights
and policies privileging Sinhalese Buddhists on the island.
The monks, characterizing themselves as the protectors of
Buddhism, ground their views in spiritually authoritative
texts. During the 2006 Norway-facilitated peace talks between
the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, many monks, including the JHU, protested what they interpreted as a process
ultimately aimed to disempower the Sinhalese. During these
processes, monks staged demonstrations in front of the state
building and at local religious sites, with actions ranging from
sit-down protests to burning the Norwegian flag.
There have been no studies specifically gauging the politics
of Sri Lankan monks. However, Frydenlund's (2005) survey of
monks' views of the conflict showed that many monks theoretically supported notions of state decentralization, but felt
threatened by a federal political solution that could offer more
opportunities for Tamil self-representation. He also found that
the majority of the activism performed by Buddhist monks
was actually done against Tamil interests. Incidentally, those
who fought for Tamil interests cited political, rather than religious, reasons. As Seneviratne (1999) reflected on the irony of
the majority of monk political allegiances, "[Wihen the idea of
a political solution is suggested to replace this slaughter [of the
conflict], the chief monks who oppose it are more numerous
than the bearers of arms" (p. 280).
While it is impossible to make general claims about all
Buddhist political ideology in the country, a prominent theme
is pro-Sinhalese activist work. 2 This may more of a reflection of
the political situation and the historical connections between
Sinhalese nationalism and the religion than with religious doctrine in itself. Many monks, out of their responsibility to their
constituents, felt the need to engage in issues of social justice. In
Sri Lanka, where the ethnic conflict has colonized the domain
of politics, 3 monks seeking to be active have been funneled into
Sinhalese nationalist causes. Monks responding to the needs of
their constituents risk adopting populist politics, even when
those politics may contradict certain aspects of their religion.
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It could be seen that populism, which can be easily hijacked
in multiple directions, may be the strongest factor motivating monks to campaign in the interest of Sinhalese nationalism. While this form of Buddhism has many adherents, there
is another form of Buddhism that offers an alternative view.
Following is the story of an organization that tries to inform its
practices with Buddhist spiritual ideology rather than with the
Buddhist political identity.
Sarvodaya's Buddhist Activism in Sri Lanka
The story of Sarvodaya, while maintaining many Sinhala
Buddhist traditionalist themes, has shown an interesting deviation from the mainstream Sinhala nationalist narrative.
Sarvodaya tries to demonstrate that it is an organization built
along Buddhist ethics, spirituality, and principals, not one that
condones a harmful and exclusive Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Emerging from an anti-colonial Sinhalese nationalist
tradition, Sarvodaya tried to differentiate itself by applying
its traditionalist Buddhist rhetoric to projects encouraging
inclusivity. From the moment of its inception in the 1950s,
Sarvodaya demonstrated this inclusivity through its extension
of projects to Tamil areas where it hired Tamil leadership, and
later through its peace and dialogue projects.
George Bond (1996) wrote that Sarvodaya was able to reappropriate Sinhala nationalism as a more ecumenical cause given
its ability to "cleans[e] it [Sinhalese nationalism] of racial claims
for the superiority of the Sinhalese" (p. 133). They achieve this
through emphasizing the strength and power of Sri Lankans,
rather than of the Sinhalese alone. Carrying some elements of
Sinhalese traditional nationalism,' Sarvodaya leadership also
tends to romanticize the pre-colonial past and strives for the
aesthetics of the rural village unblemished by today's materialism. This traditional nationalism helps explain why Sarvodaya
has gained popularity among its Buddhist constituency, and
also demonstrates the ways in which Sarvodaya has evolved
as a product of its context.
Sarvodaya, starting purely as a development organization in
the 1950s, located its first project in a village of low caste people
who previously had been shunned by their local society. In an
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effort to validate the agency of the villagers while helping the
population develop, Sarvodaya engaged in a local participatory voluntary work program. This program later expanded nationwide to include Tamil and Muslim areas. Now, Sarvodaya
is one of the largest development organizations in the country,
with a network of over 15,000 villages (Ariyaratne, 2008). In
every area where Sarvodaya has programs, the leadership is
almost always local and representative of the people who are
being helped. When the ethnic tensions of Sri Lanka escalated in the 1970s and 1980s, Sarvodaya quickly emerged as one
of the leading peace-oriented organizations. Recognizing the
Buddhist principle of interrelatedness, Sarvodaya leaders felt
that the engagement in peace was crucial to its investment in
development. Accordingly, Dr. Ariyaratne, the organization's
founder, initiated further programs of dialogue and exchange.
In the months leading to the racial riots of 1983, Dr. Ariyaratne
took special measure to encourage exchange programs between
youth of the conflicting groups, and to participate directly in
discussions of peace with the Tamil population.
It was the violent riots of 1983 that placed Sarvodaya in the
public eye as one of the firmest advocates of peace. On July
23, 1983, Dr. Ariyaratne, once aware of the violence plaguing
his immediate surroundings, mobilized areas of protection for
the Tamil victims within twenty-four hours, sheltering some
in his own home. Additionally, he published strong statements
condemning the violence, and later organized large interfaith
and interethnic meetings to brainstorm options for pursuing
peace. Within the aftermath of the violence, Ariyaratne was the
first Sinhalese leader to visit the Tamil refugee camps in the
north of the country to offer condolences and donations for
their recovery (personal communication, Devanesan Nesiah,
Summer, 2009).
In the decades since the riots, Sarvodaya bolstered its existent peace programs. Its approaches towards peace range
from dialogue and exchange to meditation and peace walks.
Sarvodaya's dialogue and exchange programs have been
aimed at all sectors of the population from more powerful
politicians to rural youth. Its youth program, "Shanthi Sena,"
focuses both on dialogue and connecting people from areas in
conflict through local four-day amity camps. The program has

Sarvodaya Shramadanaand Buddhist Peacemaking

167

been active since the 1970s and currently has a membership
of over 86,000 youth. The Shanthi Sena program, like many of
Sarvodaya's initiatives, does not focus strictly on nominative
peace projects. The youth also are trained in leadership, mediation, and first aid. Sarvodaya's "5R" program, based largely in
the North and East, approaches peace work as a multifaceted
project based in "relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation, and reawakening." The success of Sarvodaya's multilayered peace projects depends largely on its connections to its
larger network of self-governance and development.
In order to tap into more spiritual sides of peace work,
Sarvodaya organized mass peace marches around the country
and large conferences including over 2000 people. Twice, it has
organized mass peace meditations which have demonstrated
its impressive ability to mobilize large groups of people. Its
most recent mass meditation in 2002 brought together 650,000
people at Sri Lanka's ancient capital, Anuradhapura, to meditate with spiritual leader Deepak Chopra.
As Ariyaratne noted, "people can write entire books about
Buddhism and Sarvodaya" (personal communication, Summer,
2009) as almost every aspect of the organization has been built
with Buddhist principles in mind. Ariyaratne explained that
the organization is especially focused on the Four Brahma
Viharas ("divine abidings" or positive conditions of being) as
its "guiding principles" (2001, p. 467).5 In terms of peace, these
principles interact with two prominent elements of Buddhism
in their ability to inform Sarvodaya's peace activism. The first
relates to the Buddhist notion of self and interdependency. The
second pertains to action and the concept of ahimsa, or nonviolence. Both work together in the context of Sarvodaya to
help pursue a sustainable peace in the country.
The Buddhist notion of self can first be informed by the
concept of anatt, or selflessness. Selflessness can be interpreted in several different ways. In one way anatti can be seen as
nonattachment, and the absence of selfishness. Another way
addresses the myth of self and questions the hardened categories of an individual and collective identity. The way to conceptualize the idea of anatta is to examine the ways in which the
individual is distinguished from others. Nhat Hanh and Kotler
(1987) explained the interrelated quality of the self through the
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term, "interbeing" which he took from the Avatamsaka Sutra.
Through this notion of interbeing, the particularity of the self
also reflects the universality of its connection to all beings and
entities.
Someone, by using the concept of anatta to inform her own
definition of self, is compelled to rethink the way she is distinguished from others. If the self is inherently interrelated and
dependent on other people, then personal welfare is also dependent on the welfare of others. On the individual level, this
means that a person's happiness is predicated on the happiness of her neighbor. On the collective level, it questions the
distinction between one group and another (e.g. Tamil and
Sinahlese groups). The removal of socially constructed divisions allows for the development of new concepts of self, selfprotection, and inclusivity. If one group is separated from the
other in terms of hardened categories, it is easy to see welfare
as a zero-sum game wherein the power of one group depends
on the disempowerment of another. The concept of anatta
unsettles the notion of competition for prosperity. It both
exposes humanity as a large interrelated group, and questions
the notions of boundaries as they appear (Galtung, 1993). As
Ariyaratne explained, an acceptance of the concept of anatta
has a liberatory quality that can lend towards more peaceful
thinking. Ariyaratne wrote, "in that highly evolved state of
a living being called 'human,' there is a potential to free the
mind from narrow barriers of family, race, color, religion, national borders and fragmented ideologies" (1980, p. 78). This
is apparent in the case of Sri Lankan identity formation and
mobilization where scholars, such as Valentine Daniel (1996),
see the conflict in similar terms:
[O]ne way of understanding the current violence
on the island is to see it as a check on the narcissistic
expansiveness of infantile impulses, impulses that fail
to recognize that the whole world is not one's own
and that all of being is not encompassed within the
boundaries of an ever-expanding identity. (p. 68)
Sarvodaya's attempts to break away from exclusionist
identities and to construct a more fluid sense of self delegitimizes the psychological foundations of war.
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Obeysekere (1991) argued for a humanist Buddhism with
a conscience that can communicate more effectively to the Sri
Lankan heart, rather than the head. Through this conscience,
the Sri Lankan populace can break down societally constructed barriers and develop compassion for others. Sarvodaya,
in its engagement of anatta, discourages the fashioning of
differences between the Sinhalese and Tamil participants in
order to encourage Sarvodaya members to resist discriminating against each other and recognize their common identities
and needs. When asked what his thoughts were about the Sri
Lankan president declaring that minorities did not exist in Sri
Lanka, 6 a peace program leader expressed, "No minorities is a
very good idea ... Now Sri Lanka only has Sri Lankan people.

This is a very good philosophy" (personal communication,
Summer, 2009). While the president's attempt at a rhetorical
erasure of minorities has many problematic political implications, the leader's optimistic interpretation of the statement
reflects a genuine effort to impart the belief of anatta onto
the situation. This enthusiasm for supporting the "no minorities" stance of the president was reflected by the majority of
the Sarvodaya staff in interviews conducted for this paper. To
them, this idea of "no minorities," rather than discounting the
diversified experiences of people in the country, discouraged
people from thinking of each other in terms of their racialized
collective identities, but rather in terms of their common humanity and their shared investment in a peaceful future.
The overwhelming support of the president's statement,
however, also highlights tensions within the interpretation
of anatta. It complicates the notion of one-ness in comparison to same-ness. Whereas a universalism reflected in policies
of equal protection and access can demonstrate a support of
unity, there is also the risk of unity becoming an oppressive
project of appropriation, codification, and forced conformity
to certain prescribed norms. This could easily allow people
a way to avoid dealing with issues of past discrimination
and issues of redistribution. In the case of Sri Lanka, ideas of
unity and oneness have tended towards echoing majoritarian
Sinhala-normative sentiments, in which a Sri Lankan identity
is overtly or more subtly equated with the Sinhalese identity.
Specifically in the case of the President's speech, it was understood that while ethnic minorities no longer existed, those
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who were not considered patriotic enough would be chastised
as the new "minority." While Sarvodaya's higher leadership
has been clearer in its cautious interpretations of majoritariandominated unity, it is not always reflected further down the
leadership structure.
Another important aspect of Sarvodaya's peace activism
is the concept ahimsa. Himsa translates to violence or harm
and indicates its negation. Thus, ahimsa is most commonly
translated to the term "nonviolence." Dr. Ariyaratne has many
ways of interpreting violence, which then leads to a broad
interpretation of ahimsa. Dr. Ariyaratne explained that violence can be enacted by citizens of the government as well as
by organizations such as the LTTE. Additionally, violence can
manifest in terms of the poverty in the country. Dr. Ariyaratne
thus included notions of structural and cultural violence in his
conception of violence and the process of fighting it. Structural
violence can be interpreted as the mechanisms of institutional
coercion that prevent people from aspiring towards their potential (Galtung, 1965).7 Poverty constitutes structural violence
because it creates conditions where people's investment in
their own survival forces them to into situations of conflict.
In trying to diminish violence, Dr. Ariyaratne has worked to
combat the poverty of the country as well as the psychological factors encouraging people to become physically violent
towards each other. He called this building a "psychological"
and a "spiritual infrastructure." Other manifestations of structural violence can be interpreted as inequitable power structures. Engaged Buddhist theorist Ken Jones (1989) explained
that addressing structural and cultural violence can be interpreted to be the core of Engaged Buddhism. He wrote, "To see
only the violence of those who, in desperation, answer intolerable institutional coercion with overt violence is to become
party to the hypocrisy of established power" (Jones, p. 146).
It is generally accepted amongst the Engaged Buddhist
scholars that the genesis of ostensible outer peace is inner
peace. The belief is that if one is inwardly peaceful, she or he
will be able to interact non-violently with the outer world. In
this sense, the inner cultivation of peace is also an essential
part of practicing ahimsa (Bond, 2004). Conversely, violence
in one's mind also can condone or lead to external violence.

Sarvodaya Shramadanaand Buddhist Peacemaking

171

Vietnamese non-violent Buddhist activist Nhat Hanh wrote,
"We usually think that killing occurs in the domain of the
body, but a fanatical mind can cause the killing of not just one,
but millions of human beings" (cited in Sivaraksa, 2005, p. 15).
Sarvodaya works to cultivate inward peace so as to prevent
outside violence before it starts. This explains the emphasis it
places on group meditation programs and small-scale amity
camps. Thus while meditation programs might not overtly
address issues of structural inequalities and injustice, they
address a deeper part of humanity-hopefully preventing the
very thought processes that lead to structural and physical
violence.
This interpretation can inform the practice of ahimsa in
terms of politics as well. The relationship of Sarvodaya's
politics to peace is significant because of the political nature
of peace work in the country. Violence comes about through
many different factors: some are merely psychological, yet
others are related to institutional and structural coercion. The
political structures and practices of the country, such as majoritarian governance, have led to both state and extra-state violence. Accordingly, while undertaking the project of individual
transformation is an important factor of fighting violence, it is
also essential to understand and address the structural issues.
Sarvodaya's relationship to politics becomes quite complicated in light of the way Sarvodaya vocally chooses not to align
itself with specific political parties and policies. In his essay,
"Weaving Peace from Bottom-up," (2008) Dr. Vinya Ariyaratne
explained that while implementing the principles of non-party
political power and seeking participatory politics and democratic self-governance, Sarvodaya creates a constructive, nonviolent and peaceful power influence at the national level, including moral power, meditation power, and people power (p.
5).
Here, we see that Sarvodaya tries to establish change while
avoiding the institutions of party politics which have often
been major sources of violence in the country. Within this
excerpt, politics is framed in two ways. The first is in terms of
"party politics"-often a corrupt and violence-perturbed arena
that has not seen much progress in terms of the conflict. The
second is "participatory politics"-a political model Sarvodaya
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supports because of its connection to grassroots empowerment
and its ability to allot agency to populations beyond the elite.
Sarvodaya's decision to step away from larger issues of
politics can be interpreted in two opposing ways. In one way,
its divorce from party politics contrasts it to the long history of
Buddhist actors in the country that have associated themselves
with politics, often to pursue and support projects of exclusive Sinhalese nationalism. As discussed before, the engagement of Buddhist monks in elections, campaigning against
more inclusive policies towards the Tamil population, and recently in their establishment of their own political party, all
are examples of ways in which the engagement of Buddhists
in politics has even hurt the peace process. Sarvodaya, by not
engaging in politics, also distances itself from this form of contaminated Buddhism. Sarvodaya stands as a quiet model of an
ecumenical and inclusive Buddhism unhindered by the binds
of politics.
Additionally, by not involving itself in politics, Sarvodaya
protects itself from undue governmental attack. Acting primarily as a large development organization, Sarvodaya interacts
with the Sri Lankan government through multiple organizational and financial channels. In many areas of its operation,
the organization depends on governmental cooperation in
order to fund its projects and gain access to certain areas. While
Sarvodaya has a history of cooperation with the government,
it also has a history in which it has been persecuted by the government. Its large share of non-political power with a network
of over 15,000 villages has already made it seem quite menacing to the government, and it has been the victim of multiple
governmental campaigns (Perera, Marasinghe, & Jayasekere,
1992).
Due to its large constituency and encouragement of nongovernmental autonomy, Sarvodaya first came under government suspicion for unproven issues such as corruption and
funding in the 1970s (Perera, Marasinghe, & Jayasekere, 1992).
In 1980, the Volunteer Service Organization Registration and
Supervision Act required Sarvodaya and all other NGO organizations to register with the government and share information
about its funding and its activities. In 1990, Sarvodaya became
one of the largest targets of the inquiry of a presidential NGO
investigation in which leaders within the organization were

Sarvodaya Shramadanaand Buddhist Peacemaking

173

continually questioned by the government and taken into
custody for up to six months. During this time, Sarvodaya
lost government support of several of its programs, and was
blacklisted by UNESCO. The government encouraged newspapers, especially through the government-run "Lake House"
publishing company, to write stories slandering the organization. In 1992, when Sarvodaya won the Niwano peace prize,
the Sri Lankan ambassador to Japan tried to discourage the
organization from giving Ariyaratne the prize. It has been
speculated that the government targeted Sarvodaya because
it viewed Dr. Ariyaratne as a political threat. Nonetheless, this
forever shaped the relationship between the government and
Sarvodaya, making its leader more adamant that he would
stay far away from politics, and the organization was strongly
warned by the government of the repercussions that awaited
it if it were to pose any challenges. Rather than playing within
the dangerous realm of politics, it chooses to make the most
change possible outside of it.
However, the lack of engagement in politics also has some
unintended consequences. Sarvodaya's lack of participation
in overtly questioning the government's role in both systems
of violence and coercion could also be seen as indirectly legitimating governmental violence. While Sarvodaya literature
reflects the beliefs of its leaders that violence has been committed both by the state and by extra-governmental people and
organizations, there still is a gesture in the direction of military legitimization. This can be seen further back in Sarvodaya
literature, where Sarvodaya commanders have suggested
that Sarvodaya youth volunteers be prepared to enter the
army (Ariyaratne, 2001). This appeared more recently with
Sarvodaya staff who, in interviews, unanimously heralded the
2009 military victory of the government over the LTTE as a
great step forward without voicing much concern for the violence committed by the government or the current/past treatment of minorities, such as the conditions of the Internally
Displaced Person (IDP) camps (Amnesty International, 2009),
or allegations of war crimes (Permanent People's Tribunal,
2010; United Teachers for Human Rights, 2009). While in
principal the notion of ahimsa plays a large role in Sarvodaya
ideology, many Sri Lankans still find difficulty with the concept
of just war in understanding their own politics towards
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minority rights or governmental minority concessions. This
brings about questions of how "engagement" works within
Engaged Buddhism. Does engagement require a certain disengagement from politics, or does it require further participation,
even at the expense of endangering one's own existence?
The multiple challenges within the politics of peace have
placed Sarvodaya in a delicate position in terms of peace work.
As seen through its work, it tries to build a "psychological"
and "spiritual infrastructure" among the Sri Lankan population that reconceptualizes identity in ways that will make adherents more caring and invested in the well-being of others.
To add to the difficulty of being associated with politicized
Buddhism, the organization is placed under strict scrutiny by a
paranoid government to which it is already indebted through
their collaborative projects to help the Sri Lankan populace.
Sarvodaya, recognizing that peace work is only one aspect of a
largely intertwined project of social uplift, also has many other
projects that do not relate directly to the ethnic conflict. Similar
to the delicate position Sri Lankan monks have been placed
in, Sarvodaya's responsibility to its large network of predominantly Sinhalese people complicates its dedication to ahimsa
in regards to the minorities in the country. Populism and progressive conflict politics clash and the way to navigate through
the disagreement is not clear. As a result of the delicate political situation, Sarvodaya is able to vaguely allude to the specific changes needed to alter the inequitable social structure,
but cannot make controversial claims without further quivering the tightrope strung up by the complicated politics of its
situation.
The Benefits and Challenges of Populism
In a country where the majority of society identifies
as Buddhist, the type of Buddhism followed becomes an
important factor in the pursuit of peace. Both Sarvodaya
Shramadana and the Sri Lankan monks will eventually have
to come to terms with the way they navigate the populist elements of their religion. The monks' investment in populism
arrives from their commitment to care for the interests of their
constituents. Sarvodaya's investment in populism comes
from its mission of prioritizing the agency of the grassroots
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organizations. In the case of peace, Sarvodaya makes a large
effort to demonstrate that the people, too, can be a part of the
peace process. Ariyaratne (1989) explained that Sarvodaya is
trying to "increase the space available for the people to participate in a lasting peace process without peacemaking remaining
a monopoly of a few privileged groups circumscribed by their
limited concept of peace" (p. 146). It is evident in Ariyaratne's
statements regarding peace work that he closely links the
process to his goals of smaller governance and to the de-monopolization of the general governing apparatus. Working
outside the contours of elitist politics provides larger opportunities for participatory state building, making the constituents
more apt to locate their own role within peace work.
A difficulty, then, is for Sarvodaya to form a strong and
consistent ideological front with control over its own projects
that extends from its central leadership to its more distanced
constituents in light of its efforts to prioritize grassroots empowerment. While its leaders may have very clear ideas about
the problematic aspects of all violence, state legitimated and
otherwise, the same politics may become diluted further down.
This means that no matter what is written in Sarvodaya literature, its mostly Sinhalese employees, and majority Sinahalese
Buddhist constituents may still look out for Sinhalese interests
in political rather than spiritual ways. This is especially the
case when Sarvodaya members must decide how to interact
with a government that seems to prioritize mostly Sinahalese
Buddhist interests. Sarvodaya emphatically discourages
extra-governmental violence-which may serve to discourage another ethnic riot. However, the ambiguity of governmental morality in terms of the conflict continues. Through
Sarvodaya's programs, members might learn to prevent themselves from being violent to other minorities on the island, but
they still may condone violence when performed as a governmental maneuver of righteousness.
While Sarvodaya's multiple and intertwining projects encounter many questions, its peace work highlights some that
are particularly relevant: How can it use its own Buddhist
ideology to pursue peace without letting Buddhism's
historical political identity make its religious identity reign imperial within its projects? Does its decision to not engage in
politics separate it from the communalistic Buddhism in the
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country, or does it allow Sarvodaya to quietly condone state
actions while it tries to pursue greater change through outside
channels? As Sarvodaya is such a large, popular, and populist
organization, its actions have implications far beyond its headquarters. In fact, the uniqueness of its work can set the tone of
possibility for most peace-oriented civil society in Sri Lanka
and the world. Similarly, by not considering issues of power,
privilege, and political urgency, it risks narrowing the field of
possibility for others.
However, Sarvodaya's connection to such a large portion
of the Sri Lankan demographic places it in a prime position to
change their mentality. In this sense, populism, which could
be perceived as a challenge to Sarvodaya's peace work, can
also be its greatest strength. Identifying as a social movement,
but in light of its persecution by the government, Sarvodaya
has worked at the grassroots level-focusing on changing the
ways society perceives the conflict, and accordingly their own
actions within it. Through the far reaches of its programs, the
diversity of its projects, its connections to Sri Lankans of almost
every demographic, its reputation of caring for peace, and its
ability to mobilize large masses of people, it provides one of
the strongest spaces of potential to realize Obeysekere's (1991)
concept of a humanized, heart-centered Buddhism. How far
they can take this humanized Buddhism within the space of
the political Sri Lankan context is largely up to them.
As Escobar and Alvarez (1992) explained, struggles focusing on daily life rather than on changing governmental policies
also deserve to be recognized for their transformative qualities. They wrote that these struggles show the "... intersection

of processes of articulating meaning through practices, on the
one hand, and macro processes of domination, on the other ... "
and furthermore, "... struggles over meanings at the level of
daily life ... are the basis of contemporary social movements"

(p. 71). In this sense, Sarvodaya, by engaging itself in multifaceted and spiritually focused peace projects, has the ability
to infuse its conceptions of peace into the minds of its constituents at the level of daily life. In this way, it is an actor in
a larger project. Sarvodaya challenges the concept of violence
as an acceptable norm and pushes for its participants to adopt
more peaceful ways of interacting with each other. While this
does not always directly address the political implications of
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the conflict, it does locate an avenue of peace work within the
political opportunity structure of the conflict (Tarrow, 1994).
Considering the political opportunities and constraints in the
political and historical context, Sarvodaya is able to mobilize
around the resources and political opportunities opened to
them.
It can be seen that when stuck in such a precarious position, Sarvodaya is doing remarkable work as a Buddhist organization. Operating with a predominantly Sinhalese Buddhist
demographic, it has Sinhalese normative tendencies, but
tries hard to perform through the good will of a spirituality
that comes from Buddhism, but does not impose it. Because
the question of peace inevitably includes politics, a non-political religious peace project is quite a challenging aspiration.
However, by planting the seeds of peace in the minds of the Sri
Lankan people, Sarvodaya strives towards cultivating a new
Sri Lanka ready to move past the conflict.
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(Endnotes)
1. Though, as Anne Blackburn (2010) points out in Locations of
Buddhism, the trajectory of Buddhism in the country is certainly
not linear. Many elements of nationalism and ritual maintain
continuous ties throughout its history of the island.
2. There have also been Buddhist monks that have worked for
minority rights. An extraordinary example is a counter-rally
partially organized by the All Lanka Bhiku Organization against
a nationalist Buddhist rally in 1997. The counter-rally, which
boasted of over twice the amount of attendance than the former
rally, was conducted in three languages, and donated two truckloads of coconuts to the mostly Tamil North-East of the country
(Abeysekara, 2008). Unfortunately this type of activism is not
typical and less documented.
3. In the 1800s, monks were more involved in anti-colonial
movements as evidenced in the monk rebellions of 1818, 1834, and
1848. Later, in the early 1900s, monks were more active in leftist
labor activism, seen in their participation in the general strike of
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1923 and the Harbor strike of 1927. It was only later, that Sinhala
nationalism became such a strong theme in monk political work
(Tambiah, 1992).
4. The Sinhala Buddhist national consciousness has several main
themes: a romanticization of the pre-colonial past of the island,
where Sri Lankans were able to tend to their agricultural projects
in an atmosphere of unadulterated Buddhist simplicity. In modem
times, this is coupled with the frustration with the current situation
influenced by the capitalist and industrialized influences of
colonialism and globalization.
5. "1. Metta-Respecting life and having loving-kindness for all, 2.
Karuna-Looking at the causes of suffering and employing various
progressive measures to eliminate them, 3. Muditha-Witnessing
the joy of others and being happy (Nissarana joy), 4. UpekkhaDeveloping equanimity and depth of thought, and facing the eight
fold path [steps toward right action] courageously" (Ariyaratne,
2001, p. 467).
6. On May 9, 2009, the Sri Lankan government claimed victory in
the protracted conflict through their massacre of LTTE leaders,
including the infamous Velupillai Prabhaharan. In his widely
quoted speech following the military victory, the Sri Lankan
president, Mahinda Rajapaksa rhetorically attempted to inaugurate
Sri Lanka into a post-identity era in a frequently quoted speech:
We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary three
years ago. No longer are the Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and
any others minorities. There are only two peoples in this country.
One is the people that love this country. The other comprises the
small groups that have no love for the land of their birth. Those
who do not love the country are now a lesser group. (Rajapaksa,
2009)
7. It is worth noting that Galtung is also affiliated with Sarvodaya.
He has made several visits to the Sarvodaya headquarters and
published a book on Buddhism and Peace through Sarvodaya's
publishing company. Sarvodaya's 2003-2004 annual report
states, "Addressing the gathering, Prof. Galtung stated that the
foundation for universal peace as well as lasting peace in Sri Lanka
can be found in the Sarvodaya philosophy and that everyone in
the country should cooperate with Sarvodaya so as to translate
this philosophic context into action to achieve permanent peace"
(Sarvodaya Shramadana, 2004, p. 77).
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In reaction to its militarist past, Germany has created a strong
culture of peace, includingsolid educationaland institutionalsupports for maintaining popular attitudes critical of war and military operations. Germany has been recognizedfor these efforts by a
number of internationalorganizations,including the United Nations. At the same time, Germany has sought to maintain a policy
of active membership in NATO and active cooperationand participation in NATO operations.As the United States applies increased
pressure on its NATO allies in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan,
many of the inherentsocial and political tensions in German policy
have surfaced. The German experience of continuing to build a
culture of peace while simultaneously participatingin unpopular
military operations provides a significant case study for all who
would seek to build and expand a culture of peace among nations.
Key words: Germany,culture ofpeace, NATO, militaryoperations

On January 12, 2009 Germany's then Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier wrote an open letter to newly elected
President Barack Obama, in which he offered the following reflections on the continued catalysts for global conflict and the
necessity of seeking more peaceful alternatives.
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The challenges before us are huge: a transparent and
reliable architecture for the world financial system ...
Establishing trust between East and West. Bridging
different cultures and religions alienated from each
other. Bringing peace and new perspectives where
crises now prevail ... Seeking partners, dispelling

hostile stereotypes-nothing is more important in a
world where radical forces still misuse religious and
cultural differences to stir hatred ... I am convinced

that no one can defeat terrorism and hatred with the
strongest military battalions alone. Peace becomes
possible only once we convince people of a better
alternative to animosity and violence. When we succeed
in winning their minds and hearts. When we help to
make economic development and possible prospects
for life ... Only dialogue and cooperation, not suicide

attacks and Qassam rockets will usher in enduring
peace. ... Without the willingness to comply with

internationally respected ground rules, cooperation
becomes impossible ... We stand for a comprehensive

approach to peace. (Steinmeier, 2009)
Steinmeier's (2009) remarks encapsulate in many respects
Germany's postwar values. His letter highlights the importance of international economic development, intercultural understanding and tolerance, the power of diplomacy to resolve
disputes, and the use of military force as a last resort. Perhaps
more than any other nation, Germany has used its warring
past to underscore current imperatives for peace. Germans are
proud of their decades-long pacifism and conscious rejection
of military heroes (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). Germany is an
active European sponsor of events that showcase, educate, and
advocate on behalf of global peacebuilding. Prior to the fall of
the Berlin Wall, Germany hosted a gathering of artists, scientists, writers, and musicians to develop a "counter-project" to
the Cold War stand-off. It was the first nation to establish an
International Society for a Culture of Peace, which mobilizes
and globalizes cooperation to defuse violent conflict. In 2006,
Germany won official recognition by the United Nations for
its 30-year contribution to sustainable peace education and its
staunch refusal to glorify war.
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Gauging Success
Germany's efforts to embrace non-violence as both a political and cultural ethos is borne out in the country's continued positive ranking on the Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI,
launched in 2007, rates both developed and developing nations
according to their relative states of peace. The index is composed of 24 indicators, ranging from a nation's level of military
spending to its relations with neighboring countries and the
level of respect for human rights. The Global Peace Index seeks
to determine what cultural attributes and institutions are associated with states of peace. Countries most at peace are ranked
first; a lower score indicates a more peaceful society. Non-volatile nations have higher per capita income, greater freedom,
elevated levels of sustainability, and equitable social expenditures. According to the 2010 GPI report, peace creates a society
that promotes human potential and its many diverse forms
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010b). In 2007, Germany
ranked 12th out of 121, compared to a ranking of 96th for the
United States. In 2008, the number of included nations grew to
140. This time, Germany ranked 14th out of 140. The U.S. remained drastically lower, at 97th. The 2010 edition of the Global
Peace Index (based on 144 countries) revealed similar findings.
Germany stands at 16th, the United States at 85th (Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2010a).
Germany's claim to becoming a culture of peace requires an
ongoing assessment of its cultural values and an active pursuit
of broad-based social justice initiatives. Peace practitioners
agree that despite traditional notions that equate peace with
the elimination of war, peace is an evolving concept that embraces multiple definitions and approaches. Johan Galtung of
the International Peace Research Institute speaks of a negative
peace or, simply put, the absence of violence (Galtung, 1996).
Peace can also be discussed in terms of deterrence, avoiding
war through a balance of power, or being equally armed for

aggression. A further definition focuses on a positive peace, with
high levels of equity and social justice within and between societies. The most aspirational of all concepts regarding peace
is the model of a culture of peace, a societal framework that prioritizes the following elements: non-violent conflict resolution;
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universal values of human rights; sustainable development;
cultural diversity; and citizen participation. The year 2010
marked the final year of UNESCO's InternationalDecade for a
Culture of Peace and Non-Violence. The U.N. action, designed
to build peaceful futures for the world's children, prioritized
attitudes and behaviors that reject violence, prevent conflicts
by addressing their root causes, and solve problems through
dialogue and negotiation. The U.N. launched its initiative by
underscoring the centrality of global peacebuilding efforts not
only for human rights advocacy, but for international democratization and security (UNESCO, 2000).
Whither the Military?
Despite Germany's long-standing commitment to a culture
of peace, the nation's aversion to war is not without detractors.
Critics of a "post-pathos, post-heroic" Germany argue that the
European power manifests a lack of passion for protecting its
freedoms (Kurbjuweit, 2010). Apoll conducted in 2007 revealed
that over 60 percent of Germans believed that their army,
the Bundeswehr, "bolsters Germany's prestige in the Western
world" and has a positive impact on people's lives outside its
borders. By contrast, over a third of those interviewed posited
that military operations have a decidedly negative effect on
security within Germany. In terms of an overall appreciation of
the armed forces, there are stark differences among Germany,
the U.S., and other European countries. When asked if they felt
a sense of gratitude towards their own military, 87 percent of
Americans said yes, as compared to 64 percent in Britain, 52
percent in France, and a meager 30 percent in Germany. The
basic German attitude, say researchers, can best be described
as a product of their history: "a benevolent reserve characterized by moderate emotional attachment" (Riecker, 2009, p. 1).
This less than enthusiastic response is borne out by statistics
produced by Germany's own Ministry of Defense. In 2004, for
example, 150,000 Germans were called up for compulsory military service. Seventy thousand served in the military. Eighty
thousand served as conscientious objectors, working in nonmilitary institutions (Weimberg & Ryan, 2007). The subject
of the German military is so sensitive that September 2009
marked the first time soldiers were memorialized since World
War II (Black, 2009).
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Culture or Cowardice?
The German peace movement, some contend, represents a
dangerous dismissal of geo-political realities. This perceived
naivet6 is echoed by the director of Germany's Institute for
International Security Affairs in Berlin. "We tolerate the military, but we don't want to know about it" (Peel, 2010b). Others
go one step further. Pacifism implies a categorical refusal
to defend one's nation and therefore betrays democracy.
Proponents of a more security-minded agenda do not deny the
horrors of Germany's militarist past. Nor do they devalue the
nation's success in building a peace-loving society. Support for
a more robust defense apparatus is based on the premise that a
culture of restraint is obsolete in an age of terrorism. While the
German constitution limits the use of armed force to defensive
operations or to emergency NATO assistance, some charge
that the country is hampered by an imbalanced assessment of
its military. The army's restriction to peacekeeping missions
has left the homefront vulnerable. It likewise has demoted
the German soldier to a beneficent warrior "with a rose in his
gun barrel" (Kurbjuweit, 2010). Critics of Germany's anti-war
policy claim that for decades the country has clung to lessons
from the past and left the fighting to others. Such a position,
they say, is no longer tenable. As one commentator posited,
"If you want to stop people who are both trying to kill and
unafraid of dying, chances are you won't be untainted yourself. That might be hard to swallow, but it's still the truth"
(Neukirch & Supp, 2010).
InternationalLeadership
When it comes to war and peace, Germany is between a
rock and a hard place. German unification struck fear in the
hearts of its European neighbors, who worried the nation
could protect-and expand-its economic interests at gunpoint. A similar anxiety surfaced in 1994 when Germany was
accused of "nationalistic impulses" for considering armed protection of its trade routes (Peel, 2010b). In the years following
the Wende (turning point) from Cold War politics, Germany
quickly allayed regional angst that it posed a threat to world
peace. It entered the political stage as a team player in shaping
foreign policy and attempted a delicate balance between
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leadership and restraint. Yet, as many analysts observe, the
continuation and exacerbation of global conflict confronts the
German nation with a host of new challenges. Germany's increased involvement in multilateral decision-making raises
expectations that it will contribute not only politically and financially, but militarily if necessary. The days of "checkbook
diplomacy" are over.
Observers of German politics, both domestic and foreign,
frequently juxtapose Germany's reconciliation with itself and
its history with the nation's confusion and anxiety about its
role outside its own borders. Timothy Garton Ash, in his 2007
review of the Stasi-related film Das Leben der Anderen (The
Lives of Others), argues that it is precisely, and paradoxically,
the shadow of a violent past that has transformed Germany
into a paragon of peace. Ash (2007) writes:
The Germany in which this film was produced, in
the early years of the twenty-first century, is one of
the most free and civilized countries on earth. In this
Germany, human rights and civil liberties are today
more jealously and effectively protected than ... in
traditional homelands of liberty such as Britain and the
United States. In this good land, the professionalism of
its historians, the investigative skill of its journalists,
the seriousness of its parliamentarians, the generosity
of its funders, the idealism of its priests and moralists,
the creative genius of its writers, and yes, the brilliance
of its filmmakers have all combined to cement in the
world's imagination the most indelible association of
Germany with evil. Yet without these efforts, Germany
would never have become such a good land. In all the
annals of human culture, has there ever been a more
paradoxical achievement? (p. 3)
Ash's (2007) assessment of German high-mindedness and
virtue, born of its Auseinandersetzung (coming-to-terms) with
a warmongering past, contrasts with that of journalists who
accuse the nation of failed leadership on the international
stage. According to these less laudatory spectators, Germany's
foreign policy continues in a state of transition, from a midsized power bolstered by the United States to a cautiously reunified country sensitive to European fears, to a team player
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too timid to flex its political muscle. Critics assert that Germany
has repeatedly sacrificed influence for non-aggression. The
language of peace, international understanding, and multilateral approaches is, quite simply, shorthand for cowardice-or
at the very least, a fear of commitment.
Striking a Balance
Germany's Catch 22-damned if they fight, damned if they
don't-is nowhere more apparent than in the country's expected involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Political debates
during the lead-up to the Iraq War expressed considerable
ambivalence. The central question was whether the nation
could reconcile its identity as a military power, its obligation to uphold global alliances, and its ongoing commitment
to peace. In the end, Germany opposed the war in Iraq and
refused to join the Coalition Forces. This general suspicion
and critique of military intervention was coupled with persistent advocacy of those values enshrined in a culture of peace.
Germany demanded the closure of the U.S. detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A German legal team encouraged U.S.
soldier Andr6 Shepherd, who went AWOL in 2007, to apply for
asylum to escape further combat. Shepherd's lawyers cited an
EU mandate that protects deserters who refuse participation
in crimes against peace or humanity (Meyer & Kaiser, 2008).
In 2005, a German federal court challenged U.S. actions in
Iraq, expressing concern that such military incursions failed
to conform to the U.N. charter. As recently as March 2009,
Germany admitted 2,500 refugees from Iraq, granting the displaced persons special resident status.
As Operation Iraqi Freedom nears completion and NATO
increases its presence in Afghanistan, Germany's delicate balancing act between public opinion and political obligations has
intensified. Germany, along with most of Europe, celebrated
the election of Barack Obama, hoping the new President would
transform transatlantic relations. But Washington expects a lot
from Europe in return, most notably in regions key to U.S. interests, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East,
Russia and China. Germany's Bundeswehr is actively engaged
in anti-terrorism campaigns and supplies warships to safeguard shipping off the Horn of Africa. Germany has assured
Israel that in the event of an Iraqi attack it would provide a
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missile defense system as it did in 1991 during Desert Storm.
German forces, as part of NATO, are stationed on the TurkishIraqi border as well as in Kuwait.
Germany likewise has assumed a commanding role in ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. Thus
far Germany has continued to couch its role in terms of humanitarian missions. Germany's Parliament-approved presence in
Afghanistan has three primary goals: to guarantee security;
to facilitate reconstruction efforts; and to assist Afghan security forces in their response to rebel attacks. Former Defense
Minister Franz Josef Jung characterized Germany's contribution as a comprehensive strategy of "networked security" that
prioritizes infrastructure development, including agriculture,
health and education. He described Germany's role as farreaching, yet inextricably tied to the host nation's own military and civilian commitment-to enhanced democracy, the
prevention of terrorism, the promotion of human rights and
the rule of law, and an end to extremism and intolerance. For
Jung, Germany's commitment as the third largest NATO force
in the country is crucial to Afghanistan's overall stability. He
therefore expected the German public to honor the bravery of
Germany's troops. "Our soldiers are facing these dangers with
courage and resoluteness," Jung announced, "for which they
deserve our utmost respect and gratitude" (Jung, 2009).
Calls to Action
Nine years into the Afghanistan conflict, the German government finds itself increasingly caught between two contending forces: pressure from Washington to supply more troops and
growing public antipathy at home (Black, 2009). U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates expressed deep concern over what
he describes as the "demilitarization of Europe" (Editorial,
2010). The growing lack of robust defense capabilities, Gates
argued, creates real or perceived weakness that can precipitate aggression. Furthermore, it diminishes Europe's ability to
respond when necessary. The Defense Secretary concluded his
critique with the following admonishment: Europe's failure to
step up militarily and face the threat of terrorism head-on is
nothing short of "an impediment to real security and peace"
(Schwennicke, 2010). Germany's status as the third largest
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contributor to ISAF did not spare the nation from further
censure by its U.S. partner. Germany's police training program
for Afghan security forces was dismissed as too academic, too
long, and ill-suited to the Afghan context (Dempsey, 2010).
Former ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal, as well as his
successor David Petraeus, have told Germany to expect and
assume more risks. The generals don't just want more soldiers;
they want them out on foot patrol. Counter-insurgency, the generals insist, requires direct contact with local Afghans. Large
convoys of German soldiers do more to scare village residents
than build their trust. And the Bundeswehr's limited mandate
creates too much distance from the populations NATO is there
to serve (Gebauer, 2010). "Situational awareness can only be
gained," Petraeus reported, "by interacting face-to-face, not
separated by ballistic glass" (ISAF, 2010). While U.S. military
officers praise Germany's commitment to the alliance, they
are frustrated by the country's continued political debates at
home.
Awakening the Warrior
Germany long avoided the term war to describe its range
of operations in Afghanistan. Germany's refusal to go on the
offensive, combined with a clear NATO directive to assist with
civil reconstruction, allowed the populace to speak of German
operations solely in humanitarian terms. In the early days of
the campaign, the majority of Germans supported a national
military presence in Afghanistan-with the notable caveat that
troop levels were not increased and that Bundeswehr soldiers
did not participate in aggressive combat. The governmentsanctioned escalation of deployments (expected to reach 5,350)
as well as the rising number of civilian and military casualties,
has changed all that. As one journalist reported in June 2010,
Germans "get shot at. They shoot. And they get killed." War is
the only word that fits (Editorial, 2010).
Germany's linguistic struggle over Afghanistan-from
"humanitarian operation," to "robust stabilization mission,"
to "armed conflict," to "war"-is more than mere semantics.
The country's postwar commitment to pacifism, the pillar of
its politics and culture, has ignited a political debate unique in
its intensity. Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has argued
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consistently that the war in Afghanistan is necessary to prevent
the spread of international terrorism and to keep the struggling nation from descending into chaos (Schwennicke, 2010).
While Merkel acknowledges that a Western-style democracy is
unattainable in the tribal nation, she insists that Germany must
support its NATO partners in creating a more viable government and preventing a Taliban or Al-Qaeda stronghold in the
region. German opposition to the Chancellor is wide-ranging.
Merkel has been chastised for attempting to talk Germans
back into war, for abandoning a culture of restraint in favor
of one in which military aggression is "normal, manageable
and appropriate" (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). Merkel is likewise
accused of failing to explain to the German public the reasons
for a more martial approach and for not attending the ceremonies of fallen soldiers (Dempsey, 2010). Others disapprove of
a missing timeline for shifting security tasks to Afghan forces,
thereby allowing Bundeswehr troops to come home (Czuczka,
2009).
A leaked CIA memorandum from March 2010 exposed a
belief among intelligence officials that Germans are largely
apathetic towards the war. According to the memo, public indifference allows the German government to continue support
for the mission. The report concedes that an upsurge in military or civilian casualties could rapidly turn apathy to hostility. The CIA suggested a counter-measure that plays to German
fears of "terrorism, opium, and refugees" (Mellen, 2010). Such
attitudes severely underestimate Germany's postwar commitment to diplomacy over deployment. When one looks at
the German homefront, it is clear that public opinion is decidedly against armed intervention. In terms of Afghanistan,
Germany's citizens are quick to point out this unpleasant yet
unavoidable truth: the more soldiers ISAF sends in to fight,
the more Taliban insurgents rise up to attack them. To date,
140,000 NATO soldiers from 43 countries have not been able to
defeat 25,000 Taliban fighters (Neukirch & Supp, 2010).
Defending Peace
Popular opposition to the war is borne out in a series
of recent opinion polls. Interviews conducted in April
2010 revealed that 62% of Germans are against the NATO
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offensive. This number is up from 55% percent in 2009 and
34% in 2005 ("Immer," 2010). Despite Germany's troop presence in Afghanistan, and Angela Merkel's promises to remain,
Germans are doubtful of ISAF's success. The results of a
survey sponsored by the German Marshall Fund show that
75% of the country is pessimistic about the military campaign,
compared with 62% in the European Union as a whole (Peel,
2010b). German opposition to the war in Afghanistan likewise
is fueled by the financial cost. Official government figures price
the war at $1.2 billion per year, although many set the figure at
three times that amount (Schwennicke, 2010). An opinion poll
conducted in spring 2010 disclosed that 76% of Germans are
in favor of cutting defense spending. Germany's new Defense
Minister, Karl zu Guttenberg, agrees and proposed terminating compulsory military service in favor of a smaller, professionalized force (Peel, 2010a). Guttenberg admitted that it is
increasingly difficult to sell the Afghanistan mission to an electorate that has lost faith in its success (Dejevsky, 2010).
Concerns about the monetary burden of the ISAF mission
are far outweighed by mounting fears that Germany is losing
its moral compass. Although many citizens support the idea
of a voluntary military, along with fewer men and women in
uniform, the majority of Germans resist the notion that greater
sacrifices in blood and treasure are required at present. One
columnist aptly noted. that war, whether in Afghanistan or
elsewhere, "transforms not only soldiers, but the society they
return to" (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). German concerns regarding the impact of current conflicts are wide-ranging. The
German media released a series of reports exposing major deficits in the Bundeswehr's operations: lack of cooperation with
civilian agencies on reconstruction efforts; lack of equipment
(vehicles, weapons, aircraft) and training; lack of interpreters to interact with locals; and a lack of sufficiently encrypted
computer networks to send mission-critical classified messages (Szandar, 2009).
As of July 2010, the number of Bundeswehr casualties stood
at 47. Despite this relatively small number of German deaths
compared to deaths of U.S. and British soldiers, the German
tolerance for war dead remains low. Former Bundeswehr
Chief of Staff Harald Kujat is convinced that substantive
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discussions regarding Germany's presence in Afghanistan will
be triggered when the "pain threshold is crossed" (Schwennicke,
2010). In Kujat's view, that threshold is quickly approaching, a
view also held by former Defense Minister Peter Struck. Struck
realized as early summer 2003 that Afghanistan was not a
simple "hit and run" operation. In Der Spiegel magazine, he
recounted his trip to Cologne's airport, where he met with the
families of troops killed and maimed in a suicide bomb attack.
"It must have been clear even to the last holdouts that this was
not just an aid mission in uniform." Struck then added that
the faces of the grief-stricken relatives continue to haunt him
(Schwennicke, 2010).

Crisis of Conscience
In contrast to a slate of American films depicting soldiers'
experiences in Afghanistan, February 2009 marked the first
attempt by German television to depict the story of Bundeswehr
troops serving with ISAF. The movie, Willkommen zu Hause
(Welcome Home), is a modern-day version of the 1947 postWWII classic Drauflen vor der Tilr (The Man Outside), which
begins with a young soldier's attempted suicide. Willkommen
zu Hause offers a similarly sober view of war and its effects. The
film's protagonist survives a suicide bombing that claimed the
life of his best friend. His return home is a desperate attempt
to reclaim his old life and reconnect to his girlfriend, family,
and friends. As the plot progresses, the soldier's war trauma
gains the upper hand. He cannot sleep, panics at the sound
of breaking glass, and vomits when he smells roasted meat.
The final scenes show the soldier entering a veterans' hospital, in hopes of finally getting relief. Statistics report that in
2008, 245 German soldiers suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, a significant increase from the 121 cases reported in
2005. Willkommen zu Hause created such public outcry that the
German parliament engaged in a heated debate over the role
of Germany's Defense Ministry in helping soldiers cope with
their emotional wounds. The Bundestag voted unanimously to
assist soldiers in combat operations overseas. Efforts include
the opening of a research institute on the effects of war trauma,
a telephone hotline for soldiers in crisis, and an online network
where troops can talk to one another about their experiences
(Lichtenberger, 2009).
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U.S. tolerance of combat losses in Afghanistan-1,095 as
of mid-August 2010, according to iCasualites.org (Operation
Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan, 2010)-is anathema to the
majority of Germans. High-risk battle strategies are considered too reckless, too dangerous, and too costly. Yet what most
distinguishes the American homefront from its European
counterpart is not their differing thresholds regarding soldiers killed or wounded; it is how many civilians are counted
as collateral damage. Markus Kaim, in his assessment of the
growing German opposition, made the following observation:
Germany's discomfort has much less to do with the death of
their own troops. What worries Germans most is that German
soldiers are killing Afghans (Black, 2009). The turning point in
German public opinion came on September 4,2009. A fuel tanker
convoy traveling in the German-patrolled area of Kunduz province was captured by the Taliban. The insurgent forces then
ordered local villagers to the site to collect the hijacked fuel.
Learning of the attack, German colonel Georg Klein ordered
two American fighter jets to strike. More than 140 Afghans
died, many of whom were civilians. Before Kunduz, the war
in Afghanistan was a hard sell. It was far away. The threat to
Europe was obscure. And it violated Germans' commitment to
pacifism. After Kunduz, new questions arose about NATO's apparent disregard for innocent Afghans. The Bundestag offered
assurances that the army's chief priority in Afghanistan is to
protect the civilian population. It also approved the payment
of reparations to the families of the Kunduz victims. For many
Germans, however, the response of military officials revealed
more concern about their reputations and careers than about
the charred bodies of unfortunate bystanders (Gebauer, Goetz,
& Medick, 2009). The tide of popular opinion took another
major turn in April 2, 2010, when German troops mistakenly
shot dead six Afghan soldiers following an ambush in which
three Bundeswehr troops also died (Mellen, 2010).
ReconsideringReconciliation
Germany's involvement in ISAF continues to be a political
and cultural minefield. In May 2010, Germany's five leading
research institutes added their voice to the nation's growing
rejection of the NATO mission and challenged the ability of
current operations to bring stability to the war-torn country.
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In their report, the respected think tanks argue that the cessation of conflict is contingent on a power-sharing deal with
the Taliban-something U.S. forces have thus far dismissed.
They insist that reconciliation must replace NATO's reliance
on counter-insurgency measures. German peace and security
experts overwhelmingly favor Hamid Karzai's strategy of
talking to the Taliban, not bombing them (Hessler, 2010).
Germany's growing abhorrence towards the violence in
Afghanistan marks a significant return to its most cherished
postwar values. The rejection of military engagement-whether
by its own troops or those of its allies-signals an unwillingness to compromise long-term peace for short-term geo-political gains. Despite persistent counter-arguments that the
nation must show "patience and fortitude" to see the mission
through, German citizens remain unconvinced (Kaim, 2007).
The country may owe much to its NATO partners, but solidarity has its limits. It is amid this groundswell of support for
peacebuilding over war fighting that, in August 2010, the army
announced a major offensive in Afghanistan's north. Weary of
NATO criticism that German soldiers are too passive in the
face of the insurgency, senior Bundeswehr officers opted to
risk increased casualties-and political backlash at home-to
improve their standing among their partners. The new German
commander in Kunduz province confirmed that attacks to
eliminate the Taliban would begin in October and underscored
his resolve to "get this done" (Phillips, 2010). It is ironic that
this military sweep would be achieved using Germany's existing reconstruction teams, that is, soldiers serving in a protective capacity as first responders and development specialists.

The Way Forward
Germany's embattled commitment to its postwar ethos
offers a compelling case study regarding the possibilities for
peace in a time of war. As the debate continues, scholars of
German political and cultural history pose key questions regarding Germany's future on the world stage. Will the nation
continue to promote peacebuilding and diplomacy? Will it
stand as a model for other nations, convincing them we can
no longer afford, in Vandana Shiva's words, the "luxury of
violence"? (Shiva, 2002). It is worth noting that the recent 40'
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anniversary of the Northeast Modem Language Association
featured a panel on "Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Reading
Resolution in German Literature and Culture." The call for
papers reads:
With conflicts raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and
the Palestinian Territories, Sudan and elsewhere, war is
a central global concern. But is there room in the age of
terror for forgiveness and reconciliation? ... It has often

been said that the history of Germany in the 2 01 century
is the history of war and violence, but can cultural
expressions ... provide valuable insights into processes

of resolution and reconciliation? (Scott, 2009)
In attempting to respond to this question, I encourage all of
us-sociologists, historians, literary critics and others-to consider once again the essential distinction between simply managing conflict and truly seeking peace. The German experience
provides a constructive road map in this regard. Current political and cultural debates reveal a robust, public, and nuanced
examination of what it means to be "secure," both as a single
nation and as a community of nations. In July 2010, Germany's
Foreign Office presented a comprehensive plan devoted to balancing the country's security concerns with sustained checks
on military expenditures and engagements. In reference to
Afghanistan, the strategic blueprint underscored Germany's
long diplomatic history with Afghanistan and highlighted the
presence of 90,000 Afghans for whom Germany has become,
more than any other European nation, "a second home"
(Federal Foreign Office, 2010). The report reminds its international partners that Germany was the first to host U.N. talks
on the future of Afghanistan. Afghan leaders traveled again
to Germany to bolster the role of civil society and to discuss
the de-escalation of armed force. Germany's ongoing commitment to reconstruction, development, good governance and
security is evidenced by heightened financial assistance to the
region, which is scheduled to double between 2009-2013. Key
projects are the construction of educational facilities to renew
Afghanistan's rich cultural heritage, as well as outreach centers
to help demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. While
the debate about ISAF continues, I am reminded of Timothy
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Garton Ash's reference to that "good land" of journalists, scholars and artists indelibly marked by a history of conflict. Seen in
this context, it is fitting that the Goethe Institute,Germany's premiere agency for culture, is sponsoring workshops in Kabul on
music, theater, photography and film. It likewise pledged to
restore historical monuments in Kabul, Bamiyan and Heratmany of which were laid waste by war.
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The first step in achieving peace on earth must be the
elimination of war and threats of war. Citizens of the United
States are in a better position than others to make this happen.
We spend significant portions of our tax dollars, and borrow
money from foreign countries, to wage wars. We sell weapons
and destabilize governments. We prioritize funding for war
over spending on education, medical research, alternative
energy sources, healthcare, housing and food for the needy, a
balanced budget and almost everything else that can have a
positive impact on this planet's quality of life.
The U.S. has a long history of waging war, from the Native
American nations decimated by the U.S. Army to the recent
bombing of tribal areas in Pakistan. During my lifetime, the
U.S. has bombed more than 20 countries. Since the end of World
War II, no other country has killed and injured more people
living outside of its borders. We spend more on war, and have
more soldiers in other countries, than any other nation.
War is glorified in our culture. The U.S. honors its military
and reinforces warrior behaviors with monuments to war-time
presidents, memorials to wars and to those who have served
and died in wars, with medals, promotions, ceremonies, even
vanity license plates and discounts at Kmart@ and Home
Depot@. Children are taught that soldiers are heroes and role
models. These activities and symbols are all part of sustaining
the culture of war. U.S. leaders continually reinforce this by
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referring to those in the military as heroes.
One reason the U.S. wages so many wars is that few citizens
speak out publicly against them. Most Americans remain silent
while our military kills and wounds children, mothers, and
other civilians. In a representative government such as ours,
with members of the U.S. House of Representatives seeking
election every two years, the government will be responsive
to widespread antiwar sentiment, just as it eventually was to
the civil rights movement. We have the power to take action.
It's only a matter of changing our culture slightly so that more
citizens feel comfortable speaking out.
If our goal is world peace, then we must oppose military solutions including invasion, occupation, production of weapons
of mass destruction, use of weapons, and/or threats of war.
Imagine the impact if one percent of the population marched
in the next antiwar rally. What if one percent of voters contacted their representatives in Congress asking for an end to
the Afghan war? Most people now recognize those who fought
for civil rights as heroes. What if we could change our culture
so that those who demand peace are also appreciated and not
considered to be unpatriotic, anti-military, or un-American?
There are few indicators that American society values those
who oppose war. As President John F. Kennedy wrote, "War
will exist until that distant day when the conscientious objector enjoys the same reputation and prestige that the warrior
does today" (Kennedy, n.d.). We can use simple behavioral
principles to modify our culture and increase the number of
people who speak out. We can encourage antiwar behavior,
identify role models to emulate, reduce negative consequences, and provide positive reinforcement.
The mission of the US Peace Memorial Foundation is to
demonstrate that advocating for an end to war, or for peaceful
solutions to international problems, is an honorable and socially acceptable activity. We will accomplish this cultural change
through three mechanisms:

1. Award an annual peace prize for antiwar work to
recognize and honor U.S. peace leaders as a reminder
that our culture values their work. Recent recipients
have been Congressman Dennis Kucinich and Cindy
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Sheehan.
2. Build the US Peace Memorial dedicated to those who

have opposed war or proposed peaceful alternatives
to national aggression (Knox & Wagganer, 2009a). A
national monument in Washington, DC will recognize
peace leadership by displaying antiwar statements of
U.S. presidents and hundreds of other famous citizens
from all walks of life (e.g., Margaret Mead, Helen
Keller, Ben Franklin, Albert Einstein). The monument
will also include electronic documentation of activities
of thousands of other citizens who have taken public
stands against one or more U.S. wars. The memorial
will provide teaching moments for visitors that can
help to change our culture by making Americans more
aware of, and more comfortable with, our rich history
of antiwar activity.
3. Publish the US Peace Registry to recognize and

honor role models for peace and to document a broad
spectrum of modem nonviolent antiwar behavior (Knox
& Wagganer, 2009b). This ongoing scholarly work
helps current and future generations understand how
individuals and organizations have opposed war and
promoted peace. It is hypothesized that the knowledge
generated will reinforce antiwar actions, stimulate new
discussions, reduce stigma, increase comfort levels,
and perhaps lead to greater citizen involvement in
interventions for peace.
If you are interested in world peace, your first obligation
should be to demand that your own country stop invading,
occupying, and bombing other countries. There are many
peaceful alternatives to aggression and we must be willing
to advocate for them. Please join us at www.uspeacememorial.org to recognize those who have had the courage to speak
out. Significant contributions to peace on earth are within our
power.
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